Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov

Russian military leader

• Born: September 16, 1745
• Birthplace: St. Petersburg, Russia
• Died: April 28, 1813
• Place of death: Bunzlau, Silesia (now Bolesławiec, Poland)

An innovative Russian military commander, Kutuzov is best known for defeating Napoleon during the French invasion of Russia in 1812 after having lost to him at Austerlitz in 1805.

Early Life

Born in St. Petersburg, Russia’s capital and “Window on the West,” Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (myihkh-uh-EEL ihl-uhr-YAWN-uhv-yihch kew-TEW-zuhf) was the son of Illarion Matveevich Kutuzov, a lieutenant general of the army corps of engineers who had married well and enjoyed the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna’s patronage. Following his mother’s early death, young Mikhail was raised in the country by his maternal grandmother but eventually spent time at his father’s house in the capital, where he acquired the social graces necessary to function among the high nobility.

At age twelve, Kutuzov was sent to military engineering school, where he compiled a stellar academic record. By 1761, he attained the rank of ensign and entered military service. Promoted to captain in 1762, he was posted to Astrakhan, serving under Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Suvorov, who would become Russia’s most revered military leader. Later the same year, Kutuzov was transferred to Reval to serve as aide-de-camp to the Estonian military governor. An accomplished horseman, Kutuzov first saw action in cavalry sorties against Polish patriots in 1768.

In 1770, Kutuzov, now a major, moved south to serve with Count Pyotr Rumyantsev’s army against the Turks near Bucharest. Although he distinguished himself in battle and earned a position on the count’s staff, he was transferred in disgrace in 1772 for mimicking his commander. Thereafter, Kutuzov would be less open and trusting and more prone to suspicion and keeping his own counsel. His subsequent service with the Second Army in the Crimea introduced him to operational service with the Cossacks. Nearly fatally wounded near the eye during an assault on Alushta in 1773, he returned to St. Petersburg for convalescence. (After sustaining a nearly identical wound years later, he would retain his sight but suffer recurring bouts of pain and display a disfiguring scar for the rest of his life.) In 1774, Kutuzov began a tour of Western Europe in search of medical help. Over the following two years, he traveled in Prussia, Holland, Britain, Austria, and Italy. In London, he developed an interest in the American Revolution, especially George Washington’s later leadership of the Continental army.

In 1776, Kutuzov returned to the Crimea, once again serving under Suvorov. From Rumyantsev, he had learned the importance of maneuvering his army to avoid unfavorable conditions for battle and of even being willing to retreat to gain an advantage. From Suvorov, he would gain a deep respect for the bravery and endurance of the Russian soldier, learn the necessity of leading by example, and cultivate a commonsense approach to training and managing his army. During his decade in the Crimea, Kutuzov was promoted to brigadier general (1782) and married Ekaterina Il’inichna Bibikova, with whom he had five daughters and one son who died prematurely. Renewed hostilities took his unit to the Turkish border in 1787. In 1790, Kutuzov won commendations and a promotion to lieutenant general following his heroism in the storming of the stronghold of Ismail, of which Suvorov appointed him commandant.

Between 1792 and 1802, Kutuzov served Russia as a diplomat or administrator in Poland, Istanbul, Berlin (where he acquired an appreciation of the superiority of the new French battle tactics and of the backwardness of the Prussian military), Vilna (where he served as governor-general), and St. Petersburg (also as governor-general). In this last post, he was implicated in the assassination of Paul III, the “Mad Czar,” and exiled from the capital by the new czar, Alexander I. After three years on his estates, Alexander recalled Kutuzov to assume command of the Russian forces in the War of the Third Coalition (August, 1805).

Life’s Work

Despite a notable career to 1805, the world knows Kutuzov as the opponent of Napoleon I. The highly influential Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, an observer in Kutuzov’s army, declared that “the wily Kutuzov was [Napoleon’s] most dangerous adversary.” In their two main encounters, Kutuzov was able to utilize the lessons learned from Rumyantsev and Suvorov to good effect, always concentrating on maneuvering and preserving his army rather than rashly committing it to possible destruction.

During the 1805 campaign, the Russians and Austrians combined forces near the Danube River for an assault on the Rhine region as the southern arm of a giant pincer designed to wrest Germany from French control. Napoleon, having concentrated the French Grand Army in Boulogne, France, in preparation for an invasion of England, was supposed to be caught off guard. The Austrians under Baron Karl Mack von Leiberich proceeded westward too rapidly, however, and the Russians never caught up. Napoleon discovered the plan and, with fabled speed, caught the Austrians in a trap near Ulm on the Danube River and forced their surrender.

Kutuzov now stood between Napoleon and Vienna, awaiting reinforcements from Russia. Despite political pressure to shield Vienna, he maneuvered his army north and eastward away from it, using tributaries of the Danube River as obstacles to the pursuing French vanguard. Though Kutuzov knew that this would doom Vienna, it would also overextend French supply and communication lines and increase the likelihood of Russian reinforcement. He feigned a stand at St. Polten and gained additional time by making the French commander believe an armistice had been signed. Enraged at the ruse, General Joachim Murat furiously attacked the Russian rear at Schöngraben, but Kutuzov’s strategic withdrawal continued. Finally, the Austrian and Russian emperors intervened and forced Kutuzov to engage Napoleon near Austerlitz.

Both overall command and the plan of battle were Austrian, however, and Kutuzov, in his customary plain gray tunic and battered peaked hat, commanded only the center. Rankling at the subordination, he nonetheless chose to stay with his troops for the sake of morale; he often referred to them as his “children” and never shirked his responsibility to them. In the ensuing battle on December 2, 1805, the French annihilated the allied army of ninety-five thousand men, inflicting thirty thousand casualties. Perhaps Kutuzov’s principal achievement was his management of the orderly withdrawal of the Russian units under his command.

Understandably, if not justifiably, Kutuzov was passed over for the Russian command during the Prussian-French War and remained in Kiev until the spring of 1807. He then returned to garrison duty along the Turkish front, serving under the unstable and extremely suspicious Prince Prozorovski. Suspected of intrigue, Kutuzov was removed to Vilna in 1809 to serve as the military governor of the Lithuanian province. Meanwhile, the French stepped up operations in the east, and the Turks once again became restive, while Alexander strengthened his western armies.

Kutuzov returned to the Turkish frontier in March, 1811, with orders to strike a swift and decisive blow. He gathered scattered garrison units into an army at Rustchuk and countered a Turkish attack. Waiting until the Turks split their forces while crossing the Danube in late September, Kutuzov surrounded and besieged their army of fifty thousand men. Despite demands for action by Alexander, Kutuzov refused to attack and only lifted the siege in May with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest. Although rewarded with the title “most illustrious Prince,” Kutuzov had incurred Alexander’s displeasure and was sent to Vilna, a fine vantage point from which to view the growing French menace to the Russian frontier.

On June 23, 1812, France’s army crossed the Nieman River, headed for Smolensk and Moscow. Mikhail Barclay de Tolly commanded the Russian army while Kutuzov recruited and trained men for the campaign. Barclay proved indecisive and ineffective, but Alexander’s disdain for Kutuzov delayed his appointment as Barclay’s replacement until Napoleon had captured Smolensk in mid-August. Although Kutuzov suffered from rheumatism, corpulence, and severe headaches, he was extremely popular with both civilians and the military. The army’s morale, if not its fortunes, soon rose, and leaders now expected a fight. Under Barclay, the first and second armies had lost one-quarter of their men, and Kutuzov had received only fifteen thousand of a requested eighty-thousand-man reserve when he began to deploy near Borodino on September 3, 1812.

Napoleon faced the Russian army of 128,000 men and 640 cannon with 130,000 men and 587 guns of his own. Initial clashes on September 5 cost each side five thousand casualties. Napoleon used September 6 to prepare for his assault on the Russian redoubts—well-chosen and heavily fortified positions from which the Russians could inflict heavy losses. Typically pragmatic, Kutuzov’s idea of preparation for battle was a good night’s rest for all. The next day, as the French assault slowly forced the Russian lines back, both commanders seemed detached and lost in their own thoughts; Kutuzov was accused of lethargy and apathy by his enemies. Whatever his mental state, he refused to abandon the field of battle and at day’s end dressed his line where his baggage train had been posted earlier. He declared victory and prepared to fight again, a ploy that heightened his men’s morale and convinced them of their success.

His declaration also encouraged the Muscovites. At the council of war (September 13) held at Fili on the outskirts of Moscow, however, Kutuzov decided to abandon the capital: “The loss of Moscow is not the loss of Russia. My first obligation is to preserve the army.” He would retreat through Moscow to draw the French forces into the city, then withdraw to the southeast toward Ryazan. Though neither “scorched earth” nor the burning of Moscow were Kutuzov’s ideas, his armies benefited from both, which deprived Napoleon of badly needed supplies.

The Russian withdrawal to the southeast turned abruptly westward after reaching Bronniski, south of the Pakra River. Murat’s pursuing cavalry, however, was shielded from this maneuver and led farther south, while Kutuzov headed west and then southwest to Tarutino, fifty miles southwest of Moscow. This strategic point allowed him to block French movement to southern supply depots in Kaluga and Tula and placed him in a position to intercept or harry a French retreat westward. He was also able to consolidate and augment his forces (from 85,000 to 120,000) and organize partisan detachments that would prove brutally effective.

On October 18, Kutuzov attacked Murat at Chernishna, west of Tarutino, which brought the French Grand Army out of Moscow. Napoleon decided to strike toward Kaluga, a potential gateway to Russia’s southwestern agricultural heartland, but was checked in a furious battle at Maloyaroslavets on October 24. The next day he decided to abandon his invasion and retreat westward along the Moscow-Smolensk road. Kutuzov had his army shadow the French along their horrific winter exodus. Though he planned several major attacks on the bedraggled columns, only minor actions resulted.

Kutuzov continued into Prussia on January 9, 1813, and was named commander of the Russian-Prussian coalition army at a meeting at Kalisch. Soon attacked by cold and fever, he died in Bunzlau on April 28 and was interred in St. Petersburg’s Kazan Cathedral.

Significance

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was considered by Russian poet Alexander Pushkin to have been the “Savior of Russia,” and many Russians would agree. Though he enjoyed high company, he eschewed military glory, preferring patience to rashness and striking when he held the advantage. Though Czar Alexander disdained him, Kutuzov’s men knew that he understood them, and they proved fiercely loyal. Such loyalty was vital in the aftermaths of Austerlitz and Borodino and during the abandonment of Moscow. “General Winter” indeed battered the remnants of the Grand Army, but only because Kutuzov’s Tarutino maneuver cut it off from the resources of the south. Kutuzov always considered retention of the integrity of his army more important than victory in battle, a philosophy that served him well in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Bibliography

Austin, Paul Britten. 1812: Napoleon in Moscow. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1995. Scholarly, well-researched account of Napoleon’s Russian campaign, including information about Kutuzov. Austin has written two other books about Napoleon’s military experiences in Russia: 1812: The Great Retreat (1996) and 1815: The Return of Napoleon (2002).

Duffy, Christopher. Austerlitz 1805. London: Seeley Service, 1977. Detailed military history of the Austerlitz campaign with maps and illustrations.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. Borodino: Napoleon Against Russia, 1812. London: Seeley Service, 1972. Excellent account of the battle, including aftermath. Nicely illustrated.

Palmer, Alan. Napoleon in Russia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. Standard military history of the 1812 campaign that balances French and Russian viewpoints. Includes excellent notes on sources.

Parkinson, Roger. The Fox of the North: The Life of Kutuzov, General of War and Peace. Abingdon, England: Purnell, 1976. The only critical full biography in English of Kutuzov, it places him firmly in the context of his time while giving him the benefit of every doubt.

Tolstoy, Leo. War and Peace. New York: Penguin Classics, 1996. This great novel is the only introduction most have to Kutuzov; a portrayal firmly grounded in reality and colored by Tolstoy’s admiration.

Zamoyski, Adam. 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March on Moscow. London: HarperCollins, 2004. A detailed, well-balanced, and thoroughly researched account of Napoleon’s Russian campaign. Chapter 12, “Kutuzov,” focuses on the Russian military commander, but there is information about Kutuzov throughout the book.