Broken windows theory
Broken windows theory is a criminological concept that posits a connection between visible signs of disorder in a neighborhood, such as graffiti, litter, and minor crimes, and higher rates of serious criminal activity. Proposed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in 1982, the theory suggests that maintaining order by addressing low-level offenses can prevent more significant crimes from occurring. It gained prominence in the 1990s, particularly in New York City, where policing strategies based on this theory, led by Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton, focused on aggressive enforcement of minor infractions. As a result, New York experienced substantial reductions in both violent and property crime during this period.
However, the application of the broken windows theory has sparked significant debate. Critics argue that it can lead to racial profiling and disproportionately target marginalized communities, contributing to issues like overcrowded prisons. High-profile incidents, such as the deaths of Eric Garner and Freddie Gray, further intensified scrutiny of broken windows policing. While some proponents continue to advocate for the theory as an effective crime reduction strategy, the evolving conversation around policing practices and social justice has prompted many police departments to reevaluate their approaches, especially in light of calls to reform law enforcement and address systemic inequalities.
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Broken windows theory
In law enforcement, the broken windows theory focuses on the relationship between signs of general disorder in a particular place and local crime rates. According to the theory, visible signs of low-level crime, described by the catchall phrase "broken windows," suggest an acute lack of effective policing and thus encourage more widespread and serious forms of criminal activity. Examples of broken windows include things such as abandoned buildings, graffiti, loitering, panhandling, vandalism, littering, and public drunkenness.
The broken windows theory was first proposed in 1982 by the American academics James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. It inspired noteworthy changes in policing tactics in many parts of the United States, most notably New York City. While some statistical evidence suggests the broken windows theory is an effective strategy, the approach has also drawn criticism for encouraging racial stereotyping and criminalizing low-income and unhoused people, among other problems.
Background
During the 1970s, twenty-eight cities in New Jersey took part in a pilot project known as the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program. The program delivered funding to cities that allowed police departments to establish more foot patrols, thereby increasing the visible presence of law enforcement officers on local streets. These foot patrol officers took a no-tolerance stance on low-level crime, while working to establish unwritten rules of proper conduct and gain the trust and goodwill of community members. After five years, the Police Foundation in Washington, DC, released the results of a review that measured the effectiveness of the program. That review found that while actual crime rates had not been significantly reduced, local residents reported that they felt safer because of the increased police presence in their neighborhoods. It also reported that residents living in areas where the foot patrols were conducted had more positive opinions of the police. Similarly, police officers working foot patrol beats reported a stronger sense of connection to the local community and higher levels of career satisfaction, compared to officers assigned to squad car duty.
This pilot project formed the basis of Wilson and Kelling's broken windows theory, which was first explained in an article titled "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," published in the Atlantic magazine in March of 1982. Kelling, who had routinely accompanied police officers during foot patrols in Newark, New Jersey, was also one of the authors of the Police Foundation review of the project. According to Kelling's view, the initial program's statistical effect on crime may have been minimal, but its psychological effect on both local residents and those who commit crimes was immense.
Together with Wilson, Kelling developed a theory based on his experiences. It essentially forwarded the idea that using unofficial but clearly understood rules to establish order in a problem area encouraged locals to stay within the bounds of acceptable conduct. Coming to be known as the broken windows theory, the idea was further developed by additional theorists and came to include two major hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that a prevailing sense of order in a neighborhood reduces low-level criminal activity. Second, this reduction in low-level criminal activity prevents more serious crime from ever taking place.
Impact
The single best-known application of the broken windows theory took place in the 1990s in New York City, under the administration of Mayor Rudy Giuliani and police commissioner William Bratton. Giuliani and Bratton urged the aggressive prosecution of low-level crimes, resulting in a 70 percent increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests for relatively minor offenses over the course of the 1990s. During that time, criminal activity in New York City dropped at rates that far outpaced the nationwide average in the United States. Violent crime in New York fell by more than 56 percent, compared to 28 percent nationwide. Property crime declined by a reported 65 percent in the city, versus 26 percent across the United States.
Further analysis seemed to reveal an immediate, noticeable impact from the time the broken windows policing policy was introduced in New York. Using a 10 percent rise in misdemeanor arrest rates as a benchmark for identifying the point at which the theory was put into practice, the corresponding rate of robberies dropped by a reported 3.2 percent, while vehicle thefts fell by as much as 2.1 percent. Supporters of the broken windows theory have contended that these statistics offer strong evidence that the idea works when used in the real world.
However, critics of the policy have argued that there is no proof that the crackdown on low-level crime was the reason for the dramatic reductions in violent crime and property crime. Several other possible explanations for the results have been forwarded. First, the size of New York's police force grew by more than one-third during the 1990s, while the number of people imprisoned for crimes in the city increased by 24 percent. The second half of the decade also brought an economic boom that resulted in higher employment rates, both nationwide and in New York itself. Between 1992 and 1999, New York's unemployment rate declined by 39 percent, and statistical analysis has suggested that the improved employment outlook alone could account for most of the reductions in the city's robbery and vehicle theft rates.
The broken windows theory has also been criticized for encouraging racial profiling of minority groups, particularly in African American and Latino communities. Opponents claim that it also tends to target lower-income and otherwise disadvantaged individuals, such as the unhoused, while contributing to overcrowded prisons and costly burdens to the justice system. In the summer of 2014, a man named Eric Garner died after an interaction with New York City police in the borough of Staten Island. Garner had been accused of a minor crime involving the illegal sale of loose cigarettes and was involved in a physical altercation with a police officer that was captured on video by a bystander. Garner died after being placed in a chokehold by the officer, and despite the video evidence, no charges of misconduct were brought against the officer involved in the incident. The resulting public outcry brought the broken windows theory under intense scrutiny, prompting major policy reviews and changes to New York's law enforcement standards. A similar incident resulting in the 2015 death of Baltimore resident Freddie Gray was also linked to broken windows policing policies. In the late 2010s and 2020s, a nationwide discourse on defunding the police led to additional scrutiny and major policy shifts in many police departments across the US.
Bibliography
Camp, Jordan T., and Christina Heatherton, editors. Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter. Verso Books, 2016.
Francis, David R. "What Reduced Crime in New York City." National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org/digest/jan03/w9061.html. Accessed 9 Nov. 2016.
Green, Rachael. "Broken Windows Theory." Reviewed by Akeem Marsh. Verywell Mind, 7 July 2023, www.verywellmind.com/broken-windows-theory-7550632. Accessed 21 Nov. 2024.
Kelling, George. "Don't Blame My 'Broken Windows' Theory for Poor Policing." Politico, 11 Aug. 2015, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/broken-windows-theory-poor-policing-ferguson-kelling-121268#.Vc4W‗0tq61w. Accessed 9 Nov. 2016.
Kelling, George L., and Catherine M. Coles. Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Kelling, George L., and James Q. Wilson. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." Atlantic, vol. 249, no. 3, 1982, pp. 29–38.
Kirchner, Lauren. "Breaking Down the Broken Windows Theory." Pacific Standard, 7 Jan. 2014, psmag.com/breaking-down-the-broken-windows-theory-bbe9c06ae2a2#.p7xfafxbl. Accessed 9 Nov. 2016.
Sterbenz, Christina. "How New York City Became Safe Again." Business Insider UK, 2 Dec. 2014, uk.businessinsider.com/criticism-for-giulianis-broken-windows-theory-2014-12?r=US&IR=T. Accessed 9 Nov. 2016.
Welsh, Brandon C., et al. "Reimagining Broken Windows: From Theory to Policy." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, vol. 52, no. 4, 2015, pp. 447–463.