Biocentrism
Biocentrism is a life-centered ethical perspective that emphasizes the intrinsic value of all living beings, rejecting the notion that only human interests matter. This philosophy emerged significantly in the 1970s as part of the broader development of environmental ethics, drawing influence from thinkers like Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi. Biocentrists argue that each living creature has its own goods and that their flourishing should be considered in decision-making processes.
While early proponents like Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess extended this view to include ecosystems, the focus has since shifted to individual organisms, distinguishing biocentrism from ecocentrism. Prominent biocentrist Paul Taylor advocated for a respect-based ethic that treats all life as equally valuable, irrespective of differences among species. In contrast, philosophers like Robin Attfield and Gary E. Varner have proposed frameworks that vary in their commitment to equal respect, prioritizing the interests of sentient beings over nonsentient ones. The biocentric approach advocates for stronger conservation policies and a more radical response to environmental challenges than anthropocentric perspectives, maintaining its relevance in contemporary ethical debates.
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Subject Terms
Biocentrism
DEFINITION: Life-centered stance that rejects the view that only human beings and their interests matter, while recognizing the moral standing of all living creatures
Biocentrism has played a key role in the development of environmental ethics since that discipline was founded during the 1970s and had already been influential among important earlier thinkers, including Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi.
Biocentrists hold that all living creatures have goods of their own and that their flourishing, or attaining their goods, is intrinsically valuable. This value should thus be taken into consideration whenever decisions affecting the flourishing of any creatures are being made. During the 1970s, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess wanted to include living systems (such as habitats and ecosystems) within the scope of biocentrism as intrinsically valuable entities, but this view is now classified as “ecocentrism,” and subsequent biocentrists have restricted moral standing to individual living creatures.
The most widespread kind of biocentrism was presented during the early 1980s by Paul Taylor, who advocated a life-centered ethic of respect for nature. In this ethic, the realization of the good of every living creature is intrinsically valuable and to be pursued for its own sake. In Taylor’s version of biocentrism, not only is human superiority denied, but also all living things are held to be equally worthy of respect, irrespective of differences of capacities, and to have the same moral importance. Taylor recommends defensible policies of conservation and social justice, but he has difficulty deriving them from these principles.
Another kind of biocentrism, not committed to equal respect for all living creatures, was proposed in 1981 by Robin Attfield and later by Gary E. Varner, who both defend the intrinsic value of the good of every creature, whether sentient or nonsentient. Unlike Taylor, Attfield upholds Peter Singer’s principle of equal consideration for equal interests, applying it to the entire realm of life; thus the satisfaction of greater interests takes priority over that of lesser ones when they conflict. (The capacities of living creatures for health and for being harmed are held to distinguish them from artifacts, which have no goods of their own.) Attfield integrates this account of intrinsic value into a consequentialist recognition of beneficial practices, general compliance with which makes actions right through generating or preserving greater value than would otherwise prevail.
More recently, James Sterba has defended a Taylor-like commitment to species equality through species-neutral principles authorizing resort to self-defense in certain circumstances (whether greater capacities are at stake or not). These principles are held to be defensible not by enhancing value but as part of a deontological ethical system. Simultaneously, Sterba rejects the extension of biocentrism to ecosystems, holding that biotic communities have no clear goods of their own; individual living creatures constitute the limits of ethical egalitarianism.
Biocentrism in any form supports more radical policies to preserve habitats and curtail global warming than do anthropocentric stances. The biocentric viewpoint remains influential in debates about both normative principles and practical decision making.
Bibliography
Attfield, Robin. Environmental Ethics. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003.
Attfield, Robin, ed. The Ethics of the Environment. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008.
MacClellan, J. "Is Biocentrism Dead? Two Live Problems for Life-Centered Ethics. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-023-09954-5. Accessed 12 July 2024.
Sterba, James. “A Biocentrist Strikes Back.” Environmental Ethics 20, no. 4 (Winter, 1998): 361-376.
Taylor, Paul. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Varner, Gary E. “Biocentric Individualism.” In Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works, edited by David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.