Vasubandhu

Indian philosopher

• Born: c. 400
• Birthplace: Puruśapura, Gandhara (now Peshawar, Pakistan)
• Died: c. 480 c.e.
• Place of death: Unknown

Vasubandhu articulated and critiqued the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism and then developed the “consciousness-only” school, thus laying the metaphysical foundations of Yogācāra Buddhism.

Early Life

Access to the life and work of Vasubandhu (VAH-sew-BAHN-dew) begins with consideration of the activities of the Indian scholar and philosopher Paramārtha (c. 499-569 c.e.). Paramārtha was a Buddhist monk who traveled to China about 548 c.e., intending to spread the teachings of the Abhidharmakośa (fourth or fifth century c.e.; The Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu, 1983) and the Mahāyānasaṁgraha (fourth century c.e.; The Summary of the Great Vehicle, 1992). The former is a basic text of the Sarvāstivāda (or Vaibhāśika) school of Buddhism, written by Vasubandhu; the latter, a fundamental text of the Yogācāra school, written by Vasubandhu’s brother Asanga and annotated by Vasubandhu. In addition to spreading these doctrines and composing many other works, Paramārtha wrote a biography of Vasubandhu.

This biography is the foundation of the opinion, held both traditionally and by most contemporary scholars, that Vasubandhu was a single individual, rather than two distinct persons separated in time by a century or so. Paramārtha’s work of textual and doctrinal propagation supplies the grounds for the controversy. The Sarvāstivāda (“all-things-exist”) persuasion is a quite early (c. third century b.c.e.) deviation from the Theravāda school “Of the Elders,” also (critically) termed Hīnayāna, the “Lesser Vehicle.” The Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda (“consciousness-only”) position is a branch of Mahāyāna or “Greater Vehicle” Buddhism. The large designations Hīnayāna-Mahāyāna are usually understood as oppositional, as are the more detailed Sarvāstivāda-Vijñānavāda doctrines. This creates the “problem of Vasubandhu,” that is, the need to consider whether he is a single person, which views he held when, and why. The core of the problem is the legitimate doubt that a single individual would have held what seem to be divergent, even opposed positions.

Singularity is generally accepted. Vasubandhu is thought to have been born in the late fourth or early fifth century c.e. in the city of Puruśapura (modern Peshawar), located in the territory of Gandhara. The elder Asanga was probably his half brother, born of the same mother but not the son of Vasubandhu’s Brahman father. Vasubandhu was broadly educated in traditional Hindu texts but, like Asanga, chose to become a Buddhist monk. He was enrolled in the Sarvāstivāda school, then traveled to Kashmir for advanced instruction in abhidharma, that is, academic investigation into the nature of ultimate reality. Evidently, the young Vasubandhu’s intelligence was curious and searching, interested in the critical examination of arguments rather than adherence to any particular school or dogma.

Life’s Work

Vasubandhu and his brother were both Buddhist monks of, broadly, the Mahāyāna persuasion. The purpose of Buddhism is to transcend samsāra — the distressing cycle of repeated births and deaths—through enlightenment. Mahāyāna Buddhism teaches that the bodhisattvas, “enlightenment-beings,” seek transcendence or salvation not only for themselves but also for others. They help to provide the “greater vehicle” into which all may enter.

The philosophical Buddhist, then, seeks to gain enlightenment and to end suffering through investigation into both what is ultimately real, and therefore worth seeking, and, on the other hand, what is merely apparent or passing, and therefore of little or no concern. The Vaibhāśika branch of the Sarvāstivāda school, of which Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa is the most important text, understands reality in terms of dharmas.

In this usage, a dharma is that which exists noncontingently or—what constitutes practically the same quality—is able to cause an event. It is, however, misleading to attribute “thingness” of any sort (material or ideal, physical or mental) to dharmas. The comprehensive doctrine is that dharmas, while they have existence, are impermanent events or occurrences. Of course, “dharma-discourse” contains numerous details, most significantly the allocation of the seventy-five dharmas to five general categories. This categorization is in tension with the comprehensive doctrine, since it amounts to a mind-matter dualism; and it thus generates the question of how a physical occurrence is able to cause a mental event, and vice versa.

This categorical disjunction is secondary. Within the Buddhist frame, the “all-things-exist” position is deeply disturbing. It presents a world that is an endless sequence of momentary events, “the self” or “consciousness” included. Beyond this, it is unable to explain adequately either how, in the transmigratory cycle, the conscious self resumes following evident nonexistence, or how a self that is merely episodic and impermanent is able to achieve enlightenment and transcendence, that is, nirvana. The former may be termed the continuity problem, the latter the enlightenment problem. In sum, what might be called categorical empiricism or analytical phenomenology is hardly more than a starting point for mature Buddhist philosophical reflection.

In the tradition, a variety of homey and touching stories are told about how Asanga “converted” Vasubandhu from his Sarvāstivāda beliefs to the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. They amount to personal appeals from older to younger brother, in which Vasubandhu feels guilty about one or another fraternal misdeed. Be these as they may, attention to the Abhidharmakośa shows that Vasubandhu was presenting and examining Sarvāstivāda arguments, not subscribing to a creed. It is incomplete and ultimately misleading to argue that he was merely looking for solutions to philosophical problems. It is more accurate to say that Buddhist beliefs pose philosophical questions that must be thoughtfully resolved before the Buddhist soul may be in the greatest possible repose.

It is, then, the condition of consciousness (vijñāna), which must be considered carefully. To “consider carefully” normally means to “think about”; thinking implies a thinker and a thing thought, and is inherently dualistic. Yogācāra thinking avoids this trap. Yogācāra means “the practice of yogā.” Yogā, a Sanskirt word, is from the verbal root yuj, “to join”; yogā means “union.” Two things are thus suggested: first, that consciousness is to be considered and understood experientially, not abstractly or intellectually; second, that this understanding will be in the nature of a joining or a union.

It is not surprising, then, that Vasubandhu presents his mature reflections and conclusions in the Triṃśikā (fourth or fifth century c.e.; Three Works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1989) or “Thirty Verses.” These verses are best considered as a report on the experience of consciousness, and not as a treatise on the philosophy of mind. Following Vasubandhu, and thus avoiding all technicalities, consciousness is experienced as threefold. The order of presentation intimates that the first consciousness experientially is the consciousness of self (manas). Vasubandhu repeatedly says of this consciousness that it is “always reflecting.” It acts both to acquire and to look on its acquisitions. For example, it appropriates as “its own” the activities of the second sort of consciousness—perception—and thus has (knowledge of) events. The active self absorbs these experiences, and thus has thoughts and dispositions of its own. Furthermore, its relentless energy inevitably conjoins it with the “four afflictions”—view of self, confusion of self, pride of self, and love of self.

Consciousness of self, or “own-being,” is prideful and (therefore) unenlightened. It is not aware of its own origins. Somehow, the practice of yogā reveals that there is a kind of consciousness more primitive than either perception or the reflective self. Vasubandhu calls this third consciousness ālaya-vijñāna, usually translated “store-consciousness.” The store-consciousness is, as it were, the basket in which exist all the seeds (bīja), which subsequently develop into higher sorts of consciousness. It appears that the essence of store-consciousness is that it is nonintentional; that is, unfocused, all-accepting, and undirected by a purposeful, therefore partial, self.

The fundamental result of experiencing consciousness comprehensively is to place the self in a larger context, and thus to make evident the limitations of self-consciousness or “own-being.” The self arises from a condition of undifferentiated consciousness, prior to and free from self-concern. Enlightenment is the experiential—that is, direct and unreflective—apprehension of this larger consciousness. This is, for a Yogācārin, the direct experience of reality; that is, of “no (particular) thing.” One returns to that from which one has, as defined and limited self, arisen. This would seem to solve the continuity problem, since a ground in consciousness has been provided for each distinctive version of the self. In a formula, the self is diminished by expansion and transcends by returning; but it is of the essence of Yogācāra that such matters are experiential, not propositional.

Significance

The influence of Vasubandhu may be suggested with an analogy. Imagine, counterfactually, that the ancient Greek philosopher Plato first articulated a theory of forms culminating in an all-generating Good, then on further consideration reversed himself, became in affect his dissenting pupil Aristotle, and argued for a pluralistic world. For the Buddhist tradition, Vasubandhu was Plato and Aristotle rolled into one, but with the idealism-pluralism pattern reversed. His work in the Vaibhāśika division of the Sarvāstivāda school, classically expressed in the Abhidharmakośa, had a lasting effect on Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought and remains a basic text in some curricula to this day. His Yogācāra works were a principal reason that this school of Mahāyāna Buddhism became dominant. Spreading into China, Korea, Japan, and later the West, Yogācāra became, among other things, the foundation of Zen Buddhism.

Above all, Vasubandhu realized the basic principle of Mahāyāna. If Buddhism was to have meaning for many people, it had to be other than either received religious dogma or learned philosophical disputation: It had to be a matter of experience and practice. In showing that consciousness could be understood and expanded through the practice of yogā, Vasubandhu was able to derive and therefore ground metaphysical categories in experience. This foundation was critical in making Buddhism a practical part of everyday life. In assisting many, Vasubandhu was a true bodhisattva.

Bibliography

Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967. A widely available paperback by the greatest English student of Buddhism. Although brief on Vasubandhu, Conze places Mahāyāna Yogācāra in developmental context, and illuminates characteristic differences between Eastern and Western thinking. Notes and index.

Griffiths, Paul J. On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986. In this excellent but demanding work, Griffiths examines the detailed philosophical argumentation of both of Vasubandhu’s positions. The scholarly apparatus—glossary, appendices, notes, textual and interpretative bibliographies, and index—is extremely useful.

Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976. A brief but comprehensive scholarly treatment, available in paperback. Vasubandhu receives significant notice. Kalupahana pays particular attention to the meaning of Buddhist philosophical terms. Notes, bibliographies, and index.

Pandit, Moti Lal. Sunyata: The Essence of Mahāyāna Spirituality. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1998. A comprehensive contemporary treatment of the Mahāyāna persuasion. Vasubandhu is discussed largely in chapter 5, but his influence on Mahāyāna philosophizing is evident throughout. Reasonably accessible, especially the “Overview.” Chapter notes and references, bibliography, and index.

Prebish, Charles S., ed. Buddhism: A Modern Perspective. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975. An unusual cooperative effort by eight distinguished Buddhist scholars, resulting in short, topically specific chapters. Vasubandhu is discussed extensively. Chapter and comprehensive bibliographies, appendix, very full glossary, and index.

Raju, P. T. Structural Depths of Indian Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985. A masterwork by a veteran Indian scholar and philosopher. Raju places Vasubandhu, the Mahāyāna, and Buddhism generally in its larger Indian context and very usefully shows its influence on modern and contemporary Western thought. Notes, glossary, bibliography, and index.

Takakusu, Junjiro. The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. 3d ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975. This useful book is worth seeking out. Takakusu, a leading Japanese Buddhist scholar, translated Paramārtha’s “Life of Vasubandhu” and is persuaded of the “single Vasubandhu” view. He traces the influence of the various Buddhist schools in China and, especially, Japan. Contains helpful pullout tables of the dharmas, charts, and an index.