Received view

Received view is a philosophical position on science that emphasizes analyzing scientific theories through the axioms used to communicate the mathematical and logical rules related to a scientific principle. These axioms, or statements that are well-established and accepted, provide an understandable way to verbally present the numbers and symbols of a scientific equation. For example, the third law of motion, as proposed by English mathematician and physicist Isaac Newton (1643–1727), can be represented by a formula that mathematically depicts the way force acts on objects or the axiom that for each action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.

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This method, developed by logical empiricists in the early twentieth century, is sometimes known as the syntactic view. It was the main method of analyzing scientific principles for a number of decades. However, in the later part of the twentieth century, it fell under criticism, in large part because some scientists began to question the validity of a method that relied on words. Language is subject to interpretation in a way that scientific formulas are not. In addition, nuances of meaning between languages complicate the international communication and interpretation of scientific principles. As a result, the received view was largely replaced around 1970 by the semantic or pragmatic approaches. However, some scientists continue to see value in the received or syntactic view.

Background

The origins of the received view can be traced to the philosophers of Ancient Greece, particularly Euclid, the mid-fourth-century mathematician and father of geometry. Euclid developed a set of five basic concepts related to geometry that he saw as absolute truths. Later, Aristotle (384–322 Before the Common Era [BCE]) applied this idea of using sentences to summarize scientific concepts. Others followed suit throughout the ages.

In the early part of the twentieth century, a philosophical movement known as logical empiricism developed in Europe and the United States. Those who were part of the movement did not agree on all aspects of philosophic study but were united in their attention to how logic, mathematics, and science intersect with philosophy. Specifically, they were interested in how science could improve society. German philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), Carl Gustav “Peter” Hempel (1905–1997), and other members of the logical empiricism movement contributed to the development of the received or syntactic view of science.

Overview

The received view emphasizes describing scientific theories through logical statements that use connective terms such as “and” and “not” as well as qualifiers such as “all.” These logical statements made observations or described theories related to scientific concepts. In this use, “theory” refers to a scientific premise about something in the natural world that has been tested and proven multiple times and can be reliably used to predict future outcomes. The scientific theories related to how people inherit traits such as eye and hair color are examples.

As this viewpoint was developed, it was defined by some specific characteristics related to how science was practiced, how scientific research was pursued, and what people did with that science once theories were developed. Some of the key points associated with the received view include the following:

Science is cumulative, and new research and findings build on those that came before.

All aspects of the natural world are inherently real, even if they cannot be observed directly. For example, magnetic fields exist even though scientists can only observe their effects and not their actual existence. This is known as realism.

Contrary scientific theories can exist but are subject to review by means of the demarcation criterion. Austrian philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994) proposed this criterion that indicated that a scientific theory was only valid if it had the potential to be disproved by opposing theories. This is known as rationalism.

Scientific theories cannot be proven in the context of discovery. Instead, they need to be proven in the context of justification, which applies rational criteria and excludes any of the social or psychological aspects that are present in discovery.

Scientific hypotheses and theories are also based on objective, unbiased experiments and reports. These observations and reports then provide the basis or foundation for further testing to confirm the hypotheses or theories.

The terminology used for scientific study is uniform and fixed and applies universally, even when used in different theories.

While not all members of the logical empiricism movement held all these beliefs, they all combined to create what became known as the received or syntactic view of science. However, this viewpoint had several inherent flaws because it relied on language and axioms. Words are subject to inferences and intricacies of meaning in a way that scientific formulas are not. This is further complicated when words are translated into different languages, where words with similar nuances may not exist, or the translator may misinterpret or add personal interpretations to the words. As a result, the received view was seen as a less precise way to analyze science and the scientific process.

At a 1969 conference in Chicago attended by more than one thousand people, Hempel refuted the viewpoint that he had helped develop. This refutation was predominantly based on the confusion created by the imprecision of language and the inappropriateness of some of the criteria incorporated in the view for properly analyzing scientific theories. It was replaced by the semantic view, which emphasizes the use of models for explaining and analyzing scientific theories, and the pragmatic view, which emphasizes the aspects of scientific theories that are similar across multiple disciplines. However, in the intervening decades, some scientists have continued to defend aspects of the received view and continue to incorporate it into the analysis of scientific theories.

Bibliography

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Suppe, Frederick. “Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998.” Philosophy of Science, vol. 67, 2000, pp. S102–15, doi:10.1086/392812. Accessed 2 Dec. 2024.

“What Is a Theory? The Received View of Theories.” Simon Fraser University, www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/phil100/lectures/Phil100‗08‗Lecture16.pdf. Accessed 2 Dec. 2024.