Ii Naosuke

Japanese politician

• Born: November 29, 1815
• Birthplace: Hikone, Japan
• Died: March 24, 1860
• Place of death: Edo (now Tokyo), Japan

Ii was a conservative but pragmatic defender of the Tokugawa family’s rule (bakufu) in nineteenth century Japan. While he temporarily slowed the decline of the bakufu, his policies in the long run were ineffective in dealing with either the growing domestic hostility toward the shogunate or Western pressures to open Japan to full participation in world trade and politics.

Early Life

Ii Naosuke (eh-eh nah-o-sew-keh) was born into the large family of the domain (han) lord (daimyo) of Hikone, in central Japan. As the fourteenth son, he had little prospect of a major political career, because hereditary succession determined domain leadership. Lacking favorable prospects within the domain’s administration, he realistically could expect only that his father would secure his fortunes by arranging his adoption into a suitable family. A common practice in Japan, adoption was a principal means of solidifying a family’s political and military ties to other important families. His limited expectations were further restricted by the death of his mother when he was only five years old. Her passing left him without an adult to argue that he might be uniquely suited to participate in domain administration. It was largely chance that ultimately saved Ii from sharing with many of his elder brothers this fate as an adoptee and provided him with the opportunity to play a leading role in the national politics and diplomacy of a Japan that faced grave crises.

There was little in Ii’s upbringing that specifically prepared him to direct domain, much less national, policy in these tumultuous times. Reared with his younger brother in a small house by the castle moat, he trained until age seventeen in the traditional fashion of upper-class samurai. He studied poetry, religion (Zen Buddhism), the arts, and such traditional disciplines as tea ceremony. He also diligently practiced martial arts (fencing, archery, horsemanship, and gunnery) and studied strategy. As a young adult, the focus of his studies came to include discussion of current political and administrative matters. Among his acquaintances was Nagano Shuzen, who became a lifelong teacher, adviser, and friend.

Following custom, Ii’s elder brother, Naoaki, became daimyo, succeeding their father in 1834. By this time, some of Ii’s other brothers had died and the rest had been placed as adoptees in other prominent families. With the passage of time, it became clear that Naoaki would have no heirs, so Ii, in his early thirties, unexpectedly became the heir to the family headship. In 1850, when Naoaki died, Ii was installed as daimyo of Hikone.

Life’s Work

With his rise to daimyo status, Ii was thrust onto the national political stage for the first time. In part, Ii would make his mark by dint of his forceful personality and his willingness to become the leader of the political faction that defended the Tokugawa shogunate . He was also virtually guaranteed a measure of prominence solely by virtue of the fact that his family was one of the few who could provide candidates for the powerful office of great councilor (tairō), a post he would assume in 1858.

When Ii took on the responsibilities for domain administration, he also joined the ranks of the highest class of warriors and political figures in Japan, the daimyo. During the mid-nineteenth century, these men came to exert uncharacteristic influence on national policies and actions. Because the daimyo as a group were not formally incorporated into the bakufu’s policy-making organization, there was no effective means for resolving disputes among the factions that arose among them. During the preceding two hundred years, when Japan had faced no major foreign threat or internal crisis, this absence mattered little. The arrival of Europeans, who pressed Japan to open its ports to trade, sparked a controversy that the bakufu could not control. In this setting, some daimyo sought to challenge bakufu authority, and Ii rose to defend that authority.

A key issue in disputes among daimyo factions was the question of how Japan should respond to Western entreaties to open its ports. Should Japan open its ports to trade with the West, and if so, under what conditions? Should Japan keep its traditional policy of trading only with the Dutch on a limited basis? As early as 1846, the emperor, encouraged by those who sought a means to intrude on the traditional authority of the bakufu, urged the shogun to keep these “barbarians” out of Japan. (That was the first of several important efforts by this faction to use the emperor’s antiforeign opinions as a means to compromise shogunal authority.) Others, especially the students of the so-called Dutch Studies (actually, studies of Western nations), were aware of the growing technological and military power of the West. Some of these men argued that Japan could benefit from contact with the West. All suspected that Japan would have a difficult, if not impossible, time keeping Westerners at bay much longer.

Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s arrival in Japanese waters in July of 1853 brought urgency to the debate. Accompanied by several large and powerful steamships, the Perry mission was intentionally designed to impress, even to intimidate, the Japanese. Yet, at the same time, Perry brought examples of Western technology designed to entice the Japanese to trade with the United States. Perry’s visit was brief, but, before he left, he told the Japanese that he would return in a year to sign a treaty of friendship.

Perry’s visit caused substantial consternation among the Japanese. The nation had not confronted a foreign crisis of this magnitude for two centuries. In order to develop a response to Perry that would enjoy the broadest possible support from domain lords, Abe Masahiro, the most important shogunal adviser, requested all the daimyo to submit their opinions on the matter. Abe’s hopes of developing a consensus policy were dashed by the lack of agreement among the daimyo and the strident tone of many of those opposed to dealing further with Perry. Tokugawa Nariaki, who was to be the leading opponent of contact with the West, argued that Japan should refuse the American demands, strengthen the nation’s defenses, and be prepared for war. Ii, who soon became the leading advocate for a more restrained and pragmatic approach, agreed that Japan should strengthen its defenses but went on to argue that minimum concessions should be granted to Perry in order to avoid war. His proposals included extending the trading privileges granted to the Dutch to other Westerners.

Despite the division of opinion among the domain lords, the shogunate did sign a treaty of friendship with Perry when he returned in 1854. This treaty was limited in scope, but it contained one provision that would keep the foreign policy dispute alive for several years—a provision to negotiate a full-scale commercial treaty with the United States. Townsend Harris was sent to Japan as ambassador, with the specific charge of completing the commercial treaty. From the time of his arrival in 1856, Harris was beset by Japanese attempts to limit the performance of his ambassadorial duties. Among the Japanese, his presence and his mission were always a source of contention, even an object of violent attack. Abe attempted to deal evenhandedly with each side in the debate. Ii was appointed to guard the emperor and to protect him from the Western barbarians. Ii’s antiforeign nemesis, Tokugawa Nariaki, was placed in charge of coastal defenses. In the end, attempts to be fair only provoked heated reactions from each faction.

Between late 1855 and Ii’s death in 1860, however, Ii was able to engineer the appointment of a number of his supporters to high positions. Beginning with the appointment of Hotta Masayoshi to the rank of senior councillor, the pragmatic defenders of the Tokugawa rule gained preeminence in that most powerful advisory body. This development would have put Ii’s supporters in control under normal circumstances, but Nariaki was able to open another arena of competition that, if successful, would allow him to gain direct control of the shogunate itself.

The key issue was who would become the next shogun. Among the antiforeign faction, the preferred candidate was Nariaki’s son, Keiki. If Keiki were to become the heir and eventually the shogun, Nariaki and his followers could dominate the councillors, reform the shogunate, make efforts to keep the West at bay, and generally guide national policy. Ii and his allies naturally opposed this effort.

In early 1858, the domestic and foreign policy disputes between these two factions came to a head. Hotta presented the emperor with a commercial treaty (the Harris Treaty with the United States) for his approval. Usually, the emperor’s consent was automatic, but by this time the antiforeign faction and other supporters of Keiki had been able to convince the emperor that signing the treaty was not in Japan’s best interests. They persuaded him to refuse to approve the treaty. Rebuffed and embarrassed, Hotta fell from power.

Now Ii was given a special opportunity: He was appointed to the position of great councillor in early June. This office was not a regular one in the Tokugawa administration. Someone was appointed to this position only in great crises, and the authority to act decisively accompanied the title. Ii’s actions were forceful, even impolitic. By July, Ii determined to push ahead with the signing of the Harris Treaty. He also agreed to sign similar treaties with other Western nations. Determined to protect his political flank, he appointed his own candidate, the daimyo of Kii, heir to the shogunate. He also filled as many offices with his supporters as opportunity and his authority to force resignations allowed.

Finally, to remove further threats to his authority from Nariaki and others, he began a purge of his opponents. By 1860, he placed Nariaki under house arrest. About seventy people were arrested in all; seven were sentenced to death, and a number of others were either given short-term imprisonment or sentenced to exile. He dismissed other officials who disagreed with him. This aggressive assault on Ii’s opponents created an atmosphere of retribution. Although Ii sought to close the rift between the court and the bakufu, his opponents moved quickly to secure their own position at the imperial court. They created situations to embarrass Ii politically. Each of these efforts failed and frustration rose among Ii’s enemies. His aggressive attempts to support his own position created new foes.

Finally, opposition to Ii peaked in the spring of 1860. As he approached the Sakurada Gate of Edo on March 24, his carriage was attacked by a band of dissatisfied warriors, allies of Nariaki. Ii was hauled from his carriage and beheaded on the spot.

Significance

With Ii Naosuke’s death, the last major attempt to preserve the traditional Tokugawa political order ended. In the arena of foreign affairs, he had tried to preserve Japan’s independence by bending to Western demands enough to keep Westerners from invading Japan. Domestically, Ii sought to protect the traditional authority of the shogun, and he refused to grant additional authority to the emperor or the domains.

All Ii’s efforts failed to stem the crescendo of anti-bakufu criticism. Had Ii defended the bakufu’s prerogatives less vigorously, the Tokugawa shogunate ultimately might have been able to compromise effectively with its critics, and Tokugawa rule might have continued for more than another decade. Contrary to his expectations, Ii’s purges did not still the opposition but merely created more and deeper opposition to his policies. By 1868, four domains led a direct military assault on the bakufu and established a new, fully centralized government, which set Japan on the road to international preeminence.

Bibliography

Alcock, Rutherford. The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a Three Years’ Residence in Japan. 2 vols. Reprint. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969. A widely available account of life and politics in late Tokugawa Japan by a British diplomat.

Beasley, W. G. The Rise of Modern Japan. 3d ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of the Western challenge to Japan and the overthrow of the Tokugawa.

Hane, Mikiso. Modern Japan: A Historical Survey. 3d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001. Chapter 4, “The Fall of the Tokugawa Bakufa,” includes information about Ii and Perry.

Lee, Edwin Borden. The Political Career of Ii Naosuke. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Lee argues that Ii was a patriot who temporarily fought off those who sought to compromise the authority of the bakufu and who pragmatically dealt with the problems posed by Perry’s arrival and the advent of the “unequal treaty” system.

McMaster, John. “Alcock and Harris: Foreign Diplomacy in Bakumatsu Japan.” Monumenta Nipponica 22 (1967): 305-367. Diplomatic negotiations from the Western side, as seen by a British and an American ambassador. McMaster discusses the broader international context (economic and political) in which the negotiations took place and provides some sense of the military threat Japan faced.

Totman, Conrad. “From Sakoku to Kaikoku: The Transformation of Foreign-Policy Attitudes, 1853-1868.” Monumenta Nipponica 35 (1980): 1-19. A general reassessment of Japanese attitudes toward intercourse with the West. Totman suggests that at first loyalists and defenders of the bakufu shared the same goal for Japanese foreign policy—keeping foreign contacts to a minimum—but that they disagreed over the means. The ultimate victory of internationalization was the result of a change in fundamental Japanese perceptions of what was good for Japan, not the result of the ascendancy of a favorably disposed faction over isolationists.

Webb, Herschel. The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Chapter 4, “The Throne in Politics,” analyzes the increased use of the emperor by the anti-Tokugawa forces. Ii’s conflict with the imperial loyalists is discussed.