Biology and Culture

A standard academic introduction to the relationship between biology and culture is typically framed around the debate of nature versus nurture; whether human behavior is the product of an innate and predetermined set of genetic and hormonal combinations or whether human behavior is the product of external and societal influences that are learned in a social context. While the nature versus nurture debate is the key issue presented and discussed in this article, a more historical introduction is necessary in order to show that biology and social/cultural theory have not always been mutually exclusive academic disciplines. Indeed, social theory and biology have often had direct influences on each other throughout the history of ideas. Subsequently, the most current sociological and ethnographic research is cited to illustrate the difficulty in dividing nature and biology from culture, social life, and sociology. The various aspects of life these disciplines focus on and represent are always interconnected.

Keywords Behavioral Endocrinology; Behavior Genetics; Bio-power; Epistemology; Natural selection; Social Darwinism; Social facts; Sociobiology

Sociology > Culture > Biology & Culture

Overview

The definition of "culture" as inextricably bound to biological metaphors of growth and cultivation is the first necessary consideration when examining the relationship between biology and culture within the history of Western thought. The definition of culture, prior to as well as after its use by the human sciences, has remained tied to a certain conception of nature as its point of origin. Culture, prior to its application to social life, "was the growth and tending of crops and animals, and by extension the growth and tending of human faculties" (Williams, 1977, 11). And as the prominent classical theorist of culture, Georg Simmel (1997), notes, the latter notion of culture, which implies human development, "refinement," and the acquisition of intellectual sensibilities beyond a more crude and primitive natural state, still references nature as the edifice and foundation from which it is generated:

A natural energy or allusion, which is necessary only in order that it may be surpassed by actual development, forms the presupposition for the concept of culture. From the standpoint of culture, the values of life are civilized nature; they do not have here the isolated significance that is measured from above, as it were, by the ideals of happiness, intelligence and beauty. Rather, they appear as developments of a basis that we call nature and whose power and intellectual content they surpass in so far as they become culture (36-37).

Besides these natural and biological connotations inherent in the concept of culture itself, the historical emergence of theories of evolution and natural selection teach us that culture, along with biology, has had an impact on ideas about social life and the role of competition in society as well. Social theories, such as Social Darwinism, as well as the theories of evolution and natural selection have revealed themselves equally reliant upon biological and social factors. Raymond Williams (1980/2005) develops this idea in an essay on Social Darwinism, writing that "Indeed, my own position is that the theories of evolution and natural selection in biology had a social component before there was any question of reapplying them to social and political theory" .

Social Darwinism, Biology & Culture

This inherent compatibility between the biological theories of evolution, such as Darwin's theory of natural selection, and the prevalent social theories of his era is often traced back to the famous phrase, "survival of the fittest," coined by the social philosopher Herbert Spencer in 1852, as well to the notion of a "struggle for existence" present in the sociopolitical theory of population growth propagated by Malthus (Rogers, 1972, 266). Although Darwin himself resisted the attempt to apply his theory of natural selection to a view of society, it is interesting to note that even his writings at times relied on "metaphorical concepts" which "epitomized the views of Malthus and Spencer on human society, and particularly on English society" (Rogers, 1972, 267). This may at least lead to a partial explanation of why the Social Darwinists appropriated Darwin's theory of natural selection "to rationalize their diverse creeds of individual and collective and competition" (Rogers, 1972, 265-266).

For Williams, the idea of competition justified through the biological reference to natural selection was not enough in itself to generate the theory of Social Darwinism alone. Rather, it is the notion of competition together with the ideas of individual characteristics being influenced, selected and promoted by the environment, and a general conception of history as "progressive development," which allows one to formulate the social theory.

You have competition, inherent competition, as a natural state; and the idea of character being influenced by circumstances can very easily modulate into its being selected by favorable circumstances. Add to that the theory of historical progressive development and you have Social Darwinism in its developed form" (Williams, 1980, 88).

With these ideas of competition, selection, and historical progress and development taken together, one begins to see how the evolutionary and social theories of Darwin and Spencer both mirrored and justified an image of nineteenth-century English society as progressing into the competitive arena of industrial capitalism. Williams (1980) notes this, writing "Almost at once, however, the extensions began to be made: Moving out from the social ideas of Spencer and gaining a lot of support from the general climate of harsh competitive individualism as a social ideology at that stage of industrial capitalism and general industrial development" . The awareness of this theoretical justification of capitalism inherent in Social Darwinism leads Williams (1980) to formulate its most deplorable effect and how it lingers with us in the present — that the Social Darwinist legacy has led to the acknowledgement of the bleak realities of unchecked individual competition and moral indifference present in late capitalism as part of a natural state, unavoidable, and irreplaceable:

It is the social theory of that system which had promised order and progress and yet produced the twentieth century. Instead of facing that fact, in all its immense complexity, the rationalizers and natural rhetoricians have moved in to snap at and discourage us: not to ratify an imperialist and capitalist order, but to universalize its breakdown and to persuade us that it has no alternatives, since all 'nature' is like that (102).

Durkheim's Social Facts & the Creation of the Nature v. Nurture Debate

In the school of French sociology emerging out of the work of Emile Durkheim, one begins to see a break with the Spencerian conception of society as composed of individuals competing in a state of nature. In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim (1895/1982) notes that whereas classical social theorists such as Hobbes and Rouseau perceived:

A break in continuity between the individual and society… it is from the opposing idea that the theoreticians of natural law and the economists have drawn their inspiration. For them social life is essentially spontaneous and society is a natural thing. But if they bestow this characteristic upon it, it is not because they acknowledge it has any specific nature, but because they find a basis for it in the nature of the individual (142-143).

For Durkheim, neither the notion of nature nor the individual provides an adequate starting point or object from which to ground a scientific analysis of society. What he gives us to replace this error, which he perceives in Spencer's social theory, is a theory that society is comprised of social facts. Spencer provides a method which suggests that the study of social facts should be the initial focal point and foundation for any type of sociological analysis. Insofar as Durkheim's theory suggests that social facts are only preceded by other social facts without any prior presuppositions of nature or individuals, one begins to perceive a break in sociological theory between biological theories of nature and evolution on the one hand and social theories that focus on the role of social facts, institutions, and culture in society on the other. In essence, it is only after Durkheim delineated sociology as the study of social facts that sociologists found themselves in the debate of nature versus nurture. Thus through a closer analysis of Durkheim's definition of social facts, one can see how society and culture have become separated from nature for scientific purposes and how the study of society and culture is reduced to a series of causes and laws that are solely societal and, in this sense, of their own nature.

The Removal of Biology from Social Study: The Self-Governing Social Environment

In an attempt to mirror the objectivity and rigor of the hard sciences, and drawing an example from physics and chemistry in particular, Durkheim (1982) suggests that we should treat social facts as things and that this orientation should form the foundation of sociological method: "The proposition which states that social facts must be treated as things — the proposition which is at the very basis of our method — is among those which have stirred up the most opposition. It was deemed paradoxical and scandalous for us to assimilate to the realities of the external world to those of the social world" (p.35). In defining a thing as "any object of knowledge which is not naturally penetrable by the understanding," Durkheim (1982) sets up the notion of social facts as a set of phenomena that should be studied as objects independently and "outside the consciousness of the individual" (1982, 51). And central to this idea that social facts are independent from and external to individuals is the notion that social facts work on individuals from without; they have a sort of power over individuals' thoughts and actions, which often manifests itself in the form of coercion and constraint. Durkheim (1982) explains this power of social facts over individuals in defining social facts as "consisting of manners of acting or thinking, distinguishable through their special characteristic of being capable of exercising a coercive influence on the consciousness of individuals" . Furthermore, Durkheim (1982) describes these collective patterns of thinking and acting comprising social facts as institutions, which form the main object of sociological analysis as a scientific endeavor: "One may term an institution all the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the collectivity; sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning" .

Thus against the Spencerian conception that society is formed solely through the association of individuals and has a reference point in a prior constitutive nature, Durkheim (1982) argues, "society is not the mere sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics" (p.129). And this belief that society exists according to its own particular nature leads Durkheim (1895/1982) to conclude that the causes of social facts can only be found in other social facts and not in any prior natural or individual state: "The determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts and not among the states of the individual consciousness… The primary origin of social processes of any importance must be sought in the constitution of an inner social environment" .

Urdy's Argument for Nature

It is precisely this Durkheimian argument that all forms of social activity and thinking are solely derived from social causes, which J. Richard Udry (1995), a sociologist well-versed in biology, takes issue with in his article, "Sociology and Biology: What Biology Do Sociologists Need to Know?" In this sense, Udry (1995) takes up the 'nature' side of the nature versus nurture debate and argues that even though Durkheim's proposition is essential in defining the orientation and focus of sociology as a scientific discipline, it is scientifically inaccurate for sociologists to define all forms of "social behavior" as having inherently social causes and that we must look to discoveries made within evolutionary biology, behavior genetics, and behavioral endocrinology in order to delineate the sources of social activity that are the result our individual biological nature rather than societal and cultural causes (1267).

Udry (1995) describes these three biological models (evolutionary biology, behavior genetics, and behavioral endocrinology) and the contrasting types of explanations of human social behavior they offer in the following passage:

Sociobiology offers the postulate that not only is the anatomy of animals evolved: Animal social behavior is evolved. Behavioral endocrinology offers the postulate that hormones affect behaviors. Behavior genetics offers the postulate that genes affect behavior. We can think of these three postulates arranged into one: Evolution selects the genes that control the hormones that activate the genes that code for the neurotransmitters that control behavior (1268).

It is Udry's position that sociologists should incorporate these models of human behavior into their own explanations in order to control for what aspects of social behavior are the result of evolution and genetics and subsequently explain certain types of variance in the specific behaviors of groups and individuals as the result of social and cultural influences. Using the fundamental axiom of sociobiology:

[Sociologists] can recognize the uniformities of human behavior as evolved human nature and take as our task the explanation of variance among groups or variance among individuals… Sociobiology can use evolutionary theory to explain the uniformities, and we will take the Durkheimian rule to explain the variance between groups and between individuals (Udry, 1995, 1269).

According to Udry (1995) however, this is not to say that all such variances between individuals and groups can be causally attributed to societal influences, especially if sociologists incorporate an understanding of behavior genetics and "accept that human behavior is genetically founded. We must also accept the possibility that the variance in social behavior both within and between populations may have some genetic explanation" (1270). For Udry, behavior genetics poses a serious problem for sociologists not only because it is concerned with discerning which variances in behavior within populations are the result of genes and those which are the result of the environment, but also because the scientific method adopted by the behavior genetic paradigm is most effective in isolating genetic and environmental influences. Udry (1995) explains this core strength of behavior genetics as follows:

The aspect of this discipline that is most familiar to sociologists is that it decomposes the individual variance in a behavior in a population into two components: the variance attributable to genetic sources and the variance attributable to environmental sources… It is genetic research design that makes possible the separation of the two components. While this knowledge is useful, it is the source of one of the biggest threats to current sociological theories (1271).

Compounding this dilemma is Udry's reference to the studies of identical twins conducted by Thomas Bouchard (1990), in light of which Udry (2005) writes, "For sociologists his most important finding is that he cannot find any behavior or attitude on which there is not a significant genetic effect. He looks at almost all individual attributes that a sociologist might be interested in. The moral of his story is there is no behavior that is safe for the sociologist's traditional paradigm" (1271-1272). And citing Rowe (1994), Udry (1995) suggests that many "core sociological variables" are heavily influenced by genetic factors: "Genetic effects are strong on income, education, personality, divorce, sexual behavior, religiosity, smoking, selection of friends, and delinquent behavior, to mention some scary variables" (1272). Udry (1995) also draws on findings in behavioral endocrinology to argue that even an individual's gender based behavior, in terms of displaying traditionally masculine or feminine traits, is related to hormone levels present when that individual was in the womb:

It may seem incredible to the sociologist that fetal hormone events could affect the degree of femininity of behavior in a woman 30 years later… This is a direct contradiction of the sociological model that attributes sex differences and within sex differences in gendered behavior solely to social forces (1275).

Udry thus concludes his article by arguing that one of the only processes left that sociologists can still explain free from contestation by biological models is social change. He writes, "Even if biological models explain variance in gendered behavior at the individual level, they can never explain why the gender structure in the U.S. changed between 1930 and 1990" (Udry, 1995, 1276).

Getting Past the Nature/Nurture Divide

Canguilhem: The History of Biology & Nature

There are ways of approaching the relationship between biology and social/cultural theory other than looking at traditional sociological variables or social facts and trying to tease out whether they are in fact the result of societal causes or whether they are the result of evolution and genetics. One such way is to analyze the discourse of biology as a historical product — as a product of the history of ideas or a movement towards the realization and understanding of a scientific object, such as 'nature,' through the development of scientific knowledge and reason. Looking at the development of knowledge in such a way is referred to in philosophy as epistemology, and in the work of the philosopher, Georges Canguilhem, one sees the first sustained attempt to provide an epistemology of biology. Specifically, Canguilhem set out to study how biology as a science has historically constructed the object 'nature' and to question whether nature in fact operates in the manner which biology portrays it. The operation that Canguilhem performs in this sense can be viewed as treating biology as an object of historical social scientific inquiry. Canguilhem (1994) makes this distinction between the object of science and the object of the history of science as follows: "The history of science is the history of an object — discourse — that is a history and has a history, whereas science is the science of an object that is not history, that has no history .

Foucault & the "Dubious Sciences"

Michel Foucault, the famous student of Canguilhem, pursues the relationship between social science and nature from another perspective. As Paul Rabinow writes, rather than focusing on the life sciences as Canguilhem did, Foucault's object of historical inquiry is the 'dubious sciences' of Man (Canguilhem, 1994). Just as Canguilhem approaches biology as a discursive object available to historical analysis, Foucault focuses on the social sciences themselves (i.e. philosophy, psychology, sociology, statistics) as an object of social and historical inquiry. Foucault also analyzes how these discourses constitute populations as "subjects" and strategize to control and utilize these subjects through relations of power, governance, and techniques of subjugation. Foucault refers to these techniques of caring for, analyzing, and subjugating subjects with the term "bio-power." Rabinow defines Foucault's conception of bio-power: "As the fostering of life and growth and care of population becomes a central concern of the state, articulated in the art of government, a new regime of power takes hold. Foucault calls this regime 'bio-power'" (Foucault, 1984, 17).

Latour & Removing the Nature/Culture Divide

In the more current research of Bruno Latour, one sees an attempt to eradicate the distinction between nature and culture altogether as he calls into question scientific practice itself. Rabinow describes Latour's work"

More strictly ethnographic studies of laboratory life, like those of Bruno Latour, would come later and aim not merely at correcting the positivist and idealist understanding of science as a single unified activity achieving a cumulative understanding of nature, but also at dismantling the very idea of science — a position as far from Canguilhem's as one could imagine (Canguilhem, 1994, 13).

For Latour (1993), nature and culture exist and intermingle in society in an interwoven and almost indistinguishable manner, which is already evident for him in how anthropologists write about peoples' cultures:

This would be a hopeless dilemma had anthropology not accustomed us to dealing calmly and straightforwardly with the seamless fabric of what I shall call 'nature-culture,' since it is a bit more and a bit less than a culture. Once she has been sent in the field, even the most rationalist ethnographer is perfectly capable of bringing together in a single monograph the myths, ethnosciences, genealogies, political forms, techniques, religions, epics and rites of the people she is studying (7).

Conclusion

From this analysis, one can begin to see that there are many ways to analyze the relationship between biology and culture. As if performing a historical and epistemological analysis of one scientific discipline were not complex enough, looking at the historical intersection of two scientific disciplines, such as sociology and biology, leaves one with a sense of unexpected commonalities, irreconcilable differences, a fusion of possibly arbitrary distinctions, and a lot of questions.

Terms & Concepts

Behavioral Endocrinology: "Behavioral endocrinology offers the postulate that hormones affect behaviors" (Udry, 1995, 1268).

Behavior Genetics: "Behavior genetics offers the postulate that genes affect behavior" (Udry, 1995, 1268).

Bio-power: A term coined by Michel Foucault, bio-power refers to the techniques of a regime involved in caring for, analyzing, and subjugating subjects.

Epistemology: Epistemology is the philosophical analysis of the development of knowledge.

Natural Selection: Elaborated in Darwin's theory of evolution, natural selection refers to the idea that nature selects traits through evolution, which are useful in promoting the survival of a species.

Social Darwinism: Social Darwinism is a nineteenth-century philosophy that describes society as marked by competition for survival between individuals.

Social Facts: Durkheim (1982) defines social facts as "consisting of manners of acting or thinking, distinguishable through their special characteristic of being capable of exercising a coercive influence on the consciousness of individuals" .

Sociobiology: "Sociobiology offers the postulate that not only is the anatomy of animals evolved: Animal social behavior is evolved" (Udry, 1995, 1268).

Bibliography

Bouchard, Jr., T.J. & Lykken, D.T. (1990). Sources of human psychological differences: The Minnesota study of twins reared apart. Science, 250(4978), 223-228. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9011190297&site=ehost-live

Canguilhem, G., Delaporte, F. (Ed.), Goldhammer, A. (Trans.). (1994). A vital rationalist. New York: Zone Books.

Darowski, J. J. (2012). Chuck Versus the Machine: The Intersection of Biology, Technology, and Identity on Chuck. Journal Of Popular Culture, 45, 712-726. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5931.2012.00954.x Retrieved November 5, 2013 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text:http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=78111876&site=ehost-live

Durkheim, E., Lukes, S. (Ed.), Halls, W.D. (Trans.). (1982). The rules of sociological method. New York: The Free Press.

Fischer, R. (2013). Situational challenges: Putting biology, resources and multi-level constraints back into the picture. Asian Journal Of Social Psychology, 16, 30-33. doi:10.1111/ajsp.12017 Retrieved November 5, 2013 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text:http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=85293330&site=ehost-live

Harper, K. (2013). Culture, Nature, and History: The Case of Ancient Sexuality. Comparative Studies In Society & History, 55, 986-1016. doi:10.1017/S0010417513000480 Retrieved November 5, 2013 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text:http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=90310802&site=ehost-live

Latour, B., Porter, C. (Trans.) (1993). We have never been modern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Foucault, M., Rabinow, P. (Ed.) (1984). The Foucault reader. New York: Pantheon Books.

Rogers, J. A. (1972). Darwinism and social Darwinism. Journal of the History of Ideas, 33, 265-280.

Rowe, D. C. (1994). The limits of family influence: Genes, experience, and behavior. New York: The Guilford Press.

Simmel, G., Featherstone, D.F. (1997). Simmel on Culture. London: Sage Publications.

Spencer, H. (1852). A theory of population, deduced from the general law of human fertility. Westminster Review, 57, 468-501.

Turner, J. H., & Maryanski, A. (2012). THE BIOLOGY AND NEUROLOGY OF GROUP PROCESSES. Advances In Group Processes, 291-37. doi:10.1108/S0882-6145(2012)0000029004 Retrieved November 5, 2013 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text:http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=84997121&site=ehost-live

Williams, R. (2005). Culture and materialism. New York: Verso.

Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and literature. New York: Oxford University Press.

Udry, J. R. (1995). Sociology and biology: What biology do sociologists need to know? Social Forces, 73, 1267-1278. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9508060146&site=ehost-live

Suggested Reading

Canguilhem, G. (1989). Normal and the pathological. New York: Zone Books.

Coll, C.G. (2004). The interpretation of culture and biology in human development. Research in Human Development, 1, 145-159. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=13377888&site=ehost-live

Dawkins, R. (1989). The selfish gene. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fulcher, J. (2003). Socialization, identity, and interaction: Socialization and family relations. In Sociology, 139-146. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scheff, T.J. (1983). Toward integration in the social psychology of emotions. Annual Review of Sociology, 9, 333-354. Retrieved November 17, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=10457992&site=ehost-live

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Weisner, T. S. (2012). Exploring the Complex Interactions between Biology and Culture in Human Development. Current Anthropology, 53, 142-144. Retrieved November 5, 2013 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text:http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=71100783&site=ehost-live

Essay by Richard Savage, M.A.

Richard Savage holds a Master's Degree in Sociology from the New School for Social Research.