Speedy Trial Act of 1975
The Speedy Trial Act of 1975 is a significant piece of legislation in the United States that reinforces the constitutional right to a speedy trial, a right rooted in historical legal traditions, including the Magna Carta. This act established strict timelines for the prosecution process, mandating that the government must initiate prosecution within thirty days of an arrest and ensuring that trials are held within specified periods, typically sixty days after arraignment. The act aims to minimize the negative impacts of delays in the judicial process, such as loss of evidence and witness availability, which can ultimately compromise a defendant's ability to defend themselves.
The Speedy Trial Act is designed to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system while balancing the rights of the accused with societal interests in expediting criminal proceedings. It also allows trial courts discretion to dismiss cases that do not adhere to these timelines, although it does not apply to juvenile proceedings, which have separate regulations. By imposing these time constraints, the act seeks to prevent undue incarceration and alleviate the burdens of prolonged legal processes on individuals and the justice system. Overall, the Speedy Trial Act serves as a critical framework for ensuring timely access to justice in criminal cases.
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Subject Terms
Speedy Trial Act of 1975
Identification U.S. federal legislation
Date Became law in January, 1975
Intended to reduce the unnecessary detention of persons accused of committing federal crimes, the act established definite time periods for the completion of various stages in the prosecution of defendants for the commission of federal crimes.
The right to a speedy trial was derived from a provision in the Magna Carta, incorporated into the VirginiaDeclaration of Rights of 1776 and established in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The provision safeguards against undue and oppressive incarceration of persons prior to trial by minimizing anxiety and concern emanating from public accusation and limiting the possibility that undue delay will compromise the ability of accused persons to defend themselves. The passage of time may lead to loss of witnesses through death or relocation beyond the reach of the subpoena and the blurring of memories of available witnesses. Juxtaposed against these considerations is the societal interest in providing a speedy trial because incarcerated persons must be supported at public expense, and the fact that defendants incarcerated over a long period of time may be tempted to “jump” bail and may use the backlog of cases in a plea bargain for a reduction of charges or sentences. Delay is said to retard two of the goals of criminal law: deterrence and rehabilitation.
Held to be among Americans’ “fundamental” liberties in the Bill of Rights made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to a speedy trial is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to accused persons. The statute of limitations protects against possible prejudice from delays between the time the government has gathered sufficient evidence to proceed and the actual instituting of proceedings.
In determining whether a time period is too long to be consistent with the speedy trial guarantee, the Supreme Court in its major case in this area, Barker v. Wingo (1972), identified several factors that should be assessed: length of delay, reason for the delay, and defendant’s assertion of the right. A deliberate delay was deemed serious, while the absence of a witness was justifiable. Factors such as crowded dockets and negligence were to be judged individually. Finally, a court was to review the possible prejudices and disadvantages suffered by a defendant during a delay. A determination that a defendant had been denied the right to a speedy trial could result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or to reverse a conviction in order that the indictment may be dismissed.
Impact
The Speedy Trial Act imposed strict time deadlines and definite time periods for bringing defendants to trial, replacing the arbitrary factors of the Barker decision. It was decided that the government must initiate prosecution within thirty days following arrest (sixty days if no grand jury is in session), arraign defendants within ten days after filing indictment or information, and bring defendants to trial within sixty days following arraignment. According to the act, the following delays are not counted in computing days: delays needed to determine defendant’s competency to stand trial, delays due to other trials of the defendant, delays due to hearings on pretrial motions, and delays due to interlocutory (provisional) appeals that interrupt the proceedings.
The Speedy Trial Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, which have their own speedy trial provisions. Trial courts have discretion to dismiss cases that are not brought to trial promptly. States have the authority to enact their own speedy trial deadline provisions.
Bibliography
Samaha, Joel. Criminal Procedure. 4th ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1999.
Sundquist, James. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001.