Cognitive Dissonance Theory

First proposed by Leon Festinger in the late 1950s, cognitive dissonance theory was a relatively simple and straightforward explanation of how human beings deal with inconsistency. The first empirical validation of the theory, however, inadvertently called into question one of the central tenets of behaviorism, the predominant paradigm in psychology at the time. Controversy ensued, and a flurry of research on dissonance soon followed. Several decades and thousands of publications later, cognitive dissonance has evolved into something quite different.

Keywords Attitudes; Aversive Consequences; Cognitions; Consonant Cognitions; Dissonance; Festinger, Leon; Foreseeable Consequences; Free Choice; Self-Affirmation Theory; Self-Consistency Theory; Self-Perception Theory

Educational Theory > Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Overview

Cognitive dissonance theory was first proposed by Leon Festinger – a psychology professor at Stanford University – in the late 1950s. Part of the original appeal of the theory was its simplicity and parsimony; it seemed to provide a relatively straightforward and commonsense framework for explaining how human beings deal with inconsistency in thought and action. Very quickly, however, the theory stirred up a "proverbial hornet's nest of controversy" by unintentionally discrediting a central tenet of behaviorism, the predominant paradigm in psychology at the time (Cooper, 2007, p. 6). The controversy, Cooper (2007) argues, propelled the theory forward; today, over one thousand studies have been published on cognitive dissonance theory, and the theory itself has evolved into something much different.

Further Insights

Festinger's Theory

What Festinger observed, and what became the central premise of his entire theory, was the simple fact that human beings like consistency. Furthermore, human beings strive to reduce inconsistency; that is, people are motivated to do something in order to eliminate the feelings of discomfort that result from what he called 'nonfitting relations among cognitions" (Festinger, 1957, p. 1). Comparing dissonance to hunger, Festinger (1957) wrote, "cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction" (p. 3). He summarized his basic hypotheses as follows:

• The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance; and

• When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance (Festinger, 1957, p. 3)

Cognitions

Festinger's theory helped move the study of social psychology forward by introducing the concept of cognitions. Defined as "any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior" (Festinger, 1957, p. 3), cognitions allowed researchers to easily compare psychological phenomena – attitudes, behavior, opinions, and observations – which had previously been studied in isolation. When two cognitions are opposed to one another, or when "the obverse of one…would follow from the other," dissonance occurs. Festinger used the following as one example of dissonance; an individual may have a cognition representing a belief about smoking – it is bad for her health. This same person, however, continues to smoke. Thus, her cognition about her behavior is at odds with her cognition about her beliefs about smoking. As a result, the individual experiences dissonance.

Magnitude of Dissonance

Festinger introduced a second concept – the magnitude of dissonance – that further distinguished his theory from other 'inconsistency' theories. More specifically, he recognized that not all dissonance would be experienced equally. The magnitude of discomfort, he theorized, would depend on the importance of the cognitions (Festinger, 1957). A person who believes in animal rights, for example, but who fails to stop to help an injured animal might experience a great deal of dissonance; a person who eats a donut for breakfast, knowing that he is violating the diet he is unmotivated to maintain, might experience less. In addition to the importance of a particular set of cognitions, Festinger suggested magnitude could also be impacted by other relevant cognitions. If the person who ate a donut for breakfast, for example, ate only fruits and vegetables the day before, and also planned to exercise the day he consumed the donut, then these relevant consonant cognitions might help offset dissonance.

Reducing Dissonance

The above example suggests one way in which dissonance might be reduced, but Festinger's original theory suggested several methods, some used more frequently than others. If dissonance occurs between knowledge about the environment and one's behavior, for example, an individual may change her behavior in order to reduce dissonance. If the donut eating exerciser planned to run outside, but a thunderstorm looms overhead, he might decide to run inside instead. Another way in which dissonance can be reduced is by changing one's environment. In many cases this is the most difficult way to reduce dissonance - the runner can hardly expect to stop the thunderstorm, for example – but this is sometimes a viable option in social environments as opposed to physical ones (Festinger, 1957). Dissonance can also be reduced by adding new cognitions that are consonant with the knowledge or behavior an individual hopes to maintain; the dieter, for example, might seek out research which suggests a diet high in fat is good for one's health, and avoid all research which suggests otherwise. He might also reason that there are many worse things he could do for his health, such as smoking or drinking; such consonant cognitions help reduce the dissonance he experienced as a result of eating an unhealthy breakfast.

Relationship infidelity was studied as a dissonance-arousing behavior as well, and Foster and Misra (2013) found that perpetrators of infidelity respond in ways that reduce cognitive dissonance, such as through trivialization of the importance of the infidelity.

Just as changing the environment is often not a reasonable way in which to reduce dissonance, Festinger (1957) also recognized that behavior is often resistant to change. The behavior itself may be satisfying, or changing a particular behavior may result in pain or loss. As a result, the cognitions that most often change are the ones related to attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. As Cooper (2007) writes, "In general, it is difficult to change cognition about one's behavior. Therefore, when behavior is discrepant from attitudes, the dissonance caused thereby is usually reduced by changing one's attitude. The resistance to change of the behavioral cognition is what makes dissonance theory seem to be a theory of attitude change" (p. 8).

Context of Dissonance

Finally, Festinger's original theory also addressed the context and/or environments in which dissonance might occur. Specifically, he suggested that dissonance occurs as the result of almost any decision a person might make in daily life. Decisions often involve making choices between two attractive alternatives, between two alternatives that have both pros and cons, or between multiple alternatives, so that regardless of the end result, "dissonance is an almost inevitable consequence of any decision" (Festinger, 1957, p. 36). A person shopping for a car, for example, will recognize advantages and disadvantages to any choice she might make; one car may be more expensive, another uses less gas, a third might enhance her image. When faced with attractive alternatives, "the end result would be that having made the decision, and taken the consequent action, one would begin to alter the cognition so that alternatives which had previously been nearly equally attractive ceased to be so" (Festinger, 1957, p. 34).

Although Festinger's theory addressed the dissonance that results from everyday decision-making, his theory is arguably best known for its explanation of dissonance resulting from forced compliance. When an individual is forced to behave publicly, or make a public proclamation, that runs counter to his or her privately held beliefs, dissonance will result. How will individuals resolve dissonance in such situations? Festinger hypothesized that it would depend on the magnitude of the dissonance, as well as the magnitude of the punishment (for noncompliance) or reward (for compliance), but that a change in attitude would likely occur. He explained, "the empirical question, of course, arises as to how one can identify and distinguish public compliance without private [attitude] change from instances where private opinion is also altered" (Festinger, 1957, p. 87).

Testing the Hypothesis

An empirical test of his hypothesis is exactly what Festinger, along with his colleague J. Merrill Carlsmith, pursued next. Students were asked to participate in an intentionally tedious and boring peg turning task, and believed they were being evaluated on their performance. After they had completed the task, they were told that they had been assigned to the control condition; if they had been in the experimental group, they would have been confronted by a confederate in the waiting room, who would have told them how much fun they were about to have turning pegs. The researcher then announced that his confederate had failed to show up yesterday, and asked the student if she would be willing to play the role. Half of the students were given $1 to play the confederate role, the other half twenty dollars. Almost all students agreed to play the role. They would now experience dissonance by saying something – the peg turning task was fun – that was counter to their experience – the peg turning task as they experienced it was dull and repetitious. After the students made their public proclamations, their attitudes toward the peg turning task were reassessed.

What exactly did Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) predict? And what were the results? According to Cooper (2007) "Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) made a prediction that seemed less than obvious in terms of everyday wisdom but which followed logically from the theory of cognitive dissonance. They predicted that the speech given for a small amount of money would produce more favorable attitudes toward the task than the speech given for the large amount of money" (p. 17). And indeed, this is exactly what they found. The large reward helped reduce the dissonance (by providing a consonant cognition), but those who received only $1 weren't able to explain away their inconsistency as easily. As a result, they reduced their dissonance by changing their attitude toward the task, so that it was more in line with the behavior they exhibited as a confederate. And herein is where the controversy arose; Festinger had just demonstrated that smaller rewards lead to greater change, which flew in the face of behaviorism, whose central tenet was that "organisms learn by reward and punishment. The greater the reward, the greater the learning" (Cooper, 2007, p. 20).

Evolution of the Theory

Festinger never set out to challenge behavioral learning theory, and in fact, never directly addressed it when discussing his results. Nonetheless, upon publication of the above study, behaviorists set out to find alternative explanations for Festinger's findings. The challenges, Cooper (2007) argues, helped the theory evolve into what it has become today. The following section will briefly outline this evolution, drawing largely from Cooper's (2007) fifty-year retrospective of the theory. The evolution can be categorized according to three major challenges and/or shifts:

• The search for mediating effects,

• Validation of dissonance as an experience not an inference, and

• The introduction of the role of the self.

Viewpoints

The Search for Mediating Effects

Rosenberg (1965, as cited in Cooper, 2007) launched the first counterattack on dissonance theory, arguing that the counterintuitive relationship between reward and attitude change demonstrated in Festinger's classic study resulted from subject-researcher interactions, rather than the relative drive to reduce dissonance. Specifically, Rosenberg hypothesized that students viewed the $20 reward as a bribe, especially because the amount of money was disproportionate to the nature of the task. Students then assumed the researcher was studying how they might react to a bribe, and therefore intentionally set out to prove "I can't be bought." Those who had been paid the larger amount, therefore, changed their attitudes less. Rosenberg needed to show that by eliminating what he called 'evaluation apprehension' students would be free to change their opinions in direct relation to the magnitude of the reward.

Rosenberg devised an experiment in which students were asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay for either a large or small amount of money. Students believed they were actually participating in two separate experiments; after writing the essay, they proceeded to the next experiment and were asked their opinions on a variety of issues, including the issue about which they had just written. As Cooper (2007) explains, Rosenberg "had the attitudes [assessed] by a completely different experimenter who was in a different room doing a different study. In this way, subjects would not feel that they were having their honesty and integrity assessed by the [original] experimenter and would not hold back their true opinion" (p. 30). The results supported Rosenberg's hypothesis: those given the larger reward for writing the counter-attitudinal essay changed their attitudes more than students given the smaller reward. Rosenberg had, or so it seemed, successfully discredited Festinger's theory.

The Free Choice Factor

Others, however, weren't quite so sure. Although Rosenberg had attempted to replicate Festinger's original study, changing only the manner in which post-experiment attitudes were assessed, he had inadvertently changed a second important variable. In Festinger's original study, students were given a choice about whether they wanted to play the confederate role. They could say yes or no, without consequence. In Rosenberg's study, however, students were not given a choice. They were told to write an essay they did not believe. Why might choice be an important variable relative to dissonance? Cooper (2007) explains "If I were required to write the essay, then that requirement serves as an important cognition consonant with my behavior. That cognition might have been powerful enough to eliminate all dissonance" (p. 33). In order to test this hypothesis, Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967, as cited in Cooper, 2007) conducted an experiment, similar in design to the classic study, except that students were assigned two different conditions – low choice and high choice. They predicted only students in the high choice condition would experience dissonance, and only then would the magnitude of the reward play a role in reduction of dissonance. The results supported their prediction, proving that "behavior that is at variance with attitudes causes dissonance, but only under conditions of high-decision freedom. In the absence of freedom, there is no dissonance" (Cooper, 2007, p. 35).

Rosenberg's study, and Linder, et al's response, is an example of the way in which controversy and disagreement spurred the theory forward. As a result of the 'conversation' between theorists with opposing viewpoints, the role of an important caveat – the condition of free choice – was discovered. In the decades that followed, research would uncover a number of other important caveats, or what Cooper (2007) refers to as the "but only's." Dissonance occurs, but only under certain circumstances. In addition to the condition of free choice, research demonstrated that dissonance occurs, but only when people are committed to their behavior, only when the behavior leads to aversive consequences, and only when those consequences are foreseeable.

A New Dissonance Theory Emerges

A number of creative studies demonstrated these caveats. With respect to foreseeable consequences, for example, researchers asked students to write essays favoring an unwanted campus policy; half of the students were told their essays would be forwarded to the campus advisory committee, the other half were told their essays might be forwarded. After writing the essay, all students were then told that none of their essays would be forwarded. For those students who were told their essay might be forwarded, the good news eliminated their dissonance, and they demonstrated little attitude change in post assessments. For those who were told their essays would be forwarded, and for whom this outcome was not foreseeable, dissonance was not eliminated. "The unforeseeable nature of the good consequence did not allow these participants to be free of their dissonance and the need to change their attitudes" (Cooper, 2007, p. 72).

The results of such studies were enough for Fazio and Cooper (1984, as cited in Cooper, 2007) to put forth an alternative theory altogether, rather than amend Festinger's original proposal with corollaries liked those described above. According to the new theory, "dissonance does not occur because of inconsistency per se, and attitude change is not in the service of restoring consistency. Rather, attitude change occurs to render the consequences of behavior non-aversive" (Cooper, 2007, p. 79). In other words, dissonance results from our perceptions of unwanted and aversive consequences, not from inconsistency. It is important to note that such a theory represents a radical departure from Festinger's original theory. The new proposal, however, has generated some controversy of its own. Harmon-Jones (1999) writes, for example, "the present evidence convincingly demonstrates that dissonance effects can be generated by a cognitive discrepancy that does not produce aversive consequences. Indeed, the results suggest that the original version of the theory was abandoned prematurely" (Harmon-Jones, 1999, p. 85).

Validating Dissonance as an Experience

Rosenberg's research precipitated a series of challenges and amendments to the original version of cognitive dissonance theory. So too did the work of Bem (Cooper, 2007). Citing the central tenets of his self-perception theory, Bem challenged the entire notion of cognitive dissonance, and argued that the results of Festinger's study could be explained more simply via the notion of inference. Just as we infer attitudes and opinions of other people from their behavior, so too do individuals infer their own attitudes and opinions from their own behavior. In other words, people don't always have direct access to their own thoughts, but rather scan their past behavior in order to infer their own beliefs. Thus, students in the original study would remember they had received twenty dollars to publicly express an opinion they didn't believe; the money would be enough to explain their behavior, thus requiring no change in attitude. Bem's theory was more parsimonious, in that it did not rely on internal states of arousal and the subsequent drive to reduce them. "It simply needed to invoke an inference process – the very same process that people use to infer the attitudes and characteristics of others" (Cooper, 2007, p. 39).

Because Bem & Festinger explained the same results in different ways, it was initially difficult to determine which theory might provide the better explanation of the results. Zanna and Cooper (1974, as cited in Cooper, 2007) designed the first set of studies – called misattribution studies – to answer this question. Once again, the researchers replicated Festinger's classic study, except that one group of students was given a pill and told it would produce side-effects, such as arousal and tension, and others were given a pill and told they would experience no side-effects. They then participated in the same attitude-discrepant experiment – duping their classmates into believing the peg-turning task would be fun – and were later assessed on their attitudes toward the task. Zanna and Cooper hypothesized that those who took the pill and believed it would produce arousal would experience little dissonance; they would simply attribute the unpleasant arousal to the pill, and therefore have no need to change their attitudes. Those who were not given an external stimulus upon which to misattribute their arousal would experience dissonance and change their attitudes. The results confirmed their hypotheses, providing support for Festinger's original notion that dissonance is experienced, not just inferred. (Cooper, 2007).

The Introduction of the Role of the Self

As the role of the self became increasingly prominent in social psychology, cognitive dissonance theory experienced yet another evolution. Self-affirmation theory and self-consistency theory have both been used to reexamine the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. According to self-affirmation theory, "we are motivated to see ourselves as good and honest people and any evidence to the contrary will upset our equilibrium. People will distort their cognitions about themselves in the service of protecting their self-system" (Cooper, 2007, p. 91). Importantly, self-affirmation theory proposes that threats to the self-system can be corrected in a variety of ways, not just by correcting the specific wrong. In a classic 1975 study of self-affirmation theory, Steele and colleagues (as cited in Cooper, 2007) showed that women whose sense of self was threatened – researchers told them their neighbors thought they were unhelpful – could restore their integrity by volunteering for a charity. Surprisingly however, women who were told they were bad drivers could also restore their sense of integrity/self by volunteering for a charity. "As Steele commented, it's the war, not the battle, that has to be won. If a specific, attitude-discrepant behavior threatens the self-system, the repair can be made at either the local or general level. If need be, the attitudes compromised by a particular behavior can be left intact, and the individual can find a way to bask in the glory of his or her other achievements" (Cooper, 2007, p. 95).

Self-consistency theory shares many similarities with self-affirmation theory. Both say dissonance is significantly related to threats to the self-system and both believe most people generally have a healthy self-esteem. Self-consistency theory differs, however, in an important way; it suggests that people have expectations about how they should behave, and that when they fail to behave in line with expectations, inconsistency and dissonance results. If individuals with low self-esteem act in accordance with expectations (e.g. a person believes she isn't smart and acts accordingly), for example, then no dissonance will result. In the end, those with high self-esteem change their attitudes more than those with low self-esteem.

Self-affirmation theory, however, predicts the opposite. Because self-esteem acts as a global support system, if a student feels he has threatened his sense of self by lying to his classmate, he can look for other ways to affirm himself. Those with high esteem will find alternative ways quickly, experience less dissonance, and therefore, exhibit less attitude change.

Although the two theories appeared to contradict one another, Stone and Cooper (2001, as cited in Cooper 2007) thought otherwise. They looked for ways in which the self plays a role in dissonance, and under what conditions it serves as a resource, an expectation, or both. They believed the missing piece of the puzzle could be found by analyzing the standards one uses to judge his or her behavior – recognizing that people typically use either normative standards, comparing themselves to a larger group, or personal standards, comparing themselves to their own standards. They discovered that when people rely on normative standards to evaluate their behavior, self-esteem does not play a role; when people rely on personal standards, however, self-esteem does matter. Although self-esteem plays a role when people rely on personal standards, Cooper (2007) concludes that individuals are more likely to use normative ones.

Conclusion

Cognitive Dissonance Theory Today

Cognitive dissonance theory has traveled a long way since the late 1950s, but continues to evolve even to this day. In past research, "rarely has the person experiencing dissonance been conceived as a member of the group. Rather…virtually all dissonance research has focused on the individual acting alone (Cooper & Stone, 2000). In a laboratory test of group impact, Zanna and Sande (1987, as cited in Cooper & Stone, 2000) asked students to write counter-attitudinal essays, but asked some students to write a group essay, and others to write individual essays. Even though students in the group condition believed they had developed a more convincing essay, they experienced less dissonance, and therefore less attitude change, than those in the alone condition. "Apparently, the ability to diffuse responsibility to the rest of the group" mediated the experience of dissonance. Finally, researchers have also used dissonance theory to study social identity; recognizing that attitude change is not always a viable way to reduce dissonance when one's social identity is threatened, researchers have uncovered two alternative processes – increased hostility toward the out-group and repression. If a democrat makes a statement that threatens his identity as a liberal, for example, he may be unable to reduce dissonance by changing his political affiliation and becoming pro-republican. He must reduce the arousal, however, and does so by displacing it onto the already unattractive out-group; thus, he becomes even more hostile toward republicans. Alternatively, people may choose to repress behavior that threatens their identity; if the same democrat voted for Bush in the last election, he may choose to selectively forget how he voted in 2004, thereby eliminating dissonance that might result.

In its application to education, Pedder and Opfer (2013) studied patterns of cognitive dissonance and alignment between teachers’ values and practices with regard to professional development, and made the discovery that only a minority of teachers are engaged learners. There is a “prevailing individualist approach to learning among the majority of teachers. And there are important between- and within-school differences in the mix of teachers’ learning orientations.” Consequently, the authors recommended “differentiated forms of support for promoting effective professional learning in schools” (Pedder & Opfer, 2013).

Walton (2011) studied and offered suggestions for applying cognitive dissonance to student instruction. He asked, “How might cognitive dissonance nurture, rather than constrain, meaningful reflection on alternative experiences, narratives, and social differences?” Among his conclusions were that critical educators should strive to help their students make personally relevant connections between new and previous learning experiences, and that educators might consider engaging students in critical conversations on topics and problems that are of particular importance to them, thus allowing more relevant and varied opportunities for disequilibrium to occur (Walton, 2011).

Terms & Concepts

Cognitions: Defined as "any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior" (Festinger, 1957, p. 3), cognitions allowed researchers to easily compare psychological phenomena – attitudes, behavior, opinions, and observations – which had previously been studied in isolation. According to the original theory, two inconsistent cognitions give rise to dissonance.

Consonant Cognitions: Festinger hypothesized that dissonance can be reduced in several ways – by changing one's behavior, by changing the environment, or by adding cognitions that are consistent with the belief or behavior one hopes to maintain. The latter are referred to as consonant cognitions.

Dissonance: Festinger defined dissonance as an uncomfortable psychological state resulting from inconsistency, or "non-fitting relations among cognitions." He compared dissonance to hunger, arguing that when either occurs, humans are motivated to reduce or eliminate such feelings.

Foreseeable Consequences: As research on dissonance progressed, investigators realized certain conditions were necessary for dissonance to occur. One such condition is the existence of foreseeable (and aversive) consequences. Only if an individual can foresee the negative consequences her 'inconsistent' actions might bring about, will dissonance occur.

Free Choice: As research on dissonance progressed, investigators realized certain conditions were necessary for dissonance to occur. One such condition is the existence of free choice. If individuals are forced to do or say something that contradicts their opinions or beliefs, the coercion itself eliminates dissonance.

Self-Affirmation Theory: In the latest evolution of dissonance research, investigators have become increasingly interested in the role of the self. Self-affirmation theory suggests that individuals like to see themselves as good and honest people; individuals are motivated to protect their self-system in the face of information that suggests otherwise. Importantly, self-affirmation theory proposes that threats to the self-system can be corrected in a variety of ways, not just by correcting the specific wrong. Thus, global self-esteem helps protect the individual from dissonance.

Self-Consistency Theory: In the latest evolution of dissonance research, investigators have become increasingly interested in the role of the self. Self-consistency theory differs, however, in an important way; it suggests that people have expectations about how they should behave, and that when they fail to behave in line with expectations, inconsistency and dissonance results. Self-esteem helps buffer against dissonance, but only when people act according to expectations.

Self-Perception Theory: Self-perception theory provided one of the initial challenges to cognitive dissonance theory. Bem hypothesized that people were inferring their beliefs and opinions from past behavior, just as they infer the attitudes of others through observation. Only the process of inference, not the condition of arousal or uncomfortable psychological states, was needed to explain Festinger's data. Later research confirming physiological arousal validated Festinger's theory.

Bibliography

Cooper, J., & Stone, J. (2000). Cognitive dissonance and the social group. In D. J. Terry & M.A. Hogg (Eds.), Attitudes, behavior, and social context: The role of norms and group membership . (pp. 227-244). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Cooper, J. (2007). Cognitive dissonance: A fifty-year retrospective of a classic theory . Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, and Company.

Foster, J.D., & Misra, T.A. (2013). It did not mean anything (about me): Cognitive dissonance theory and the cognitive and affective consequences of romantic infidelity. Journal of Social & Personal Relationships, 30, 835–857. Retrieved December 14, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=90607174&site=ehost-live

Harmon-Jones, E. (1999). Toward an understanding of the motivation underlying dissonance effects: Is the production of aversive consequences necessary? In E. Harmon-Jones and J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. (pp. 71-102). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Pedder, D., & Opfer, V. (2013). Professional learning orientations: patterns of dissonance and alignment between teachers’ values and practices. Research Papers in Education, 28, 539–570. Retrieved December 14, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=90363402&site=ehost-live

Walton, J.D. (2011). Dissonance in the critical classroom: The role of social psychological processes in learner resistance. College Student Journal, 45 , 769–785. Retrieved December 14, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database Education Research Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=77305729&site=ehost-live

Suggested Reading

Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (Eds.). (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Mook, D. (2004). Classic experiments in psychology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Wicklund, R.A., & Brehm, J.W. (1976). Perspectives on cognitive dissonance. New York, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.