Xunzi

Chinese philosopher

• Born: c. 307 b.c.e.
• Birthplace: Zhou Kingdom, China
• Died: c. 235 b.c.e.
• Place of death: Lanling, China

Through his development and modification of Confucian teachings, Xunzi built a synthesized and more realistic foundation for Confucian ideology that was influential throughout China during the Han Dynasty.

Early Life

Although Xunzi (shewn-dzur) is undoubtedly a great figure in Chinese philosophy, the basic facts of his life are still controversial among scholars. According to most Chinese scholars, he was born in the northern state of Zhao (Chao), and the period of his activities as a philosopher and politician covers sixty years, from 298 to 238 b.c.e. The most reliable sources about his life are his own writings, published posthumously, and Sima Qian’s Shiji (first century b.c.e.; Records of the Grand Historian of China, 1960, rev. ed. 1993). Yet almost no information about his early life, his education, or even his family background can be found in these early sources, which provide an account of his life beginning at the age of fifty, when he first visited the state of Qi (Ch’i) and joined a distinguished group of scholars from various philosophical schools at the Jixia (Chi-hsia) Academy. This lack of information about his early life prompts some modern scholars to doubt the accuracy of the Records of the Grand Historian and suggest that Xunzi first visited the Jixia Academy at the age of fifteen, not fifty. These scholars contend that either Xunzi’s age was erroneously recorded in the first place or the Records of the Grand Historian text was corrupted, and that his true date of birth is closer to 307 b.c.e. rather than the traditional c. 313.

Life’s Work

Whether Xunzi first appeared on the stage of history at fifty or fifteen does not change much of his historical role, for he did not really affect his contemporaries or his immediate environment during his lifetime. Like his predecessors in the Confucian school, Confucius (Kong Qiu; 551-479 b.c.e.) and Mencius (Mengzi; c. 372-c. 289 b.c.e.) specifically, Xunzi traveled from state to state, trying to persuade the rulers of Qi, Qu (Ch’u), Zhao, and even the Legalist Qin to adopt his brand of Confucian statecraft. The dating of his various visits to these states is again an area of endless academic debate.

There are, however, two reliable historical dates in Xunzi’s public career. In 255 b.c.e., he was invited by Lord Chunshen (Ch’un-shen) of Qu to serve as the magistrate of Lanling. He was soon forced to resign the post when Lord Chunshen gave credence to some slanderous rumors about the potential danger of the benevolent Confucian policy. Xunzi then left for his native Zhao. He stayed as an honored guest in the Zhao court until Lord Chunshen apologized for his suspicion and invited him to resume the magistrateship. Xunzi remained in the position until 238 b.c.e., the year Lord Chunshen was assassinated. Xunzi was immediately dismissed from office, and he died in Lanling, probably soon after the coup.

The most immediate impact of Xunzi on the political situation of the ancient Chinese world came, ironically, from his two best students, Hanfeizi (Han-fei; c. 280-233 b.c.e.) and Li Si (Li Ssu; 280?-208 b.c.e.). Both men deviated from his teachings of Confucian benevolence and turned his emphasis on pragmatic sociopolitical programming into realpolitik. Hanfeizi became a synthesizer of Legalist thought, and Li Si became a prime minister who helped Shu Huangdi (Shih Huang-ti; c. 259-210/209 b.c.e.) set up a totalitarian state after China was unified.

Xunzi’s greatest contribution to Chinese civilization lies in the field of philosophy, or, more generally, in the intellectual formation of Chinese sociopolitical behavior. His writings were perhaps compiled by himself in his later years but were definitely supplemented with a few chapters from his disciples. The standard edition of Xunzi’s works is the end product of a Han scholar, Liu Xiang (Liu Hsiang; c. 77-c. 6 b.c.e.), who collated and edited the available sources into thirty-two chapters. Since Xunzi lived through a period of fierce political strife, constant warfare, and tremendous social change on the eve of China’s unification (also the golden age of Chinese philosophy known as the period of the Hundred Schools), his approach to the social and ethical issues of Confucian philosophy was markedly more realistic than those of Confucius and Mencius. In his defense of Confucian doctrine, he not only refuted the arguments and programs of other schools but also criticized the idealistic strain of thinking within his own camp, particularly in Mencius’s philosophy. With an admirable command of scholarship and a powerful mind for critical analysis, Xunzi demonstrated the Confucian way of thinking in a most systematic and pragmatic manner.

In opposition to Mencius’s contention that human nature is innately good and man need only go back to his original psychological urges to achieve goodness and righteousness, Xunzi states that human nature is evil and that only through education can man distinguish himself from animals. Despondent as it appears, Xunzi’s conception of human nature is quite complex and far removed from pessimism. For him, human nature—though evil—does not determine human destiny, for people have a capacity for reasoning and learning and for attaining a higher and more civilized order. That humans created civilization and sloughed off their barbarism is clear testimony to the possibility of a brighter future for humankind, as long as the civilizing order is maintained and continued. The whole process of education and socialization thus becomes the focus of Xunzi’s ethical concern.

It seems that when Xunzi addresses the question of human nature, he has no preconceived illusions and deals squarely with human psychology as such. The evil of which he speaks is simply a composite body of animal drives and has no likeness to the Judeo-Christian concept of Original Sin. With such a no-nonsense and down-to-earth approach, he is interested in human nature less as an ontological issue than as an epistemological one. His particular emphasis on “artificial endeavor” for humanity also attests this interest, which some scholars describe as a “moral epistemology.”

Xunzi’s interest in education and socialization centers on the Confucian concept of li, which has been translated in different contexts as propriety, decorum, rite, and etiquette. It is Xunzi’s belief that proper social behavior is foundational for moral gentlemen and that institutionalized rites regulate human relations for a better society. Thus, education is not only a way of acquiring external knowledge for its own sake but also a process of internalizing all the knowledge for the molding of a good and moral person. On the other hand, society is not merely a background against which one develops his or her intellectual faculty or moral character: Society is the main source of personality development. Through interaction between the individual self and the social norm, a functioning structure takes shape and reveals a pattern of li that serves as the very basis of social order.

How did li first come into existence? Confucius did not talk about its origin. Mencius was not interested in it. For Xunzi, however, this question was of primary importance. In his treatise on li, Xunzi offers the following explanation:

Man is born with desires. If his desires are not satisfied for him, he cannot but seek some means to satisfy them himself. If there are no limits and measures of regulation in his seeking, then he will inevitably fall to wrangling with other men. From wrangling comes disorder and from disorder comes exhaustion. The ancient kings hated such disorder, and therefore they institutionalized li and righteousness in order to define the relationship between men, to train men’s desires and to provide for their satisfaction.

This explanation supports his argument that human nature is evil and also shows his concern for law and order.

For Confucius and Mencius, li is the internalized moral code that impels people to exhibit proper social behavior; it has nothing to do with the penal code, or law, imposed by government from outside to regulate social order. Xunzi’s practical concern for institutionalized law and order greatly transformed this Confucian concept of li. Confucius and Mencius could not bear to see a society’s peace and order being enforced by law, while Xunzi would acquiesce on this practical matter. Xunzi, however, was by no means a Legalist entrusting the programming of social order entirely to the institution of law; he always placed the benevolence of the ruling class, the moral behavior maintained by a gentlemanly social elite, and the education of the people ahead of the enforcement of law, a necessary evil.

Xunzi’s concept of nature also complements his realistic approach to social and ethical issues. He believed that nature exists independent of human will. Heavenly matters have nothing to do with social and ethical issues, and, therefore, human beings are solely responsible for their behavior. This attitude underlies logically his idea that human nature is evil and that the good is the product of humanity’s artificial endeavor. It also implies the unlimited potential of “evil-natured” humankind to do good and better the human world, because there is no supernatural force to hinder such a human endeavor. In this sense, Xunzi should be taken seriously as an ardent optimist with regard to human progress.

Significance

During his lifetime, Xunzi did not have any major effect on historical events. War, suffering, and political intrigue continued in his country. It was during this time of chaos and disintegration that Xunzi developed his systematic reinterpretation of the Confucian tradition. If the unification of China and the institutionalization of the Legalist program toward the end of the third century b.c.e. can only be partly credited to his students Hanfeizi and Li Si, at least Xunzi can claim a lion’s share in the formation of the Confucian system during the Han period, after the Legalist Qin Dynasty collapsed. This Han Confucian system, with its strong emphasis on the blending of practical sociopolitical institutions with moral concerns, has served as the foundation of Chinese social and political norms for two millennia.

Bibliography

Cua, A. S. Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu’s Moral Epistemology. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Contains a detailed and stimulating analysis of Xunzi’s ethical theory and the rationale and argumentative discourse in his philosophy. An in-depth study of an important but rarely touched area of Xunzi’s thought. With a bibliography, notes, and an index.

Goldin, Paul Rakita. Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi. Chicago: Open Court, 1999. Analyzes Xunzi’s thoughts on such typically Confucian topics as human nature, civilization, the relation of the individual to other people, Heaven, and the cosmos, the organization of the state, and the role of language.

Kline, T. C., III, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. Virtue, Morality, and Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 2000. A collection of eleven essays on various aspects of Xunzi’s Confucianism, both studying his own work and comparing it with that of other Confucian theorists.

Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. A remarkable study in the field of ancient Chinese thought, this book is scholarly but never dull. It presents all the major issues in clear language and compares them with Western philosophical concepts without losing their original meanings. The chapter on Mencius and Xunzi is informative. With a bibliography, notes, and an index.

Xunzi. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. Translated by John Knoblock. 3 vols. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988-1994. These three volumes contain annotated translations and full-scale studies of the complete works of Xunzi. With a glossary, notes, a bibliography, and an index.