Neurosociology

Neurosociology is a relatively new field that is dismantling some of the long felt distrust many sociologists have for biological explanations of behavior. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, attempts to prove that whites were superior to other races and that men were superior to women combined biological explanations with sociology. As these theories were discredited, sociobiology also fell out of fashion, and it has remained a neglected area of study until recently. Driven by inquiries arising from the increasing popularity of the sociology of emotions and new questions about free will, sociologists are again looking to the human body -this time to neurology — to understand the physical basis for social behavior. Neurosociology is working to connect new knowledge about the brain with studies of interaction.

Keywords: Attachment Behavior; Biological Reductionism; Emergence; Epigenesis; Limbic System; Neurosociology; Primary Emotions; Sociobiology

Overview

Sociobiology & the Roots of Sociology's Hostility to Biology

If sociologists have been slow to explore the implications of neurological research on social interaction, there is a good reason for their hesitation. Earlier attempts to explain social processes through biological explanations largely fell flat, sometimes with damaging consequences. Biological explanations were used in the past to attempt to prove the superiority of the white race over other races; likewise, attempts to prove women's inferiority to men were rooted in supposedly scientific biological explanations. Sadly enough, in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a variety of sociobiological approaches were used to "prove" that women and nonwhite peoples were inferior to white men.

For example, evolutionary theory in a rudimentary form was used to support racism, as scientists speculated that racial inferiority was caused by divergent evolutionary paths, or a sort of de-evolution by some races. Early understandings of genetic inheritance also played a role in supporting various sociologically and scientifically dubious enterprises, as Mendel's laws of inheritance were adapted to justify the eugenics movement, including sterilization of "feebleminded" people (who were often immigrants or mislabeled nonconformists) and virulent forms of racism. A popular theory called Lamarckianism even claimed that culturally learned traits could be transmitted from parent to child (McKee, 1993). Many sociologists distrusted these theories and insisted that social factors were more important in explaining behavior and social interaction. Others tried to work current biological theories into their sociological theories. After these biological theories were all shown to be flawed, most sociologists avoided biological explanations.

More recent attempts to root explanations of social behavior in the fact that humans are first and foremost biological creatures have not caught the imagination of many sociologists. Many sociobiological explanations are seen as being biologically deterministic or reductionist. That is, in these explanations, human behavior is reduced to a simple, biologically determined and ultimately predictable phenomenon. These theories are often close to suggesting that biology is destiny, which is unacceptable to a discipline that studies the intricate and complex causes for human actions.

However, advances in neuroscience, genome theory and related fields have made these fields relevant to sociology in new ways. While rooted in the understanding of humans as biological creatures, these disciplines emphasize the emergent properties of the various systems that make humans into physically embodied beings. A system is emergent if it has properties that cannot be predicted from a knowledge of its constituent parts. Sociologists believe that human social behavior is emergent, because knowing the predispositions of individuals cannot explain group-level phenomena like suicide rates. Many biological processes are also revealing emergent properties. For example, a human's brain structure is suggested by that person's genetic inheritance, but the actual end product is influenced by social and environmental influences as the person develops.

Applications

Neurosociology is a field merging sociology with neurology, linking theories of social interaction with new understanding of the roots of behavior in the processes of the brain. Neurosociology has begun to generate new explanations in areas that have long drawn sociological interest. Driven by inquiries arising from the increasing popularity of the sociology of emotions and questions about free will, sociologists are again looking to the human body -this time to neurology — to understand the physical basis for social behavior. Neurosociology is working to connect knowledge about the brain with studies of interaction. The most promising work so far seems to be in the areas of attachment, emotion, and motivation.

Attachment Behavior

Attachment behavior between caregivers and mothers has a neurophysiological basis. Research indicates that humans are actually hardwired for interaction and that the roots of caregiver/infant attachment are innate. As a caregiver comforts an upset baby, molecules called opioids are released in the baby's and the caregiver's brains, producing a sense of calm. (This process does not end as people mature; in fact, attachment behavior in adults also releases opioids in both the person being cared for and the caregiver.) Separation causes arousal and eventually distress in the infant; this creates a cycle of interaction between caregiver and child that is the model for all social interaction (Smith 2004; Smith & Franks, 1999).

As is true of much of the human body, the final structure of a human's brain is not completely determined at birth. Instead, genomes offer potentials for organization and structure that are later developed as humans interact with their environments. Epigenesis is the term for how genomes take environmental and cultural information and use this information and stimulation to develop structures. Studies show that the human brain develops throughout life and that its development is not determined at birth; it is strongly shaped by environmental influences and social interaction. Without proper stimulation (emotional, cognitive and social), the brain will not develop properly. Sensory deprivation and emotional isolation can affect the emotional, cognitive and physical development of children.

Some of the early work revealing the link between emotional stimulation and cognitive development was done by Rene Spitz in the mid-twentieth century. Spitz is most known for a study comparing children raised in a foundling home with children raised in a penal institution where their mothers were confined. The children in the penal institution had contact with their mothers while the children in the foundling home had little contact with caregivers beyond that which met their basic needs. While the children were otherwise from similar backgrounds and treated in similar fashions, their development was dramatically different. The institutionalized children who were raised with bonds to caregivers developed normally, while the foundling home children had extremely high mortality rates and showed emotional distress and cognitive impairment from a very young age. The damage done by this early neglect turned out to be irreparable. This early study was influential in changing the treatment of children in institutions. Advances in the study of the brain can explain what Spitz observed in neurological terms. Environmental influences such as cognitive and emotional stimulation and attachment to caregivers can actually change the brain's structure and potential as a child develops (Tredway, Knapp, Tredway & Thomas, 1999).

The term Neurosociology, coined by Bogen, was first used in an article by Bogen, DeZure, TenHouten and Marsh in 1972. TenHouten went on to pioneer research in the different capacities of the brain's hemisphere, and to apply this research to cultural questions. For example, people raised in different cultures use their brains differently. The left hemisphere of the brain generally handles conscious thought, speech, and decision making; the right side of the brain is in control of spatial relations, time, color, motion and expressions. TenHouten showed that the children of Australian Aborigines used the right hemisphere of their brains more than the children descended from European settlers, but when the Aboriginal children joined urbanized cultures, their brain patterns shifted to more closely resemble the Euro-Australians (Franks & Smith, 1999). Studies such as these reveal that cultural choices actual do rewire the brain, but also show that such cultural preferences are mutable (unlike the early cognitive damage studied by Spitz).

Neurosociology & Emotions

Sociologists have approached the study of emotion at both the micro-level and the macro-level. Topics from the personal shaping of emotion and the connection of emotion to the social structure have been explored. The study of the biology and neurology behind emotions can help sociologists understand how emotions work in social settings. Sociologists and psychologists generally believe that some emotions are innate to all humans and others are specific to culture. They call the former primary emotions. Primary emotions

• Cannot be reduced to combinations of other emotions,
• Are found in all known human cultures,
• Are found in many animals, and
• Have biological, physiological, or neurological aspects.

Generally, sociologists believe there are four primary emotions: happiness, fear, anger and sadness. To understand how these evolved, it is necessary to consider the four main problems of animals and human life:

• Temporality — living creatures have finite life spans.
• Identity — to survive, living creatures need to belong to a group.
• Hierarchy — groups have structures in which some have more power, status and strength than others, and
• Territoriality — living creatures need a place to live (TenHouten, 1999; Turner, 1999; Von Scheve & Von Luede, 2005).

A theory that has gained widespread acceptance among sociologists of emotion argues that dealing with these basic problems caused the primary emotions to evolve as survival mechanisms.

Emotions are produced by the functioning of four body systems:

• The automatic nervous system (ANS),
• The neurotransmitters,
• The endocrine system (which controls hormones) and
• The musculoskeletal system.

These systems work together to process stimuli and produce conscious and unconscious emotional reactions. Thus, these four biological systems are behind the most basic of social interactions. The most basic social process, role-taking, can be seen as a person's reaction to the overt display of these four bodily systems functioning in another person (Turner, 1999).

Emotion & the Brain

The human brain is asymmetrical, which allows it to pack more functions into a smaller space. Emotions are generated in several areas of the brain, including the neocortex and the subcortex. In an evolutionary sense, the oldest part of the brain is the part on the bottom — the spinal cord and brainstem. The newest part — the neocortex — is on the top. One of the oldest structures in the brain is the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus, along with the thalamus, makes up the structure known as diencephalon, which is above the brainstem and midbrain but below the neocortex. The hypothalamus and the structures below it regulate the automatic functions of the body, some of which figure into emotional reactions (for example, when the heart races or the face flushes during emotional arousal). The limbic system lies above the brainstem. The limbic system contains the amygdala (where pleasure, fear and anger originate), the cingulated gyrus, and the septal nuclei (Tredway, Knapp, Tredway & Thomas, 1999; Turner, 1999). Some theorists believe that these areas of the brain are actually sorted into several limbic systems that work together; others believe that the entire system works as a unified whole. Either way, the limbic system lies below the neocortex, which is where cognitive processing takes place.

Emotions are rooted in the limbic system; this means that many emotions arise and are experienced subconsciously, below the level of the neocortex. Emotions that are experienced consciously are subject to cultural interpretation and social construction. The limbic system in humans is much larger in humans than in other primates. This, combined with the fact that the brain's emotional centers evolved earlier than its cognitive and language centers, suggests that humans' emotional development was a factor in their evolution. Emotions create social bonds; such bonds would be necessary for group survival. Scientists have long believed that emotions have evolutionary functions; by bonding people together in groups, they raise the odds of altruistic behavior and group survival (Turner, 1999).

Studies of the brain suggest that emotion is necessary for cognition, that there is no such thing as a decision made on the basis of cognition alone. Since the emotional centers of the brain evolved first, the cognitive centers are basically add-ons that extended the functioning of the pre-existing emotional system. Emotional responses are much faster than cognitive responses and often occur subconsciously (Tredway, Knapp, Tredway & Thomas, 1999; Turner, 1999). In addition, some injuries to the brain that impair cognitive ability can leave emotional functions untouched. One of the more interesting studies of the link between emotion and cognition was conducted by Damasio, Bechara and their research associates. Studying people with damaged prefrontal cortexes, they found what seems to be a link between certain forms of cognitive impairment and emotional abilities. People whose injuries impaired their ability to feel emotions or recognize emotions in others also experienced a problem with rational decision-making, even though they otherwise seemed cognitively normal (Von Scheve & Von Luede, 2005).

Neuroscience, Motives & Accounts

Many sociologists have studied motives, motivation and accounts (the stories people tell to explain their actions), concluding that people often act and react so quickly that they do not actually have a conscious reason for their actions. Accounts are thus post-hoc explanations for actions. The question of what exactly motivates action has been black-boxed until recently. Neuroscience has suggested answers to the problem of motivation. First, many actions are stimulated by emotional reactions, and by reactions to others' emotional reactions read from their expressions and body language. The old truism that much is communicated through body language has support from studies of the brain and communication. Second, studies of people with split brains (people who for various reasons have damaged or severed their corpus callosum — the conduit that transmits messages between the two halves of the brain) show that messages received in the right brain that cannot be moved into conscious thought can still influence behavior. Furthermore, in experiments, when these subjects reacted to stimuli that had been planted in their subconscious (right) brains without their knowledge, they created plausible motives to explain their actions — actions caused by experimental stimulus, not by internal motivation. Other split-brain studies have revealed that emotions can also be generated below the level of awareness. Of course, these studies cannot be generalized to people with normally functioning brains, but they suggest a great deal about how subconsciously received information and emotions motivate behavior (Franks, 1999).

Viewpoints

The Question of Free Will

The studies above that suggest that people act from motives of which they are unaware, and that many actions are undertaken without cognitive awareness, raise an important sociological and philosophical question about free will. To what extent do people have control over their own actions? This question has preoccupied great thinkers in many fields through the ages, including religious figures such as Augustine and Calvin, philosophers such as Kant and Locke, and more recently, scientists in fields from quantum physics to neuroscience.

Neurobiologists have taken different stances on what research on the brain indicates about the extent to which humans have control over their actions. On one side are scientists like Charles Sherrington, who argue that consciousness is emergent. Because nothing in the structure of the brain in isolation can account for subjective consciousness, decision making must not be determined by brain structure and function. One the other side, experiments by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues complicate the idea of free will by revealing that activity in the brain begins before people are aware that they are going to act. In Libet's study, as subjects contemplated and then engaged in actions, the researchers tracked the milliseconds when brain activity began and the moment when the research subjects indicated that they had decided to act. The onset of cerebral activity — which Libet called "readiness potential" — always occurred milliseconds before subjects made a conscious decision to act. Some researchers have taken the fact that the subconscious brain moves toward action before the person is aware and consciously willing it to be a sign that humans do not have complete control over their own actions. Other neurobiologists, including Libet, think that free will is still possible, because there is a gap between brain activity and conscious intention, and another gap between intention and the actual onset of action. The second gap indicates that humans are in control of their actions, even if they are not aware of the initial impetus for them (Libet et al 1983; Libet, Freeman & Sutherland, 2004; Mele, 2006).

This research can add depth to existing studies; sociologists already deal with the question of free will when considering the impact of socialization and cultural constraints on actions. Indeed, a central concern of the field is explaining the tension between people's experience of themselves as freely acting creatures, and the social facts and constraints that actually guide so much of their behavior.

Terms & Concepts

Attachment Behavior: Caregiving behaviors, first experienced in emotional connection between infants and caregivers, hypothesized to have a neurophysiological basis.

Biological Reductionism: Reducing complex social phenomena to biological causes, such as gender or race; biological determinism.

Emergence: The functioning of an emergent system cannot be predicted from the knowledge of its parts.

Epigenesis: Term for how genomes are not programmed with exact instructions, but use cultural and environmental information to structure themselves.

Limbic System: Term for the system (or systems) in the brain responsible for much of the origination and processing of emotions.

Neurosociology: A field merging sociology with neurology, linking theories of social interaction with understanding of the roots of behavior in the processes of the brain.

Primary Emotions: 1) cannot be reduced to combinations of other emotions, 2) are found in all known human cultures, 3) are found in many animals and 4) have biological, physiological, or neurological aspects. The primary emotions are thought to be happiness, fear, anger and sadness.

Sociobiology: A field merging sociology with biology, rooting social processes in an understanding of the biological roots of behavior.

Bibliography

Firat, R., & Hitlin, S. (2012). Neurosociology and the difficult art of building interdisciplinary bridges. Contemporary Sociology, 41, 780–783. Retrieved October 30, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=83002955

Franks, D. (1999). Some convergences and divergences between neuroscience and symbolic interaction. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: Toward a neurosociology of emotion . Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Franks, D. & Smith T. (1999). Summaries of chapters. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: Toward a neurosociology of emotion . Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Libet, B., Freeman, A., & Sutherland, K., (2004). Editors' introduction: The volitional brain. In Libet, B., Freeman, A., & Sutherland, K. The volitional brain: Towards a neuroscience of free will. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.

Libet, B., Gleason, C., Wright, E., & Pearl, D. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106: 623-642.

McKee, J. (1993). Sociology and the race problem: The failure of a perspective. Chicago: The University of Illinois Press.

Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shkurko, Y. (2013). The compatibility between sociological and cognitive neuroscientific ideas on consciousness: Is a neurosociology of consciousness possible?. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 47, 123–141. Retrieved October 30, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=85746161

Smith, T. (2004). Where sociability comes from: Neurosociological foundation of social interaction. In C. Camic & H. Joas (Eds), The dialogical turn: New roles for sociology in the postdisciplinary age . New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Smith, T., & Benard, S. (2003). Conformity pressures in interaction: Neurosociology mechanisms in the emergence of informal norms. Conference Papers — American Sociological Association, 2003 Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA. 1-38. Retrieved March 4, 2010 from EBSCO online database, SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=15921911&site=ehost-live

Smith, T. & Franks, D. (1999). Introduction: Emergence, reduction, and levels of analysis in the neurosociological paradigm. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: toward a neurosociology of emotion . Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5.Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

TenHouten, W.D. (1999). Explorations in neurosociological theory: From the spectrum of affect to time consciousness. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: toward a neurosociology of emotion . Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Tillery, A., Varjas, K., Roach, A. T., Kuperminc, G. P., & Meyers, J. (2013). The importance of adult connections in adolescents' sense of school belonging: Implications for schools and practitioners. Journal Of School Violence, 12, 134–155. Retrieved October 30, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=86400561

Tredway, J, Knapp, S., Tredway, L. & Thomas, D. (1999). The neurological role of emotions in early socialization, reason, ethics and morality. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: Toward a neurosociology of emotion (pp. 109-156). Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Turner, J. (1999). The neurology of emotion: Implications for sociological theories of interpersonal behavior. In D. Franks & T. Smith (Eds.), Mind, brain, and society: Toward a neurosociology of emotion (pp. 81-108). Social perspectives on emotion, Vol. 5. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Von Scheve, C., & Von Luede, R. (2005). Emotion and social structures: Towards an interdisciplinary approach. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 35, 303-328. Retrieved March 4, 2010 from EBSCO online database, SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=18165664&site=ehost-live

Suggested Reading

Brothers, L. (1997). Friday's footprint: How society shapes the human mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

Franks, D. (2003). Mutual interests, different lenses: Current neuroscience and symbolic interaction. Symbolic Interaction, 26, 613-630.

Franks, D. (2007). Mirror neurons and Mead's theory of role-taking: Toward a more sociological view of the brain. Conference Papers — American Sociological Association, 2007 Annual Meeting. 1-19. Retrieved March 4, 2010 from EBSCO online database, SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=34595495&site=ehost-live

Freese, J., Jui-Chung Allen, L., & Wade, L. (2003). The potential relevances of biology to social inquiry. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 233-256. Retrieved March 4, 2010 from EBSCO online database, SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=10878509&site=ehost-live

Mele, A., & Cushman, F. (2007). Intentional action, folk judgments, and stories: Sorting things out. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31, 184-201. Retrieved March 4, 2010 from EBSCO online database, Academic Search Complete. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=26438419&site=ehost-live

Melamed, D., & Abromaviciute, J. (2013). The implications of social neuroscience for expectation states theories. Sociology Compass, 7, 255–264. Retrieved October 30, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=85603937

Peters, B. M. (2013). Evolutionary psychology: Neglecting neurobiology in defining the mind. Theory & Psychology, 23, 305–322. Retrieved October 30, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=87693603