Power and Authority: Rational-Legal Authority

The individual who would create an influential profile of the types of authority present in government, the German sociologist Max Weber, had seen his share of charismatic rulers and, as such, preferred the rule of law. Among his three types of legitimate rule was the bureaucracy. This paper shall take an extensive look at Weber's theories and ideals of legitimized authority in the modern world, as well as a few examples of actual governmental systems operating in the postmodern world with active bureaucracies as their centerpieces.

Keywords Bureaucracy; Cameralism; Rational-legal; Legimitacy; Wertrationell; Zweckrationell

Power & Authority: Rational-Legal Authority

Overview

Shortly after the Declaration of Independence was adopted, state assemblies hurried home from Philadelphia to draft their own state constitutions and relevant legislation. Ironically, the delegation that had to travel the least took a rather long time to attend to this task. After 12 weeks of debates, the Pennsylvania assembly could not come to an agreement on its own constitution. Benjamin Franklin observed that Pennsylvanians were going about their daily lives without any leadership or bureaucratic infrastructure. "Gentlemen," he said to his Pennsylvania colleagues, "you can see we have been living under anarchy, yet the business of living has gone on as usual. Be careful; if our debates go on too much longer, people may come to see that they can get along very well without us" ("Government in action," 2012).

Indeed, for many people, the very word "bureaucracy" has a negative connotation. To them it means excessive paperwork, massive buildings packed with redundant employees, and endless exchanges of interoffice memoranda. Legendary congressman and senator Eugene McCarthy once summarized the public's negative view of the administrative wing of government: "The only thing that saves us from bureaucracy is inefficiency," he said, adding, "An efficient bureaucracy is the greatest threat to liberty" (Columbia World of Quotations, 1996).

This unflattering public impression of the administrative function of government is largely based on its often sluggish procedures. The idea of bureaucracy fails to inspire the way a charismatic leader can. Still, though high-profile politicians may create the laws, in a democratic government it is up to the bureaucracy to implement those laws.

The individual who would create an influential profile of the types of authority present in government, the German sociologist Max Weber, had seen his share of charismatic rulers and remained preferential to the rule of law. Among his three types of legitimate rule was the bureaucracy.

Max Weber's Germany

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, Germany was in a state of flux. The "Iron Chancellor," Otto von Bismarck, had successfully unified a disparate collection of unaligned monarchies and enclaves into a consolidated nation under Prussian rule. Much of this unity stemmed from the nationalist fervor he inspired among these groups, and with his growing power and militarism came a national ethic of authoritarianism and discipline.

Meanwhile, the German emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, was also beginning to consolidate his power. The relationship between Wilhelm and Bismarck seemed mutually beneficial at first, but as time passed, Bismarck's domestic policies began to prove ineffectual. The kaiser, whom Bismarck himself felt was threatened by the chancellor's control over the German administrative government, moved to capitalize on Bismarck's perceived weakness in controlling a limping infrastructure. Backed into a corner by the kaiser, Bismarck resigned as chancellor. Unfortunately, the kaiser's move had the opposite effect from the one he had anticipated; Bismarck's "weak" domestic policy making would be missed in the new Germany, and the German government, which had thrived on a tight bureaucracy helmed by the former chancellor, fell into disarray (Rempel, 2007).

That Weber could endorse one approach to political and social development as effective for Germany and look with disdain on another is unremarkable. That both of these approaches were manifest in one individual, Otto von Bismarck, is rather unusual. Indeed, Bismarck's approach to unifying the disjointed Germanic region was centered on the establishment of an extensive administrative network that followed hierarchical protocols. Unfortunately, as he embraced his power, Bismarck's continued dominance over that hierarchy left little room for flexibility among the governed, Weber believed. In Weber's view, when the chancellor departed, the people, who were used to Bismarck's "iron hand" as their sole authority, remained apathetic, and as a result, Germany was unable to develop a democratic way of life for itself (Jones, 2001).

Weber & Authority

It is understandable that Max Weber should offer his types of legitimate authority as a model for future (and, in his hopeful mind, successful) regimes. Caught amid a clear power struggle between the chancellor and the kaiser, Weber could clearly see a variety of forms of power, all of which were legitimized by a populace that seemed content with any one of them.

Weber envisioned three types of legitimate authority. The first two of these concepts resemble the types of leadership with which the Germans were familiar prior to and following the late Bismarck years. One is traditional rule, which is legitimized on the basis of rite or custom. In this case, the mantle of leadership is passed on within a royal family, for example, or via a lineage that dates back to alleged divine or supernatural occurrences, such as descent from the prophet Muhammad or from the presumed human incarnation of a god. Power is granted to an individual because it is considered his or her preordained right.

In the second of Weber's ideals, legitimate authority is granted to the charismatic individual. This type of leader rules on the basis of his or her ability to inspire devotion among the populace. Bismarck's charisma played a significant role in unifying Germany. Several decades later, Adolf Hitler's charisma would also shape Germany's course. As the object of a cult of personality, a charismatic leader, at least in the Weberian model, is not dissimilar from a traditional ruler; he or she is a singular leader who stands either alone or atop a hierarchy.

The third of Weber's types of legitimate authority is the one on which this paper will next expound. First, this essay will provide an extensive examination of the concept of rational-legal, or bureaucratic, rule. Next, it will provide examples of such rule from the modern era.

The Rule of Law

In his essay "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," wherein he first proffered his ideals on this subject, Weber stresses that an authority's legitimacy is found not in the authority itself but rather within the people who endorse the authority. "Legitimate" authority, therefore, is installed and maintained less violently than illegitimate authority, providing that the governed do not grow weary of the authority.

In the case of legitimate traditional authority, the people endorse the ruler because they have always followed whoever was in that position of power. Charismatic authority is legitimized because the people perceive the charismatic leader to have extraordinary or even superhuman qualities.

The rule of law, on the other hand, is legitimate because the people believe it is rational. Weber believed that this rationality comes in two forms: zweckrationell, or "goal-rational," and wertrationell, or "value-rational." A zweckrationell ruling entity warrants legitimacy from a society if it demonstrates a capacity for achieving that society's goals and stated purposes, while a wertrationell entity is endorsed because it operates within the framework of the society's moral and ethical codes. By combining the two concepts, Weber shows that rational authority is achievable when a ruler or government is capable of satisfying the interests of the people in a way that does not violate their society's established codes and laws.

Having seen how effectively a strong bureaucracy united Bismarck's Germany and how ultimately impotent both the chancellor and Wilhelm II were at strengthening the German infrastructure with their respective charismatic and traditional approaches, Weber clearly preferred rational-legal authority. "The purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization," he wrote, is "capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings" (Kilcullen, 1996).

Weber's views of authority extend deeper to reach within the forces that create and maintain political institutions. His ideals of legitimate authority are, after all, sociological points of view, and as such they can be applied in a variety of arenas. Weber's ideal bureaucracy is clearly applicable to business as well as to legal institutions and systems. In fact, many sociologists assert that to understand social organizations, one must understand the precepts of Weber's views of bureaucratization. By combining the notions of goals and ethics, Weberian sociology peers into the minds of individuals and accounts for how their behavior affects others within the society (Singh, 1993). It is no surprise, therefore, that Weber should use such an analytical tool in the study of legitimized authority.

Of course, Weber's ideal of bureaucracy and the rule of law is a concept, not a concrete reality. By his own admission, his model bureaucracy's effectiveness as a form of legitimized authority stems from its purity. Still, modern permutations of the rational-legal ideal are employed in governmental systems in the twenty-first-century international community.

Japan

In the seventeenth century, Japan was ravaged by war and governed by a collection of disparate warlords called shoguns. In order to unify his nation, Emperor Tokugawa Ieyasu solicited the help of an unlikely source. Fujiwara Seika, a neo-Confucian, had been using the ancient Chinese philosophy as a resource to help establish commerce and trade systems in Japan. While Confucianism itself frowned upon commerce, favoring agriculture instead, its secularity and emphasis on rationally understanding the material world seemed a perfect tool to help the country achieve prosperity. Tokugawa also saw another potential application: unifying the social fabric of the country. The bureaucracies and networks that neo-Confucianism espoused provided Tokugawa with the ability to draw together the shogunate and Japanese society under a regime that stressed the rule of law and social order and lasted for nearly three centuries (Hooker, 1996).

Although modern, postindustrial Japan no longer endorses the teachings of Confucius as the nation's sole religion, the country's social, commercial, and political elements still ring of neo-Confucianism. Indeed, the Confucian values of paternalism, establishing clear hierarchies, and social order within governmental institutions remain prominent characteristics of this East Asian country, despite its forced adoption of a Western-style constitutional system after World War II.

Weber pointed out that, in practice, bureaucratic, ration-legal systems can be diverse. After all, his model was only an ideal, and therefore capable of manifesting itself across a wide range of political systems. Additionally, the bureaucracy itself may evolve to keep pace with changes in the world order. In Japan, for example, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held fast to power from 1955 to 1993, maintaining governance as the ruling party while collaborating with various corporate interests. In 1993, the LDP was voted out for the first time, and the factions that originally composed the LDP became more self-sustaining and independent. The party returned to power in 1996 as a minority government that soon regained its majority. The LDP was voted out again in 2009, suffering its worst defeat and signaling the first true transfer of power since its formation, but decisively regained power once again in 2012.

The Japanese bureaucracy has withstood a great deal during its centuries of implementation, remaining intact despite the political and social crisis of war, the upheavals of the LDP, and the changing international political order. Even though the global commercial regime has introduced new forms of corporate governance and strategy (Masaharu, 2004), the rational-legal system that has been in place since the Tokugawa era has withstood the test of time.

Weber's Homeland

More than a century before Weber weighed in on the German political situation, a group of German writers known as Cameralists sought to address perceived civic and social problems by implementing a governmental and economic infrastructure designed to serve the public welfare. In essence, they were attempting to create what would become a centerpiece of German social, political, and economic activity: the bureaucracy (Small, 1909). In fact, even the study of public administration in Germany encompasses a wide range of disciplines. Integrated policy science, as it is known, employs a legalistic perspective in addressing the concerns of German society.

Despite the turmoil of Weber's lifetime and the subsequent horrors of the Nazi regime, the German administration has endured. Its ability to survive for so many decades is a testament to two factors. The first is that although the German public sector has endured many changes, these changes have occurred in an incremental fashion at best. Within a system that defers largely to local and regional governments, many of the reforms that are made are small and diffuse. The second factor is that even the disciplines used to study German political science are multifarious and scattered (Benz, 2005). In other words, the German legalistic approach to the myriad of social arenas, coupled with the German government's incremental problem solving, has given a long life to the German bureaucracy.

The German example provided here raises an important sociological point about the nature of the rational-legal concept. Whereas the charismatic ruler takes power through a vocal endorsement from the people and the traditional ruler assumes control through the long-standing traditions of the society, the rational-legal authority is born of the very society it seeks to govern. The goals and values that make up a society are the very forces that drive its bureaucracy, which in turn moves with the speed and efficacy permitted by its founding social institutions.

Of course, as is the case in Japan, in order for the German bureaucratic regime to continue, it must evolve to reflect modern realities. The fact that so much of the postindustrial world of which Germany is a critical part comprises sociological, political, and economic elements means that the country's bureaucracy must also find a way to interconnect these seemingly disparate disciplines by facilitating communication and formulating complex policy responses (Ueberhorst, 2004).

Conclusions

George Bernard Shaw once said of administrative forms of government, "The art of government is the organization of idolatry. The bureaucracy consists of functionaries; the aristocracy, the idols; the democracy, the idolaters. The populace cannot understand the bureaucracy … it can only worship the national idols" (Columbia World of Quotations, 1996). Indeed, not many laymen speak highly of bureaucracy, a form of social order that often evokes images of unnecessarily long lines, redundant staff, and large, unsightly buildings. A would-be political figure is often well advised to blame the bureaucracy for what the electorate perceives as unnecessary delays in implementing government policy. Voters frequently welcome such comments, lending their support to candidates who promise to cut through bureaucracy and streamline government processes.

In latter half of the nineteenth century, the power struggle between Wilhelm II and Bismarck and their collective failure to strengthen the German state gave Weber plenty of reason to be skeptical about the efficacy of charismatic and traditional authorities. The rule of law, in contrast, appealed to Weber not just because of its historical accomplishments, such as the successful unification of Germany; in his estimation, it provided promise for the future. In Weber's view, by combining the components of zweckrationell and wertrationell, bureaucracy creates a plan for progress within the parameters of acceptable social values.

While Weber clearly had his doubts about the specific regimes that oversaw his national polity, it is clear that his subsequent theories on legitimate forms of authority are not meant to be studied or applied as concrete realities. Rather, the three types represent ideals, existing in their purest forms. In fact, Weber believed that when applied in real-world situations and hence removed from their sterile conceptual confines, each ideal has its merits. Furthermore, most modern governmental systems incorporate all three types.

The hierarchies, networks, and interconnected systems inherent in a bureaucratic system have been shown throughout history to be effective in facilitating the implementation of public policy. Naturally, when placed outside of the laboratory, bureaucracy, like any other of Weber's concepts, is subject to shortcomings such as corruption, inefficiency, and other issues that can hinder public administration.

In the case of Japan, the ineffectiveness of that nation's administrative government caused a backlash against a decades-old system of rule. In the German case, administration was one of Bismarck's central themes. However, once Bismarck finished consolidating the German republic, his bureaucracy became dedicated to centralizing power behind him. When Bismarck left power, the bureaucracy was impotent to address the needs of the German people.

Despite the popular misconceptions about and drawbacks of the bureaucracies that accompany rational-legal forms of authority, Weber believed that they contained many merits. In the postindustrial world, a rational-legal authority may not address a society's issues as quickly as the citizenry may demand, but it nevertheless is a creation of that society's goals and values and is a powerful agent for carrying them out.

Terms & Concepts

Bureaucracy: A hierarchical administrative structure in which work is carried out by specialized, non-elected employees and officials according to specific rules and regulations.

Cameralism: A school of German thought active between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, dedicated to addressing social issues via bureaucratic institution building.

Rational-Legal Authority: A type of authority identified by Max Weber that gains its legitimacy through a set of rules or laws.

Legimitate Authority: According to Weber, an authority that is endorsed and upheld by a significant social body or legal institution.

Wertrationell: "Value-rational" segment of bureaucratic policy implementation.

Zweckrationell: "Goal-rational" segment of bureaucratic policy implementation.

Bibliography

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Suggested Reading

Aguilera, R., & Vadera, A. (2008). The dark side of authority. Journal of Business Ethics, 77 , 431-449. Retrieved April 19, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database Business Source Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=28090047&site=ehost-live

Buckley, F. H. (2012). Are you in? New Criterion, 31, 13–17. Retrieved October 30, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=79725039&site=ehost-live

Heydebrand, W. (2003). Process rationality as legal governance. International Sociology, 18 , 325-349. Retrieved April 19, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=10250331&site=ehost-live

McIntosh, Donald. (1977). The objective basis of Max Weber's ideal types. History and Theory, 16, 33-48. Retrieved April 19, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=4897275&site=ehost-live

Schwartz, R. E.D. (2006). Sociolegal democracy: An evolutionary approach. Conference Papers - American Sociological Association . Retrieved April 19, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=26643340&site=ehost-live

Sterling, J. S., & Moore, W. E. (1987). Weber's analysis of legal rationalization.

Sociological Forum, 2 , 67-80. Retrieved April 19, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=11057117&site=ehost-live