Moral relativism
Moral relativism is a philosophical position asserting that moral judgments and ethical systems are not universally applicable but instead vary across different cultures and contexts. It encompasses three main types: descriptive, metaethical, and normative moral relativism. Descriptive relativism acknowledges that diverse cultures possess distinct values and moral beliefs, a viewpoint generally accepted among philosophers, though some argue that core moral principles may be shared despite cultural differences. Metaethical moral relativism posits that no single moral code is absolute; rather, moral judgments are contingent on the traditions and practices of specific groups. Normative moral relativism extends this idea further, asserting that no culture's moral code is superior to another's, which implies that cultural practices should not be judged against a universal standard. Critics of normative moral relativism argue that some moral beliefs can be objectively assessed as true or false, citing examples of conflicting ethical views. Additionally, moral relativism raises complex questions about tolerance and ethical progress, as its proponents may struggle to reconcile changing cultural values with the notion that no moral framework can be deemed better than another. Consequently, moral relativism invites a rich debate about the nature of morality and its role in human societies.
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Moral relativism
Moral relativism is a philosophical belief that focuses on the value of different ethical systems and moral judgments. In philosophy, the term “moral relativism” can refer to any of three types of relativism: descriptive, metaethical, and normative moral relativism. These three types of relativism have different implications, and people can believe in one type without believing in others. The term “moral relativism” has been used in common vernacular to indicate that one thinks all ethical systems are equal or one believes in “to each their own,” but this is an oversimplification of what the term means in philosophy.
Background
Moral relativism is an important issue in metaethics, the branch of philosophy that explores moral reasoning and moral values. Unlike applied ethics, which is about what is moral and immoral, metaethics considers the idea of morality itself. Humans have been involved in metaethical reasoning for thousands of years. Moral relativism is mostly a modern idea that became popular in the twentieth century, but the roots of this idea are also thousands of years old.
Overview
Moral relativism can be confusing because the word “relativism” has an ambiguous meaning. When politicians and religious leaders use the term “moral relativism,” they intend it to have a different meaning than philosophers do when they use the term. Furthermore, three different types of moral relativism exist in philosophy: descriptive, metaethical, and normative.
Descriptive relativism is the belief that different cultures and peoples have different values and morals. This type of moral relativism is accepted by most philosophers because different cultures have different values. However, it can be controversial when it is taken to its most extreme because it implies that there are no morals shared by all cultures. Many philosophers disagree to that extreme view, as different cultures share many of the same values and morals, even if those values and morals are expressed differently. For example, different cultures have various customs and traditions to show respect toward each other, but most cultures value respect. Although descriptive relativism is mostly uncontroversial, some people disagree with aspects of the theory. Some argue that people’s fundamental morals do not vary, but religion influences the moral systems that people follow. Philosophers do not call themselves relativists, or people who believe in relativism, solely because they agree with descriptive relativism. Philosophers have to subscribe to other, more controversial forms of relativism to be relativists.
Metaethical moral relativism (MMR) is the second type of relativism. This idea states that no one moral code or judgment is absolute or universal. MMR states that all moral judgments are relative to traditions and practices of a group or culture. Furthermore, most philosophers who believe in MMR support this idea because they believe that people from different cultures can use different justifications to support their moral judgments, and there is not a good basis for resolving the differences. So, moral judgments are relative and not absolute.
Normative, or prescriptive, moral relativism is the idea that there are no objective or universal moral standards. No culture or moral code is more correct than another culture or moral code. This belief means that each culture’s moral code is correct for all the people in the culture, even if it is not correct for other people. Because they believe no moral code is better or truer than any other, people who believe in normative moral relativism could not support interfering with other cultures because of their moral judgments or ethical systems.
A number of philosophers have made arguments against the idea of normative moral realism. One of those arguments is that normative moral realism does not require moral judgments to be made using facts. Consider this example: Culture 1 bans men from voting because of the belief that men are intellectually inferior to women. Culture 2 allows men and women to vote because they believe that neither men nor women are intellectually inferior. Men either are or are not intellectually inferior to women. This is either true or false. So, the two ethical beliefs cannot be equal because one is based on something true and one is based on something false.
Moral relativism also holds the belief that all moral judgments are relative. Therefore, no moral judgment, including the idea that people take care of those who are older in age or the idea that slavery is bad, can be true for all people. Those moral judgments are only true if a culture decides they are true for that culture. Nevertheless, objectivists and even absolutists can believe that some moral judgments are relative. For example, someone might think that lying is sometimes a morally sound action in some situations but not in all situations. People who believe in God or have a religion are generally not moral realists because they believe that God, or some other higher power, knows certain moral truths. Those would be true regardless of the culture or society. Furthermore, people who believe in moral relativism cannot believe that culture has progressed, only that it has changed. So, moral relativists cannot believe that slavery was bad when it happened, as it was part of the culture in which it happened.
People who support normative moral relativism might subscribe to these ideas because of other beliefs they hold. For example, nihilists believe that there is no correct moral system or culture because they believe that moral truth does not exist. Nihilists believe that ideas such as good and evil or right and wrong do not actually exist. Because these ideas do not exist, no form of ethics is more right or good than another. Nevertheless, some people mistakenly believe that they are or should be moral relativists because of beliefs they hold. Some people believe that moral relativism supports tolerance and cite being tolerant as a reason for being a relativist. However, moral relativists can be intolerant just as moral absolutists can be. If a society values intolerant ideas, moral relativism requires a person who wants to act ethically to adopt those intolerant ideas. Furthermore, some people believe they are relativists because they believe that no one can actually know what moral truths are. These people are not actually relativists, though, because they believe in moral truths, they just do not know what those moral truths are.
Bibliography
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