Dorgon
Dorgon was a prominent figure during the early Qing Dynasty, serving as regent and military leader during a critical period of transition for China. Born as the fourteenth son of the Manchu ruler Nurhaci, Dorgon played a significant role in consolidating Manchu power following his father's death in 1626. He became a key military commander and was instrumental in the invasion of Ming China, contributing to the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in 1644. Dorgon was known for his diplomatic skills and sought to gain the loyalty of former Ming officials, focusing on administrative reforms and efforts to reduce corruption within the new regime.
Dorgon’s leadership style included a controversial policy aimed at maintaining Manchu identity, such as enforcing cultural practices on the Chinese population. Despite his efforts to govern wisely and justly, Dorgon’s legacy is complex. After his death in 1650, his reputation suffered due to political rivalries, although he was later honored by the Qianlong emperor in the 18th century. His ultimate impact was notable; he helped lay the groundwork for a Manchu rule that would last for more than 250 years, even as his policies contributed to the eventual assimilation of the Manchu people into Chinese society.
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Subject Terms
Dorgon
Manchu prince and imperial regent
- Born: November 17, 1612
- Birthplace: Mukden, Manchuria (now Shenyang, China)
- Died: December 31, 1650
- Place of death: Kharahotun, China
Dorgon devised and implemented the political and military policies that led to the Manchu conquest of China. As regent for Shunzhi, the first Qing emperor, his measures contributed to the longevity of Manchu rule.
Early Life
Dorgon was the fourteenth son of Nurhaci and one of three sons the Empress Hsiaolieh bore to the Manchu ruler. Early in his life, there was a rumor that he was a favorite of Nurhaci and was slated to become his heir. More likely, Dorgon was one of the young men whom Nurhaci had chosen to participate in a leadership rotation. Not long after Nurhaci’s death in 1626, however, one of the four senior administrators, Abahai, forced the suicide of Dorgon’s mother in a successful effort to garner complete power for himself.
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Abahai chose not to punish the sixteen-year-old Dorgon or his brothers but instead treated them well, with Dorgon and his brother, Dodo, each gaining control of a banner (a military unit). In return, Dorgon served Abahai with dedication and courage and, during the period 1627-1636, participated in almost every military campaign undertaking by the Manchu leader. In 1636, when Abahai declared himself emperor of the Qing, Dorgon became a prince of the first degree with the designation jui. Two years later, he assumed command of one of two giant armies that invaded China.
Besides his military successes, Dorgon also possessed considerable diplomatic skills and was apparently admired by Chinese Mongols and Koreans. Abahai entrusted Dorgon with important administrative posts, and Dorgon was instrumental in the establishment of the Six Boards in 1631. Dorgon encouraged Abahai to treat the Chinese under Manchu control well in order to facilitate a future Manchu conquest of China. While Abahai accepted this advice, it apparently kindled the Manchu monarch’s suspicions concerning Dorgon’s ultimate agenda. Nevertheless, Dorgon served Abahai faithfully and continued to assume major responsibilities up until the death of the Qing emperor in September, 1643.
Life’s Work
Upon the death of Abahai, his eldest son, Haoge, competed with Dorgon for the Manchu throne. The successional dispute threatened to erupt into a civil war, with Haoge holding a slight military advantage. Dorgon, however, succeeded in obtaining a compromise. Abahai’s five-year-old son, Fulin, would become the heir and rule under the reign title Shunzhi. Until Shunzhi came of age, however, Dorgon and another Manchu prince, Jirgalang, were to act as regents.
Haoge and his supporters were mollified, expecting Jirgalang, who had enjoyed an outstanding military career, to be an effective deterrent to Dorgon’s ambitions. They had not, however, counted on either Dorgon’s political acumen or Jirgalang’s distaste for civilian matters. Within months, Jirgalang was referring most important governmental affairs to Dorgon, and the latter was laying the foundations for Haoge’s demise. By May of 1644, Dorgon had Haoge impeached for sedition and demoted to commoner. In 1647, Dorgon deposed Jirgalang, who had already been demoted to assistant regent, and had his own brother, Dodo, take his place. Finally, in 1648, Haoge himself was imprisoned and encouraged to commit suicide. Later, in 1650, upon the death of his own wife, Dorgon would marry Haoge’s widow as a symbolic gesture of victory over his former rival.
During the course of this consolidation of power, Dorgon had himself repeatedly promoted in rank, starting out as uncle prince regent and culminating in 1648 with the title of imperial father regent. In the same year, he was excused from prostrating himself before the emperor at audiences. Even as he was effecting a complete domination of the Manchu court, Dorgon was also leading the Manchus in their conquest of China and in the establishment of the Qing Dynasty (Ch’ing, 1644-1911). Dorgon proved to be as clever at military diplomacy and administrative reform as he had been at conspiratorial court politics.
Within days of consolidating his power at Mukden, Dorgon had begun a massive invasion of Ming China, which had been weakened by a decadent court and constant internal upheavals. In April, 1644, Beijing fell to a brutal bandit-rebel, Li Zicheng , with the Ming emperor, Chongzhen, hanging himself near the palace. During this time, the Manchus were preparing an attack on Shanhaiguan (Shan-hai-kuan), which was being defended by General Wu Sangui (Wu San-kuei). News of the fall of Beijing prompted Wu to invite Dorgon to participate in a joint venture to punish the bandit Li and to profit from captured booty.
Dorgon, however, following the advice of several of his Chinese followers, agreed to help punish Li but also made it clear that the Manchus intended to take over the Dragon throne. Dorgon called upon General Wu to surrender his troops and join the Manchus in recapturing Beijing and eliminating Li. Using flowery sentences that promised vengeance for the late Ming emperor’s death, Dorgon’s messages also pointed out the historical validity of the so-called Mandate of Heaven’s being passed from the unworthy Ming to the worthy Qing.
Unquestionably, these polished Chinese sentences were not the products of Dorgon himself but rather of advisers such as Fan Wencheng and Hong Chengchou. Ultimately, however, it was Dorgon who realized the usefulness of ensuring that the Manchu invasion would not simply be another barbarian raid. Accordingly, Dorgon issued strict instructions to his officers and men to refrain from looting. After rushing to Shanhaiguan and accepting Wu Sangui’s surrender and subordination, Dorgon marched to Beijing.
Li Zicheng had begun to attack Shanhaiguan but had retreated to Beijing on news of the Manchu-Wu alliance. There, he crowned himself the Yong Chang emperor as his troops savagely pillaged the capital. On June 4, 1644, however, Li left after setting the palace and much of Beijing ablaze. On the next day, to the amazement of those officials and residents who were anticipating a Chinese rescue army, Dorgon appeared and announced that the Manchus were there to receive the Mandate of Heaven. He promised Beijing’s residents and all Chinese that the Manchus would rule wisely and justly. Thus, with Dorgon as regent, Shunzhi began his rule over Qing China.
During the rest of his regency, Dorgon consolidated Manchu control, both through military force and by seducing former Ming military and civilian officials into his government. Slowly but methodically, Qing rule over China spread, and the waning hope of a Ming revival expired. In battle, Dorgon not only used his own trusted kin and supporters, but also cautiously employed some of Haoge’s former allies, as well as Chinese soldiers. Dorgon was very successful at enlisting the allegiance of former Ming military officials, and he was able to employ civilian officials and draw good service from them as well.
Perhaps Dorgon’s most impressive achievement was his ability to clean up the corruption that had characterized the Ming and yet do so with many of the same officials who had served in the corrupt administration. He did much to improve morale among the Chinese officials and helped reduce corruption throughout the empire by eliminating the power and influence of the palace eunuchs. Dorgon ordered that anyone who voluntarily castrated himself in order to become a palace eunuch should be decapitated.
The regent also reduced taxes and fought against venality, both at the court and in the countryside. He strove to maintain the examination system as a principal means of recruiting honest and conscientious Chinese officials to the Qing administration. Areas that had suffered from the civil wars of the last generation were often temporarily excused from taxes. Clearly, Dorgon was intent upon making Manchu rule as smooth and as acceptable to the Chinese population as possible. Yet, like his brother Abahai before him, Dorgon struggled with the question of the assimilation of the Manchus by the Chinese. Ultimately, his solution was a form of apartheid.
Initially, Dorgon vacillated over the previous policy of ordering Chinese under the Manchus to shave the front of their heads and wear their hair in queues, a very controversial demand designed to make the Chinese conform with a Manchurian cultural tradition. By 1645, however, Dorgon decided to demand this conformity of all Chinese under the Qing as a means of separating the conquerors from the conquered. Dorgon rationalized that this policy would actually reduce tensions, but it was clear that he wished to avoid having his people assimilated by the Chinese. He gave much of the rich farmland surrounding Beijing to Manchu troops and princes and even had the Chinese population moved from the northern part of Beijing to the south. While he recruited Chinese officials, he was also careful to leave the major positions in Manchu hands.
Having eliminated his major enemies and having achieved much success in ensconcing the Manchus in China, Dorgon began in the late 1640’s to give up some of his previously rigorous regimen. He began to build a magnificent palace in Southern Jehol and was already at work stockpiling luxuries and concubines. It was not clear whether he intended to retire from active politics or to shift the focus of Manchu power from Beijing to his future palace. In any case, while not quite recovered from an illness, Dorgon went on a difficult hunting trip, took ill at Kharahotun, and died on the last day of 1650. He was buried with great honor, but his reputation would not last long after his death. By March of 1651, some of his former enemies assumed the regency and proceeded to withdraw most of Dorgon’s honors and titles. His adopted son was forced to return to his previous family, and the records of Dorgon’s achievements were rewritten in an unflattering manner. In 1773, however, the Qianlong emperor restored most of Dorgon’s honors, and his name was celebrated in the Imperial Ancestral Temple.
Significance
A consummate factionalist player, Dorgon survived the deadly game of court politics resulting from the refusals by both Nurhaci and Abahai to designate heirs before they died. Had this been his only achievement, his career would have been historically insignificant. His legacy, however, was much more considerable. Dorgon surrounded himself with talented advisers and implemented their advice. He was thus instrumental in establishing Qing rule over China in a manner that would facilitate the longevity of the dynasty. His insistence upon a form of dyarchy allowed the relatively unsophisticated Manchus an opportunity to mature into their role as overseers of a traditional Chinese government. Dorgon’s policy with respect to eunuchs also prevented an endemic problem of the previous regime from ever developing to hinder Chinese Manchu rule.
Ultimately, however, Dorgon’s hope that the Manchus would forever remain a separate people failed. In measure, this was a consequence of his land policies: By distributing confiscated land among Manchus, Dorgon essentially laid the foundations for his people’s eventual abandonment of hunting and pastoralism, the absence of which opened the door to rapid Sinicization. The Manchus would continue to rule China for more than two and a half centuries, but by becoming agriculturalists, they could not, as their Mongol neighbors had done, avoid assimilation and remain a separate people.
Bibliography
Crossley, Pamela Kyle. The Manchus. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. A history of the Manchu people, including information about Nurhaci and succeeding members of the Qing Dynasty.
Des Forges, Roger V. Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast Henan in the Fall of the Ming. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. Recounts the Li Zicheng Rebellion in Beijing and the rise of the Shunzhi emperor.
Hummel, Arthur W., ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, 1644-1912. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-1944. Volume 1 contains an excellent biography of Dorgon.
Kessler, Lawrence D. K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 1661-1684. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Although concentrating on the achievements of the Kangxi emperor, the author provides some insight into the administrative beginnings of the Qing Dynasty during the Dorgon regency.
Lee, Robert H. G. The Manchurian Frontier in Ch’ing History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Essential reading for an understanding of frontier politics during Dorgon’s life.
Michael, Franz. The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942. Reprint. New York: Octagon Books, 1965. A somewhat controversial, but still-incisive discussion of the frontier state and the processes undertaken by the early Manchu leaders to prepare for the conquest of China.
Oxnam, Robert B. Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. In searching for the origins of the concept of regency and the nature of Oboi’s policies, the author devotes considerable attention to the model provided by the Dorgon regency.
Struve, Lynn A., ed. and trans. Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tigers’ Jaws. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Personal accounts of Chinese life from the waning years of the Ming Dynasty through the Manchu takeover and eventual Qing rule.
Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China. 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. A classic in the study of Chinese history. Wakeman presents a comprehensive study of the Manchu conquest and early rule over China. Volumes 1 and 2 devote much attention to Dorgon’s career.
Wang, Chen-main. The Life and Career of Hung Ch’eng Chou, 1593-1665: Public Service in a Time of Dynastic Change. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Association for Asian Studies, 1999. A biography of Hong Chengchou, a Ming court advisor who became the most powerful minister of the new Qing government.