Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
"Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" is a landmark Supreme Court case that explored the intersection of employment law and religious freedom. The case stemmed from a dispute involving Cheryl Perich, a teacher at a Lutheran school, who claimed she was wrongfully terminated due to her disability after threatening to sue the school. Central to the case was the concept of the "ministerial exception," a legal doctrine that allows religious organizations to make employment decisions without government interference when it comes to their ministers. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Hosanna-Tabor, affirming the application of the ministerial exception and asserting that the government cannot dictate the definition of who is considered a minister within a religious organization.
This ruling marked the first time the Court explicitly addressed the ministerial exception, highlighting the balance between protecting individuals from discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and respecting religious autonomy. The decision raised important questions about the extent of legal protections for employees of religious institutions and the potential implications for future employment discrimination cases within faith-based organizations. Critics of the ruling voiced concerns that it could diminish the rights of employees in religious settings, suggesting that it complicates the legal landscape surrounding civil rights and religious liberties.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Date: January 11, 2012
Citation: 565 US ‗‗‗‗ (2012)
Issue: First Amendment
Significance: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that a woman could not sue her employer for wrongful dismissal because due to longstanding rule known as the "ministerial exception" that protected religious institutions from employment-related lawsuits from those who carried out ministerial functions for the church.
Background
Cheryl Perich was a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor religious school, associated with a Lutheran church of that name. Perich took classes mandated by the church to become a "called teacher," one capable of teaching religious subjects. She did not teach religion in her normal classes, but she did teach a religion class four days and week and engaged in other religion-related activities with her students, including leading daily prayers in class.
Perich became ill and took a leave for several months. When she was about to return, school administrators decided her condition precluded her from teaching and suggested she resign. She refused and threatened to sue; the church fired her, saying that the threatened suit violated a church teaching to resolve conflicts within the church. Perich filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), arguing that the school had ended her employment due to her condition, illegal under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). That act prevents employment discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability and bars employers from taking any retaliatory action against an employee who asserts his or her legal rights. The EEOC agreed and sued the school.
A federal district court ruled in favor of the school on the basis of the "ministerial exception," which exempts churches from discrimination suits from those who are ministers of the church. Churches are accorded this right under judicial interpretation of the First Amendment. The circuit court, on appeal, did not accept the ministerial exception claim, saying that Perich did not fulfill the requirements of being a minister. It sent the case back to the district court to retry. The school appealed that decision to the US Supreme Court. The Court heard oral arguments in October 2011 and issued its ruling the following January.
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the decision. He began by discussing the distinction at the school between "lay" and "called" teachers, the latter of whom undergo specific religious training and, on its completion, are termed "Minister of Religion, commissioned." Perich, the chief justice pointed out, had that training, accepted the role of called teacher, and assumed the title.
The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The establishment clause prevents the government from creating an official state church. The free exercise clause prevents it from passing laws that would make it difficult for any individual to carry out practices consistent with his or her religious faith. Both clauses support the ministerial exception, Roberts wrote: "Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers." After recounting the extensive case law on this issue from federal appeals courts, Roberts stated the Court’s acceptance of the principle.
Roberts then recounted the various ways in which Perich met the definition of a minister in Hosanna-Tabor’s eyes. These included specialized training, her acceptance of the commission, her own use of the label of minister in claiming a tax allowance, and her performance of ministerial duties. Given that she fit the definition, and given the Court’s acceptance of the ministerial exception, Hosanna-Tabor was protected from a discrimination suit, and the appeals court ruling was overturned.
In a footnote to the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts did not close the door completely on any employment discrimination lawsuits against churches. While the opinion made it relatively easy for churches to claim an employee had a ministerial function, the footnote allowed that the courts had the right to review and judge the merits of such claims. Justice Clarence Thomas, in a concurring opinion, seemed to take exception to that statement, though he did not explicitly reject it. Thomas wrote that the courts should not be allowed to "second-guess the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ under the organization’s theological tenets."
Impact
The Court’s ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was significant chiefly for two reasons. First, Hosanna-Tabor was the first time the Court had addressed the issue of the ministerial exception.
Second, the Court is rarely involved in First Amendment cases related to church-state relations. It had been more than two decades since the Court had handled such a case. In that case—Employment Division v. Smith(1990)—the Court had ruled that smoking peyote, an illegal drug, could be a legitimate practice within a Native American religious ritual. Nevertheless, the Court said, the state of Oregon was justified in not paying unemployment benefits to two individuals who had been fired from their jobs as drug counselors because they had partaken in that ritual. Religious beliefs did not preclude a citizen’s duty to obey reasonable secular laws, the Court said. The Chief Justice argued that Smith did not apply in this case, however, because it involved "outward physical acts," whereas Hosanna-Tabor involves internal church matters.
Some legal experts have taken issue with the Court’s decision, suggesting that it raises many new questions. Law professor Caroline Mala Corbin took issue with the Court’s deviation from Smith. Surely, she asserted, the ADA is a law "that is both neutral and generally applicable" (954), the kind allowed to apply in the Smith case. The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, however, seemed to leave individuals with little protection: "People who wish to serve their God should not have to choose between their calling and their civil rights." Professor Elliott Williams agreed, and both Corbin and Williams suggested that the Court actually ventured into doctrinal issues by evaluating the ministerial status of Perich. As Corbin wrote, "In concluding that Perich’s title proves her position was important to the religious mission of the Missouri Synod, the Supreme Court made a number of decisions about the beliefs and practices of the Missouri Synod . . . that it really has no business making" (968). As Williams argued, "Under the Hosanna-Tabor reading of Smith, the Court must inquire whether the challenged behavior is more like the physical act of ingesting peyote or more like a decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself."
Bibliography
Berg, Thomas C., Kimberlee Wood Colby, Carl H. Esbeck, and Richard W. Garnett. "Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception." Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 106 (2011): 175–190. Print.
"Bill of Rights." The Charters of Freedom. National Archives and Records Administration, n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2016. <https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill‗of‗rights‗transcript.html>.
Corbin, Caroline Mala. "The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Luthern Church and School v. EEOC." Northwestern University Law Review 106.2 (2012): 951–971. Print.
"Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."565 US ‗‗‗‗ 2012. Supreme Court of the United States. Supreme Court of the U.S., 2004. Web. 18 Jan. 2016. <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf>.
"Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, n.d. Web. 18 Jan. 2016. <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-553>.
Williams, Elliott. "Resurrecting Free Exercise in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 36.1 (2013): 391–402. Print.