R. M. Hare
R. M. Hare was a significant figure in contemporary moral philosophy, known for his development of "universal prescriptivism." This ethical theory posits that moral judgments function as universalizable prescriptions, emphasizing that when one states "x is right," it implies that "x is to be commended" and aligns with what one ought to do. Hare's approach combines elements from various philosophical traditions, including utilitarianism, existentialist ethics, Kantian ethics, and emotivism, demonstrating a diverse and eclectic perspective on moral reasoning. Unlike noncognitivists, Hare believed that moral statements not only guide actions through a universal framework but also make claims that can be rationally tested. He also engaged with the implications of his theory for moral education and decision-making, highlighting the practical aspects of ethical considerations. Hare's intellectual contributions continue to influence discussions around the nature and function of moral judgments, making his work relevant for those interested in the intersections of ethics, logic, and human behavior.
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R. M. Hare
- Born: March 21, 1919
- Birthplace: Backwell, near Bristol, Somerset, England
- Died: January 29, 2002
- Place of death: Ewelme, Oxfordshire, England
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Hare’s moral theory, called “universal prescriptivism,” is based on the idea that moral judgments are universalizable prescriptions. Like the noncognitivist, he stresses the commending or evaluating function of value statements. Therefore, at least part of what it means to say “x is right” is “x is to be commended,” or “one ought to do x.” Hare also thinks, however, unlike the noncognitivist, that moral statements are meant both to guide choices through a veiled appeal to universal principles and to assert on rationally testable grounds that something is the case. He agrees with G. E. Moore that naturalistic theories are fallacious but differs in his account of the reason for this. Hare’s work is one of the most eclectic efforts in contemporary moral philosophy, for his view has certain definite affinities with utilitarianism (in the idea that the basic human good is to maximize rational preferences that embody prescriptions), with existentialist ethics (in his suggestion that one makes a “decision of principle” when one chooses a particular action), with Kantian ethics (in connection with his universalizability thesis), and with emotivism (in his focus on the logic of the language of morals). On the practical side of moral philosophy, Hare shows an unusual philosophical interest in problems related to moral education and moral decision making.