U.S. Politics: The Military-Industrial Complex

This paper takes a critical look at the concept of the military industrial complex and the social and political forces that created this network of governmental and private institutions. The reader will gain a better understanding of government bureaucracy as a whole within the context of the American public service sector.

Keywords Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC); Military Industrial Complex; Power Elite; Strategic Geography

Sociology of Politics & Government > U.S. Politics: The Military-Industrial Complex

Overview

The military industrial complex is a network of governmental and private industrial players that developed out of the need to produce mass quantities of war materials for the First and Second World Wars. What started as an effort on behalf of American industry and government to attain victory in international conflict became a business of industrialists and bureaucrats driven largely by profit motives. This paper takes a critical look at the military industrial complex and the social and political forces that help forge and drive its influence on government. The reader will gain a better understanding of government bureaucracy as a whole within the context of the American public service sector.

The Birth of a Mega-Industry

Prior to the First World War, the United States did not see the need for a permanent national weapons manufacturer. Basing policy on the 2nd Amendment's tenet of citizen soldiers and militias, the country operated on a reactive basis — that is, if conflict arose, the US would look to the people to rise up in response. Until the 20th century, this approach proved effective.

However, the First and Second World Wars required an enormous supply of guns, cannons, planes, ships, and other vehicles, as well as supplies, fuel, and ammunition. Such manufacturing demands placed a heavy burden on the American citizenry, and during each of those wars nearly American assumed the role of a “citizen soldier,” sacrificing their personal goals to the nationalized war effort.

Following World War II, powerful officials became convinced of the necessity for an industry dedicated to satisfying the military needs of the government. The next major conflict into which the US would enter was the Korean War of 1950-1953. During this conflict private entrepreneurs who were contractually obligated to produce weapons and related military supplies worked closely with the US government to help the US armed forces operate with expediency. As the Korean War began, and as the US became embroiled in the a protracted arms race with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the links between the US military and its suppliers became essential in the eyes of the American public as well as its leaders.

The growing military industrial complex did not go unnoticed by academics of the time. C. Wright Mills addressed the phenomenon in The Power Elite. In this influential work, Mills stated that a relatively small group of individuals in Western capitalist society control most aspects of government, finance, and other highly influential aspects of society. As a component of the power elite, what he termed "the military industrial complex" consisted of an alliance of military, economic, and political players whose primary motivation is financial and who seek to maintain this arrangement at all costs. President, and former general, Dwight D. Eisenhower also identified this alliance of private military contractors and governmental officials and, while he understood it as a natural response to the international environment, he also perceived a potential danger and suggested that the new system could become corrupted by external elements. In his farewell address at the conclusion of his presidency in 1961, he warned of the "potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power" that could occur within what he termed "the military industrial complex" (Eisenhower, 2006). This was the first time the concept was used in an address to the general public.

In the late 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis led many American officials to believe that a significant investment in defense and security was essential. When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency, his administration (most notably Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger) began to infuse the Department of Defense with funding. However, no strategic plan was in place-the Reagan administration simply sought funds from Congress without developing a plan of how to spend it. With so much money and no framework by which to appropriate it, corruption ensued-the rush for federal funds caused much of the money to be wasted, and the media began reporting absurd expenditures like $640 custom toilet seats and $435 hammers. The American public, originally fearful of how the US would protect itself from international terrorism and Soviet communism, began to view with increasing cynicism the very institution assigned to protect it ("The candidates and the world," 1988).

Since the Reagan years, much attention has been paid not just to the security issues facing the US, such as conflict in the Middle East, destabilization in the former Soviet Union and international terrorism. Many political organizations have begun looking critically at how taxpayer money is being pumped into addressing the security concerns posed by these and other international situations.

Further Insights

Where Business Development & National Security Meet

The military industrial complex has the ability to not just turn an extraordinary profit in a market that is unlikely to see faltering demand, but it can also affect policymaking. Western democracies have consistently prided themselves on maintaining and creating free market economies. Free market proponents argue that such systems encourage competition, thereby lowering the price of goods and services for the consumer. Nevertheless, critics argue that when the consumer is the government, open competition often falls by the wayside.

Industry Mergers

In the late 20th century, for example, the field of American defense contractors shrank suddenly and significantly from eight to three. Defense giants Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Loral, and parts of General Dynamics all melded to form Lockheed Martin. Boeing, once a major aerospace company, absorbed its main competitor, McDonnell Douglas. Meanwhile, Raytheon assimilated Hughes, a giant among missile systems manufacturers. Such a trend would suggest to free market enthusiasts that the industry was experiencing diminishing demand.

However, the opposite was true. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that the bipolar world of the Cold War was no more. As a result, President Bill Clinton's administration was convinced that it needed to prepare the military for the possibility of tending to multiple conflicts simultaneously. He therefore asked Congress, which at the time was spending about $265 billion annually on the military, to increase that figure by $112 billion in order to address the need for multi-stage preparedness ("The insanity defense," 1999).

Mergers between defense companies were not only approved and encouraged by the US government, they were given government assistance. In the late 1990s, Lockheed sought to purchase Northrop Grumman, creating one of the largest military systems corporations ever. The deal was worth nearly $12 billion, and the government appeared to give the merger its blessing. In fact, there was speculation that the deal would receive Department of Defense investment to facilitate the merger. The Pentagon, after all, had subsidized the Lockheed merger with Martin Marietta with $348 million one year earlier (Greenwald & Merchant, 1997). Ultimately, the deal was scuttled by non-Pentagon groups who cried foul at the government's involvement, but the two titans of defense continue to work closely together on a number of projects, most recently including a lucrative, multi-year global positioning system (GPS) contract (Northrop Grumman Corporation, 2008).

Issues

Unfortunately, there are two reasons why Eisenhower's famous warning remains relevant. The first is the concern that, given the unprecedented level of access the military industrial complex has to the federal government's security institutions (and those who fund it), it may use this access to assert its own agenda and, in essence, become an unofficial contributor to the public policy and administration system.

The second of these reasons is that the American military industrial complex operates on an international level. In the absence of comparable social institutions in other nations, the US complex has become the sole provider of weaponry and military support for many other nations and armed factions. For those nations that are faced with security threats (or fending off civil conflict), therefore, the US military industrial complex is invaluable to their military efforts.

In both of these situations, such relationship opens the door for the American military industrial complex to exert a heavy influence on how countries dependent on American weaponry formulate and implement security policies, both domestically and internationally. The next section of this paper takes a more in-depth look at each of these issues and how they impact society as a whole.

Defense & Security on the Home Front

That the US is the leader in the defense industry is without question, and, as stated earlier, in a perfect world such a status would be positive in the eyes of most democratic societies. However, the fact that the military industrial complex is so deeply tied into the federal government gives rise to speculation about influence peddling and corruption. Indeed, the fact that the mergers of the industry's giants were partially subsidized under the leadership of individuals who happened to represent districts in which these companies were based provides support to such theories.

Some have tied this transformation in military production to the "the post-Fordism" of the mid-twentieth century. Thus, the US military has gone from a mentality of mass production heavily reliant (if not dependent) on an enormous public base of volunteers to a privatized, centralized industry that is outsourced, not conscripted (King, 2006).

This change is due to the fact that the public was not privy to the policymaking decisions that activated them into service to the government. This responsibility instead fell to the government that was activating them. As suggested earlier, prior to the early 20th century, military operations were not a high priority for the US government. However, the United States has been far more proactive in its foreign and military policy since that era, largely due to the Cold War. The growing military industrial complex, therefore, has assumed a role not just as a partner in the maintenance of American security, but also as a pivotal component in the development of that security. In fact, by serving as a visible partner in US international relations, it now exerts a worldwide power few industries have ever enjoyed in modern world history (Neuman, 2006).

Such power does not go unnoticed by political leaders, nor does it appear to be changing, despite changes in leadership. According to one study, despite political shifts, there has been virtually no change in the style or substance of defense industry appropriations. In fact, most members of the new congressional order have been wary of speaking out against the growth of the military industrial complex. Critics have suggested that such companies are perpetuating defense buildups despite the absence of a viable threat.

While the future of the military industrial complex remains uncertain, it has become an influential entity in business and politics. When the Cold War came to an end, spending on defense, in the US and in other industrialized nations, began to shrink. However, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, spending turned upward again around the globe. From 2002-2003, defense spending reached $950 billion. More than half of that sum was funding for the US military industrial complex. In fact, in 2008 the US defense budget exceeded the aggregate budgets of the eight other countries with the highest amount of military appropriations (Russia, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Saudi Arabia), cementing the lead that the US military industrial complex has in supplying major defense technologies and logistical support. With most of American security concerns focused on states who have a history of supporting terrorism, this figure also underscores an important point: the global fight against terrorism, a top priority in the US defense sector, remains an important issue in the minds of Americans and their elected leaders. If political leaders do not appear dedicated to combating this threat, then they may appear "weak" on the issue in the eyes of the public (Braddon, 2007).

Adding to the issue is the fact that private citizens tend not to oppose defense spending if it is done in their home districts. The Lockheed-Martin merger, for example, was endorsed by the then-Speaker of the House, Representative Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), whose home district housed Martin Marietta. Indeed, the military industrial complex is not a faceless institution-it is a powerful economic contributor in nearly every region in which it operates. In times of austerity, base and corporate closures and realignments have left many of the communities they departed fiscally challenged. The most recent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act, for example, left a great many communities with a sudden drop in population, vacant housing, and a lack of tax revenue. The areas surrounding the 11 military bases absorbing these relocated populations and businesses are faced with another challenge: a sudden population surge. Schools in particular will be hard hit, with 70,000 children enrolling in schools systems ill-equipped to handle such growth. With military personnel and contractors working to combat threats to US security from abroad, they are also facing hardship in their own families as their children face the possibility of receiving subpar educations (Maranzano, 2008).

Indeed, the military industrial complex, which experienced new growth with the renewed interest in global security, has entered into virtually every component of domestic society, from the political to the economic to the social. However, its influence has not stopped at the border: as this paper next illustrates, there are even broader, global implications for this industry.

The Military Industrial Complex on the International Stage

The rapid growth and expansion of the military industrial complex has had a significant impact on the international community. This influence is evident in two arenas. First is the effect such entities have on their potential competitors and partners in other countries. Many European defense firms also have contributed to this industry, although the US clearly remains the dominant leader. Rather than attempt to compete with American firms, these companies instead prefer to work as partners (albeit junior partners) on projects. Such partnerships can forge stronger trans-Atlantic relationships ("A shrinking arms market," 1997).

The second of these impacts centers on the effects such networks have on a region's political, economic, and social orders. An excellent example of this influence can be seen in Eastern Europe. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the former states of the USSR fell into limbo. Without a central, powerful economic driver in Moscow, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Georgia along with other nations became impoverished, economically stagnant, and susceptible to crime and corruption. Their only potential salvation, at least until Russia recovered from its painful transition from communism to democracy, was to look westward at their former NATO and Western European competitors. With few economic resources to offer the European Union, the most valuable resource most of the Eastern bloc countries could offer was strategic geography. In light of this fact, they have tended to look to NATO, the security alliance, for membership. Of course, few of these countries have the military hardware or logistical capabilities to contribute to NATO any more than they could contribute to the EU. In order to live up to their obligations to NATO, if brought in as a member, they would need to purchase such technology, likely from the same companies under contract to the US government.

Such relationships can have dangerous consequences. By infusing new weaponry into a country, the region could become destabilized. This situation occurred at the end of the Cold War, when heavy infusions of American military hardware prompted the Soviet Union to do the same with its allies, thus hastening its demise (Marullo, 1992). In the post-Cold War era, creating a new arms race in this sensitive area can undo the decade of cooperation between Russia (which is still the most powerful system in the post-Soviet sphere) and the West to reinvigorate and stabilize the region.

Destabilization is not localized to security organizations and government either. In light of the intertwining relationship between the military industrial complex and government, such a close relationship can result in defense organizations (military and private contractors alike) serving as a major tool of diplomacy. However, an unforeseen consequence of the military serving as an international emissary is that many nations, particularly those that are in the midst of transition, may not be equipped to welcome a military culture. A recent study reveals that the military has played significant roles in transitioning democracies (by bolstering defenses, combating insurgency and terrorism and other destabilizing elements). However, if these countries do not already have in place an experienced, civilian-led government, they may become more inclined to eschew legitimized civilian democracy in favor of military rule (Sundhaussen, 1998). In short, as an increasingly prevalent tool of diplomacy, the growing military industrial complex, by its nature as a promoter of security and defense (and not political development), could be doing more to stunt the growth of fledgling democracies than foster it.

Conclusion

The prominent economist and political activist John Kenneth Galbraith once complemented the concerns expressed by President Eisenhower. In his book, The New Industrial State, he warned of a thoroughly planned economy in which technocrats are firmly in control. The line between the private and public sectors would become "nearly imperceptible," in his view (Galbraith, 1967, p. 478).

The military industrial complex may not entirely fulfill Galbraith's vision, but it does seem to lend credence to its development. At the same time, Eisenhower's words of caution also seem to have greater resonance in the post-Cold War era than it did during his Cold War presidency. Indeed, the rise of the military industrial complex has lent an air of veracity to both concepts.

During the Cold War, concern over the expansion of communism led Congress and the executive branch to invest a much greater portion of federal spending in defense and security institutions, most notably the Department of Defense. The resulting interconnection between governments and those private contractors committed to carrying out the Pentagon's agenda have left an indelible mark on both the domestic and international fronts. In short, the heightened sense of concern about global terrorism has perpetuated the military industrial complex's growth as a major domestic economic contributor and as an inadvertent emissary of international diplomacy.

Terms & Concepts

Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC): An exploratory review designed to streamline and, where necessary, close and reassign US military bases.

Military Industrial Complex: Public/private network created by the interconnection of a national military, government, and private contractors.

Power Elite: The segment of American society that controls influential sectors of business , government, and politics.

Strategic Geography: National characteristic marked by political, economic, or security advantages based on geographic location.

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Adams, W. & Adams, W. J. (1972). The military-industrial complex: A market structure analysis. American Economic Review, 62. Retrieved June 2, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Business Source Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4504267&site=ehost-live

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Munro, N. (2006). Military-industrial duplex. National Journal, 38, 3. Retrieved June 2, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=22656096&site=ehost-live

O'Neill, W. L. (2007). National security and American culture. In The Long War. New York: Columbia University Press.

Schwartz, N. D. & Watson, N. (2003). The Pentagon's private army. Fortune International (Europe), 147, 36-43. Retrieved June 2, 2008, from EBSCO Online Database Business Source Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=9351976&site=ehost-live