Weber: Antipositivism and Verstehen
Max Weber, a foundational figure in sociology, introduced the concept of "verstehen," which emphasizes an interpretive understanding of human actions. This approach stands in contrast to positivism, the belief that social sciences should mimic the methodologies of the natural sciences through objective observation and quantification. Weber argued that understanding the subjective meanings individuals attach to their actions is essential for comprehending social dynamics. He distinguished between two types of verstehen: aktuelles, or observational understanding, and erklarendes, or explanatory understanding, which delves into the motives behind actions.
Central to Weber's methodology are the ideal types—abstractions that highlight the essential characteristics of social phenomena. These ideal types facilitate a deeper analysis of social actions and help connect individual behaviors to broader historical and social contexts. Weber contended that social action is inherently meaningful and oriented toward others, thereby rejecting the notion of collective action devoid of individual agency. His work has significantly influenced contemporary sociology, leading to diverse interpretations and adaptations, including phenomenology and symbolic interactionism, which continue to explore the intricate relationship between individual meanings and social structures.
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Weber: Antipositivism and Verstehen
Max Weber created a methodology in sociology that was based on the idea of “verstehen,” an interpretive understanding of people's actions. A reaction to the positivist belief that the social sciences should conduct research using the same methods as the physical sciences, Weber's verstehen connects individual action with broad historical processes and allows sociologists to take both people's subjective states and larger questions of causality into account. Verstehen is used to analyze meaningful social action, which Weber distinguished from mere reflex. Weber analytically connected this interpretive understanding of individual action with social structure through the use of ideal types—constructions that define an object in terms of its most essential qualities; these connections generated causal explanations of historical phenomena. Weber's interpretive methodology has been a major influence on sociology.
Keywords Empiricism; Ethnomethodology; Idealism; Ideal Type; Interpretive Sociology; Macro-level Analysis; Methodology; Micro-level Analysis; Positivism; Reification; Social Action; Subjective; Verstehen
Weber: Antipositivism & Verstehen
Overview
Since sociology first emerged as a social science in the nineteenth century, there has been much discussion about how best to study social dynamics. Some sociologists, called positivists, argue that sociology should study society in the same way that physical scientists study their subject matter, through careful observation of the behavior of the subject, subjected to rigorous analysis. Other sociologists point out that unlike the subject matter of the hard sciences—chemicals, atoms and the like—humans attach meaning to their actions. These sociologists argue that to fully comprehend human action, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the subjective states of the human actors—that is, to understand action, it is necessary to understand the motives and meanings attached to it. This approach is called interpretive sociology.
Max Weber (1864–1920) is one of the most important figures in the history of sociology, and was one of the earliest and strongest advocates for an interpretive methodology. One of the building blocks of his methodology was the concept of verstehen, an approach that takes individual meaning into account when analyzing society. To understand how verstehen fits into his methodology and sociology in general, it is necessary to explore Weber's definition of social action, his concept of ideal types, and his use of verstehen to connect individual action to broader social processes.
What is Verstehen?
Verstehen, a German word usually translated as "understanding," was a key element in the sociology of Max Weber. Weber is considered one of the major founding figures of sociology, along with Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Karl Marx (1818–1883). Unlike Marx and Durkheim, Weber did not limit his sociological analysis to macro-level social phenomena; in fact, he did not make a strong distinction between macro-level analysis and micro-level analysis. Instead, he thought that sociology should be rooted in a systematic understanding of the subjective meanings that individuals place on their actions, and that these individual-level understandings could in turn help explain social structures and historical change.
Verstehen was the methodological tool Weber used to accomplish this mission. In Weberian sociology, verstehen is necessary to create concepts and meaningful explanations of society, and to link the individual with the structural. Through his emphasis on understanding at the individual level, Weber avoided the reification of social structure that is so often the downfall of social analysis. In other words, he never forgot that action is human action. As he put it, "Action in the sense of a subjectively understandable orientation of behavior exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human beings… for sociological purposes there is no such thing as a collective personality which 'acts'" (Weber, 1964, pp. 101–102). While other theorists of his time tried to explain the existence of social institutions by referring to other institutions—for example, claiming that religion is a response to the economy, or social disorder is a response to specialization—Weber said that institutions cannot act. All action is human action; humans are the proper subject matter of interpretive sociology.
Weber's Antipositivism
This focus on understanding and interpretation was in contrast to sociology's trajectory before Weber. Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who first coined the word "sociology," envisioned his invention as a positivistic science. Positivists value observation and measurement, believing that sociology should strive to emulate the research methods of hard sciences like chemistry or biology. They prioritize empiricism and quantification, and they believe that through careful application of the traditional scientific method, sociologists should be able to discover laws that govern human behavior.
The positivistic program invented by Comte was first effectively employed by Emile Durkheim, who analyzed group-level phenomena (what he called "social facts"), such as the suicide rate, to discover the predictable and regular nature of human action. Durkheim's work contrasts with Weber's because Durkheim had little interest in the subjective interpretation of events, being more interested in social forces that were external to any individual. In a sense, Weber began his research at the point where Durkheim's ended.
Weber thought that the methods used by the natural and physical sciences could not explain human action because they neglected the human ability to attach meaning to action or to exercise free will and act according to intelligible motives. Thus he rejected positivism. But to say he was anti-positivist does not mean he was anti-empirical. He did incorporate large-scale historical and statistical data into his analysis, but he did so as part of his questions; in his view, data needed interpretive explanation. His answers always were grounded in verstehen, explanatory understanding (Smelser & Warner, 1976). Weber believed that social patterns and social structures were inventions that people constructed and imposed on their world to create order and meaning. To arrive at a true understanding of social dynamics, it was necessary to begin with the subjective meaning attached to action. Even when discussing broad processes, Weber held steadfast to his interpretive framework and rejected the sort of functionalist analysis that treated structures or institutions as things with the ability to act.
Social Action
Weber used the term "social action" to refer specifically to the meaningful acts of individuals, distinguishing these acts from mere reflex behavior. Social action is oriented toward other individuals and is given meaning by them. Weber distinguished social action from reflex action (for example, sneezing), involuntary action (like being accidently shoved in the line at the concession stand) or irrational acts (for example, the actions of a person with dementia). In his words, "Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, 1964, p. 88). Verstehen is used to analyze intentional and meaningful social action (Munch, 1991; Tucker, 1991).
Types of Verstehen
Weber distinguished between two kinds of verstehen: aktuelles Verstehen and erklarendes Verstehen. Aktuelles Verstehen is usually translated as "observational" (Weber, 1964, pp. 94–95) and refers to an understanding of motive and action that can be gleaned from simple observation. In his examples, observational understanding includes the processes found in the basic comprehension of a simple math equation or the ability to read a basic emotion like anger on the face of another. We understand that 1+1=2, or that John's facial expression indicates wrath. In contrast, erklarendes Verstehen, 'explanatory' understanding, refers to the understanding of the motive or meaning behind an act. For example, when seeking an explanatory understanding of a person writing a math equation, we have reached our goal if "we understand what makes him do this at precisely this moment and in these circumstances. Understanding in this sense is attained if we know that he is engaged in balancing a ledger or in making a scientific demonstration, or is engaged in some other task of which this particular act would be an appropriate part" (Weber, 1964, p. 95).
Interpretive understanding (erklarendes Verstehen) was not the ultimate goal of Weber's analysis. Instead, he believed that sociologists should move from interpretive explanations to causal explanations, passing from detailed description, to theorizing and categorizing, to comparison and generalization, to causal explanation. As he put it, "Sociology… is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course [sic] and effects" (Weber, 1964, p. 88). Verstehen was a first step in his methodology; without this step he thought the sociological project was meaningless.
Ideal Types
To move from verstehen to causal explanation, Weber created another tool—the ideal type. An ideal type is an abstraction that describes an object in terms of its essential qualities and its most typical characteristics. Ideal types are not meant to describe reality; instead, they are used as a basis of comparison. For example, when Weber wrote about the ideal type bureaucracy, he described qualities that are generally found in most bureaucracies as a starting point for analyzing bureaucratic dynamics; ultimately he explained the relationship between bureaucracies and the modern trend toward rationalization.
By ideal Weber did not mean the best or most perfect type; he meant the most typical, most common, or most expected type. Sometimes these are called "pure" types. There can be ideal types of action, ideal types of institutions, and ideal types of processes, historical configurations, and so on.
Social action becomes meaningful when it is understood in context. Sociologists can grasp a particular context through the use of ideal types. Returning to the example above of a professor writing 1+1=2 on the board: to arrive at an interpretive understanding of this social action, it might be necessary to create an ideal type professor, an ideal type classroom, an ideal type mathematics, or an ideal type scientific proposal. By creating these ideal types and using them as a basis from which to understand and interpret the meaning of this one specific act, a sociologist could create an explanation that linked the subjective meanings placed on the action with larger social institutions such as the educational system. The broad statements made about professors or equations in such a context would be ideal types: they would not describe every professor or equation, but they would be useful constructs with which to link typical behaviors and motivations to broader patterns.
It is the use of ideal types that keeps verstehen from being too narrowly focused on the individual. Ideal types provide context, and context provides an understanding of motivation, linking the individual's subjective meanings with broad social structures and processes (Tucker, 1991).
Applications
Verstehen & Antipositivism in Weber's Work
There were many facets to Weber's methodology. He usually began by defining his concepts closely, searched for subjective meanings of events, created ideal types, and then used these tools to create causal explanations of social dynamics. To move from concept to explanation, he used massive amounts of historical data, reaching across centuries and cultures for comparisons. For example, in his best-known works he investigated the rise and fall of religions and economic systems, the rationalization of modern society, traditional, charismatic and rational authority, and class, status and power. Because of his use of verstehen, though, he treated historical change as the result of individual actions that were arranged into meaningful patterns (Hall, 1991).
His insistence on understanding large social dynamics through the lens of individuals' subjective understandings of their actions can be seen in his best-known work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In this work, Weber explored how modern life was defined by an increasing rationalization, a turning away from traditional ways of thought and a new emphasis on economic, ends-driven behavior. One of the guiding questions of this work was why capitalism took root fastest in Protestant countries. Weber argued that much of the explanation could be found in the meaning that Protestants put on their actions. Calvinism placed a high value on hard work, thrift and sobriety; Calvinists believed that their work was a calling from God. Practitioners of Calvinism believed in predestination; that is, they believed that before they were born, their destinies as either one of God's elect or one of the eternally damned were already determined. This belief led them to look for signs of God's approval in their daily lives, to reassure themselves that they were among the saved. Success in worldly endeavors was taken to be a sign of God's love. Surely there could be no better recipe for a successful transition to capitalism than a people who worked hard, saved, reinvested, and took material success as a sign of God's favor (Weber, 1930).
In his analysis, Weber used verstehen to analyze the subjective meaning of work and success to early Protestants. He used ideal types to compare religious beliefs and economic systems. Putting these together with data that described the worldwide transformation of traditional agricultural societies to capitalist systems, he was able to connect individuals' subjective interpretations of their actions with large scale historical change.
Use by Other Theorists
Weber's interpretive methods in general, and verstehen in particular, have been influential in sociology since Weber first popularized his methods. Some sociologists have used the concept of verstehen in a strictly Weberian fashion. For example, Weber was a direct influence on American sociologist W. E. B. DuBois, who studied racial dynamics in the United States. While DuBois conducted massive empirical studies of the living conditions of African Americans in the United States, he also, in works such as The Souls of Black Folk, drew connections between subjective interpretations of the color line and the historical and sociological forces that caused and maintained it (Collins & Makowsky, 1993).
Verstehen has also been adapted by many other sociologists and used in ways that differ from Weber's cross-cultural and historical focus. This adaptation began with phenomenology as espoused by Alfred Schütz. Like Weber, Schütz (1970) thought that because people create institutions such as the state, the market, or religions through subjectively driven action and then subjectively orient their actions to these phenomena, sociology should study what institutions and structures meant to people subjectively, as opposed to studying the institutions and structures themselves.
Schütz's phenomenology evolved into ethnomethodology in the hands of Harold Garfinkel. Ethnomethodologists continue on with Weber's goal of interpretive understanding, although they generally confine their analysis to small-scale interaction. Garfinkel believed that because human behavior was constantly subjectively reconstructed, the general smoothness of daily interaction should present a puzzle for researchers. To achieve understanding of social situations, ethnomethodologists tend to disrupt the commonly accepted definitions of what is happening. By treating friends as strangers, refusing to follow conversational conventions, standing backwards in elevators and the like, they disrupt normal understandings because they think that the taken-for-granted rules of society are best seen when they are broken; when they can no longer be taken for granted. Through his studies, Garfinkel asserted that the knowledge that an actor brings to a situation, the characteristics of this knowledge, how this knowledge is used by the individual—in short, all the factors that create the structure of society—are subjectively founded. This places Weber's initial insistence on subjective interpretation in the center of ethnomethodology's program of research, albeit at a more micro-level of analysis (Collins & Makowsky, 1993).
The interpretive approach also contributed to the development of the symbolic interaction of Herbert Blumer and to Erving Goffman's studies of self-presentation. Interactionism is a micro-level study of the development of self, the social construction of reality, and the techniques humans use to create and sustain a shared definition of the situation through their daily encounters. Like ethnomethodology and phenomenology, it is heavily in debt to Weber's interpretive understanding.
Researchers are still finding new uses for Weber's methodology. For example, the concept of verstehen provides the basis for the case-oriented quantification approach recent software used by qualitative researchers (Collins et al., 2008), and it turns up in fields from legal studies to psychology.
Viewpoints
Criticisms
By insisting that the subjective states of individuals were the proper subject matter for sociology, Weber took a stance midway between the empiricism of positivists on one side and the idealism of German historicists on the other (Coser, 1971).
The broadest criticism of verstehen and antipositivism as the basis for methodology comes from positivists, as could be expected. The main criticism from positivists is that because verstehen calls for the use of an empathetic, imaginative approach rather than strict empiricism, the findings it generates can be hard to test empirically and hard to replicate. Defenders of Weber's methods claim that this criticism is rooted in a misunderstanding of Weber's use of verstehen. To Weber, verstehen was not an end in itself; understanding and interpretation were supposed to then lead to causal explanations of widespread and repeated social phenomena. Granted, effective use of verstehen does rely on a particular observer's pre-existing knowledge; if the observer's ability to understand and create useful ideal types that correspond to reality is limited, the method will not generate useful explanation of action (Collins & Makowsky, 1993, p. 175; Tucker, 1991). However, Weber used verstehen to connect individuals to larger phenomena, maintaining a stance that was antipositivist, yet not anti-empirical.
Historicists and idealists criticized verstehen from another angle; they critiqued the idea that social science could be generalizable. Weber created his methodology in part as a reaction to the entrenched historical idealism that dominated the German academy in his youth. Historicists did not believe that it was possible to generalize about human behavior because it was too variable across eras; broad explanations and general theories were not considered possible (Parsons, 1965). Weber rejected the idea that explanation of human behavior had to stop at an idiographic level.
Some sociologists have criticized Weber's methodological writing for being unclear, for not clarifying the distinction between intention, motive and purpose. Others defend him by claiming that some of the confusion over the use of verstehen comes from mistranslations of Weber's work. Since Weber wrote in German, and since some of the concepts he used are difficult to translate precisely into English, there is bound to be ambiguity about what exactly he meant (Munch, 1991, p. 15). For example, the early translation of his economic works by Henderson and Parsons (Weber, 1947) is seen as having a more psychological and functionalist spin than later translations. The works later translated by Gerth and Mills (Weber, 1946) sound more related to conflict theory and less psychological.
Weber has also been criticized for not spelling out his methodology more clearly. While he did write a few articles outlining his techniques, he preferred doing research and writing to talking about his methods, so much of what is known about his methodological beliefs has been distilled from careful study of his various works (Hall, 1991).
Conclusion
Verstehen refers to a methodological tool, the interpretive understanding of individual action. The emphasis on verstehen is an emphasis on content and interpretation. Weber was not content with discovering historical patterns and social regularities; he was interested in what such patterns meant to the people whose daily lives formed the larger patterns that create what humans experience as immutable social structure (Smelser & Warner, 1976). In Weber's sociology, society is not idiographic, but is also cannot by simplified and captured in a few general laws of human dynamics. Verstehen allowed him to reject positivism and unify individual meaning with patterned behavior.
Terms & Concepts
Empiricism: The style of sociology that emphasizes the collection and analysis of data generated from direct observation of the world. It sometimes implies a preference for quantification.
Idealism: In sociology, the idea that reality is rooted in human interpretation. Reality is not independent of individual experience. People construct reality through daily interactions.
Ideal Type: An abstraction composed of the most typical or essential features of a concept or process
Interpretive Sociology: A methodological approach dealing with the meanings individuals attach to their actions
Macro-Level Analysis: The study of society at the level of institutions and broad social structure
Methodology: Systematic research techniques. Methodology refers to the manner in which a sociologist gathers data, processes it, and interprets it.
Micro-Level Analysis: The study of society on the level of individual and small scale interaction
Positivism: A belief that sociology should use the techniques of the physical or "hard" sciences, that is, that sociology should study social regularities through an emphasis on quantitative phenomenon. A belief that macro-level or structural explanations are preferable to interpretive methods
Reification: Treating an abstract concept like a concrete, physical or "real" thing
Social Action: Action that is intended, meaningful, and oriented toward others
Subjective: Interpretation from the point view of the individual
Verstehen: Interpretive understanding, a methodological tool developed by Max Weber
Bibliography
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Munch, P. A. (1991). "Sense" and "intention" in Max Weber's theory of social action. In P. Hamilton (Ed.), Max Weber: Critical assessments (Vol. 2) (pp. 12–22). New York: Routledge.
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Schütz, A. (1970). On phenomenology and social relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Smelser, N. J., & Warner, R. S. (1976). Sociological theory: Historical and formal. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
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Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons, Trans.; T. Parsons, Ed.). New York: Free Press.
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Weber, M. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, Trans., Eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Suggested Reading
Bruun, H. H. (2007). Science, values, and politics in Max Weber's methodology. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Bruun, H. H., & Whimster, S. (2012). Max Weber: Collected methodological writings. (H. H. Bruun, Trans.). London: Routledge.
Freund, J. (1969). The sociology of Max Weber. New York: Vintage Books.
Kasler, D. (1988). Max Weber: An introduction to his life and work. (P. Hurd, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Swedburg, R. (2007). The Max Weber dictionary: Key words and central concepts. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.