On War by Carl von Clausewitz
"On War" by Carl von Clausewitz is a foundational text in military theory that examines the nature and philosophy of warfare. Clausewitz defines war as an act of violence aimed at compelling an opponent to act in accordance with one’s will, emphasizing that war is an extension of political objectives rather than a purely military endeavor. He argues that the decision to engage in warfare is intrinsically linked to political strategy, with the ultimate goals often transcending mere victory on the battlefield. Furthermore, Clausewitz highlights that war is influenced by a multitude of unpredictable factors, making it a complex and perilous endeavor for those involved. He delves into the distinctions between tactics, which focus on the immediate conduct of battles, and strategy, which concerns the overarching plans for achieving victory. By characterizing war as both an elaborate duel and a gamble, Clausewitz invites readers to ponder the intricate dynamics that govern human conflict. This analytical approach aims to enhance understanding and judgment regarding the multifaceted nature of warfare, making it a significant study for both military professionals and political theorists alike.
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On War by Carl von Clausewitz
First published:Vom Kriege, 1832
Type of Philosophy: Ethics, political philosophy
Type of Ethics: Military ethics
Significance: War is an extreme but natural extension of politics by violent means; therefore, from the standpoint of ethics, war is connected with the ethics of politics and has nothing to do with the military; grave moral powers do, however, exist within the military
The Work
Carl von Clausewitz’s purpose in analyzing war is purely theoretical and not prescriptive. To the question “What is war?” he answers: “War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (“Der Krieg ist . . . ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen”). War is not an isolated act; it is an extension of Politik—a blatant instrument of such policy. The decision to go to war and the proposed goal beyond victory are political, not military. Theory must, however, be analyzed in the context of real events. A paper war is not a real war; a real war is subject to influence by chance and circumstance. Real war is dangerous for its participants and is a test of their exertion.
War is not only “an elaborate duel” (“ein erweiterter Zweikampf”), a vast drama—a comedy for the victor, a tragedy for the loser. From another point of view, war is a game (“ein Spiel”) and a “gamble” (“ein Glücksspiel”), both objectively and subjectively. A theory of war must be an analytical investigation that later might prove beneficial to reason and judgment. It must consider the ends and means of warfare, which consist of strategy and tactics. Tactics are the uses to which the army is put to achieve victory. Strategy has to do with the plan for achieving victory. The real activity of war lies in the tactical aspect of battle, since tactics govern fighting. The immediate object of battle is to destroy or overcome the enemy, but the ultimate object is to subject the enemy to one’s will in a political sense. Toward this end a combatant may desire to enforce whatever peace it pleases; it may occupy the enemy’s frontier districts and use them to make satisfactory bargains at the peace settlements.