Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Summary

The rugged mountains of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan became a haven for retreating Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in 2001. The United States (US) asked for military cooperation against the jihadists, but Pakistan pursued its own strategy of negotiating with "good Taliban" leaders. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were governed by national rather than state-level authority, and day-to-day control was in the hands of local councils of elders. After 2001, the Pakistani military made intermittent attempts to drive out Taliban militias but also made deals with a few leaders whose loyalties were as much tribal as ideological. Mullah Nazir, for example, signed an agreement not to attack Pakistani forces and was allowed a free hand in other operations, which included sheltering Al Qaeda fighters and supporting Taliban combatants against the US. Making a deal with Mullah Nazir enabled the Pakistani army to concentrate its forces against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a more committed enemy whose goal was to bring down the secular regime in Islamabad. This "good Taliban" strategy, which benefited Pakistan but also helped US enemies in Afghanistan, persuaded the US to follow a unilateral strategy of its own, killing Taliban leaders with drone strikes, regardless of any truce with the Pakistani army. The situation in the FATA was a casebook example of how allies with different goals may undermine one another's strategies. In 2018, the FATA merged with its neighboring province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Key Events

1980s: Anti-Soviet jihadists use the tribal areas of Pakistan as a staging area for operations in Afghanistan.

• 2001: Taliban forces retreating from Afghanistan seek refuge in the tribal areas, where many have family and clan connections.
• 2004: After an unsuccessful hunt for Nek Muhammad, the Pakistani army signs a truce with him. He is killed later that year by a drone strike.
• 2007: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan forms as a unity organization for Taliban units. For TTP, the Pakistani army is as much the enemy as United States forces.
• 2008: TTP skirmishes break out against Mullah Nazir, a "good Taliban" in South Waziristan who has signed a cease-fire with the Pakistani army.
• 2009: Pakistani army regains control of South Waziristan and drives local TTP into hiding.
• 2010: Pakistani army is less aggressive in North Waziristan. The US launches more than 100 drone attacks, 80 percent targeted in North Waziristan.
• 2013: Mullah Nazir dies in a drone strike, leaving an uncertain balance of power in South Waziristan.
• 2018: FATA merges with its neighboring province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Key Figures

Bahawal Khan, also known as Salahuddin Ayubi, succeeded Mullah Nazir as leader of the Taliban in Wana, South Waziristan. In his thirties and illiterate, Bahawal Khan was a veteran jihadist and commander but may not have had his predecessor's ability as a strategist. He was chosen over Mullah Nazir's second in command, Qari Ziaur Rahman, who had strong links to Al Qaeda and was reportedly "no friend to the ISI" (Pakistan's intelligence service).

Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP from August 2009, issued an order in January 2013 for militants to refrain from attacks on the Pakistani army in North Waziristan. An Uzbek group immediately defied the order with a roadside bomb. TTP's policy toward Pakistan was in flux and Mehsud died in 2013.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur, leader of a large militia in North Waziristan, was formally second in command of the TTP but was close to Mullah Nazir and agreed with his refusal to attack the Pakistani army.

Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani led a jihadist cum criminal organization with headquarters in North Waziristan. The Haqqani network has ties to Pakistan's intelligence service that go back to the 1980s. Jalaluddin died in 2018 and Sirajuddin took over control of the Haqqani network.

In-Depth Description

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas comprised territory in the Himalayas along the Afghan border. Although the region is part of Pakistan, it was effectively controlled by the government in Islamabad. The rugged terrain made central control difficult if not impossible. Instead, the government recognized the authority of tribal leaders, who governed through a system of jirgas or councils of elders.

FATA in the 1980s

During the 1980s, the FATA served as a major base of operations against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) aided Afghans and fighters recruited from throughout the Muslim world--including Arabs organized by Al Qaeda--for the guerrilla war. The ISI created a network of training camps and madrassas (religious schools), largely financed and armed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi Arabia. After the withdrawal of the Russians, Afghanistan fell into a civil war, during which Pakistan sided with the Taliban, which in turn took power in Kabul and provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda.

FATA after 9/11

In 2001, after the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistani army troops entered the FATA for the first time in over half a century. Their mission was to seal off a southern escape route against Al Qaeda fighters. Tribal leaders in the FATA regarded the army's presence as a form of aggression against their long-held autonomy. In the years following, the Pakistani government switched back and forth between aggressive military campaigns to root out the insurgents and de facto truces. By the end of 2006, the estimated number of foreign fighters in the FATA was several thousand and growing. Intelligence officials estimated that 80 to 90 percent of these fighters were hardened terrorist operatives and fugitives. Waziristan, part of the FATA, had become a center for suicide mission training overseen by former Taliban commandos--ethnic Pashtun tribesmen as well as Uzbek, Chechen, and Arab militants. From there, Al Qaeda and Taliban planners launched attacks on US forces in Afghanistan. They also carried out major terrorist attacks in Pakistan. In March 2008, Pakistan issued an arrest warrant for Baitullah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistani Taliban), as the "proclaimed offender" in the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

The failure of the Pakistani army to curtail insurgents led the United States to use drone attacks against suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda positions inside the FATA. Some of these attacks resulted in civilian casualties. Tensions between the two countries rose in September 2008 when US commandos aboard helicopters entered the FATA without authorization. Islamabad demanded that US incursions into Pakistan--and attacks by unmanned aircraft--be halted immediately.

In 2007 and 2008, tribal jirgas emerged as a possible alternative strategy against Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the FATA--a strategy modeled after the Iraqi Awakening Council movement, under which the United States recruited and paid local tribal leaders to counter the influence of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Tribal leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan met in a cross-border "Pak-Afghan" jirga in Kabul in August 2007; a similar meeting was convened in October 2008 in Islamabad. These meetings did not ultimately affect the presence of foreign fighters in the FATA.

Pakistani Truces with Taliban Groups

The TTP was established as a unity organization on December 15, 2007, bringing together jihadist groups based in the FATA and in three provinces of eastern Afghanistan. The TTP issued a statement of common goals, which included defeating the American invaders in Afghanistan and bringing down the secular government in Pakistan. Members agreed in a general way on these goals, but in some quarters, there was more support for the first goal than the second. Moreover, there was serious ill-feeling among some leaders, mostly along national and tribal lines. Taking advantage of these divisions, Pakistan pursued a policy of negotiating cease-fires with "good Taliban," those who might be sworn enemies of the US but could abide by the Pakistani government, especially if it promised not to meddle with tribal autonomy.

In South Waziristan, Mullah Nazir became the dominant Taliban leader in Wana, the territorial capital, by driving out Uzbek fighters and their local sponsors in 2006 and 2007. The Uzbeks were regarded as aggressive and tyrannical, enforcing strict rules against shopkeepers and passers-by. Mullah Nazir--a member of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe, the majority in Wana--received ready support from the town council with assistance from government officials. The Uzbeks fled to the protection of the TTP, whose leader was of the Mehsud tribe. Fighting broke out between the TTP and Mullah Nazir in 2008. The Pakistani army, having signed a truce with Mullah Nazir, launched an offensive against the TTP in October 2009 and regained control of most of South Waziristan. Meanwhile, Mullah Nazir continued his support of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Conflict among Taliban groups shaped events throughout the FATA. In 2009, Mullah Nazir and TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud made a show of reconciliation at the request of supreme Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. However, skirmishes resumed, and in December 2012, a suicide bomber on a motorbike attempted to assassinate Mullah Nazir. A drone strike succeeded in killing him the following month. In North Waziristan, the leader of the TTP, now Hakimullah Mehsud, announced a major change in policy--forbidding Taliban from attacking the Pakistani army in that area. The next day, January 13, 2013, a roadside bomb killed fourteen Pakistani soldiers and wounded twenty-one. An Uzbek group, Mujahideen Ansar, claimed responsibility.

In North Waziristan, the situation was more ambiguous and unstable. The number two leader in the TTP was Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a militia commander with more similarities to Mullah Nazir than to TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, an Utmanzai Wazir, did not attack the Pakistani army. Like Mullah Nazir, he had been at odds with the Uzbeks. The Pakistani army negotiated a truce with Hafiz Gul Bahadur in 2006, but he withdrew from the deal, saying US drone strikes (with presumed Pakistani acquiescence) made it untenable. The Pakistani army, having secured most of South Waziristan, was conspicuously slow to clean up North Waziristan. US officials said this reluctance stemmed from a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network.

The Haqqani network is a militant and criminal organization headquartered near the town of Miram Shah in North Waziristan. The Haqqanis raise money from smuggling and kidnapping and have a stake in businesses ranging from car sales to factories that manufacture ammonium nitrate. Haqqani fighters have been tied to sophisticated operations designed to inflict high casualties, as in attacks on embassies and military facilities. Pakistan's ISI supported Haqqani fighters with CIA funds in the 1980s and maintained contacts through the 1990s. Veteran jihadist Jalaluddin Haqqani led the organization until his death in 2018 when he passed operational responsibilities to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani.

In 2018, FATA ceased being an autonomous region of Pakistan when the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Pakistani constitution merging the area with its neighboring province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In its own provincial assembly, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa voted to accept the merger in a majority vote.

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