Juvenile justice and the Supreme Court
Juvenile justice refers to the legal framework dealing with individuals under the age of 18 who commit crimes, recognizing their need for different treatment compared to adults. Historically, the concept of a separate juvenile justice system emerged in the late 19th century, rooted in the principle of *parens patriae*, emphasizing the best interests of the child. The Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in shaping constitutional protections for juveniles, establishing critical rights aimed at ensuring fair treatment within this system. Landmark cases like *In re Gault* and *In re Winship* highlighted the necessity of due process, such as the right to counsel and the standard of proof required for allegations, paralleling adult rights to some extent. However, the Court has also maintained distinctions between juvenile and adult justice, notably denying juveniles the right to a jury trial to preserve the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile system. As societal views shifted, particularly in the 21st century, the Court ruled against harsh penalties like the death penalty for juveniles and life without parole for non-homicidal offenses, reflecting a trend toward rehabilitation informed by developmental research. This evolving landscape showcases the balance between ensuring justice for young offenders and recognizing their potential for change.
Juvenile justice and the Supreme Court
Description: System of laws, courts, and institutions created for children who commit illegal acts.
Significance: Beginning in the 1960’s, the Supreme Court required that the juvenile justice system employ some, but snot all, of the same due process protections as the adult criminal justice system.
As early as the Middle Ages, the English legal system recognized that children who commit crimes should be treated differently than adults. The U.S. legal system also recognized this and adopted the common law rule that children under the age of seven could not be criminally prosecuted and that those between seven and fourteen were presumed unfit to be prosecuted. Children fourteen and older were treated as adults.
By the end of the nineteenth century, scholars and policymakers came to the conclusion that a special, separate justice system should be created for young people, including delinquents and neglected and abused children. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899; within a few years, nearly every jurisdiction in the United States had followed suit.
Constitutional Protections
The juvenile courts were intended to be operated under the doctrine of parens patriae, which meant that their foremost consideration was to be the best interests of the children. Juvenile court judges were to give careful, individualized consideration to the needs of each child and were to recommend dispositions that would best meet those needs. In the case of delinquents, the main goal was rehabilitation. To accomplish these goals, juvenile court judges were given a great deal of discretion in their decision making, and the process was purposely kept free of many of the legal formalities of the adult criminal justice system, such as the participation of lawyers and juries.
By the 1960’s although commentators continued to applaud the objectives of the juvenile justice system, many criticized its actual performance. It was argued that the broad discretion afforded judges, combined with the minimal legal protections in place and the general overcrowding of the system, led to frequent abuses and injustices. The Supreme Court first responded to these criticisms in Kent v. United States (1966), in which the Court hinted that youths involved in the juvenile justice system might be entitled to at least some constitutional protections.
The protections that were foreshadowed in Kent were fulfilled by the Court a year later in In re Gault (1967). The fifteen-year-old defendant was accused of making a lewd phone call. After juvenile court hearings in which he was not represented by an attorney, was denied the right to confront his accuser, and was not allowed to appeal, he was committed to a juvenile facility until his twenty-first birthday. The Court, ruling that “the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court,” overturned his disposition.
In Gault, the Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that juvenile courts use certain procedural safeguards to ensure that juveniles are treated fairly and without bias. Juveniles have the right to be notified of charges far enough in advance of a hearing and in sufficient detail to prepare a defense. They also have the right to be represented by an attorney and, if the family is unable to afford an attorney, to have one appointed. In addition, juveniles have the right to confront witnesses against them and to refuse to incriminate themselves. Finally, they have the right to appeal the juvenile court’s decision to a higher court. The Court believed that these rights would protect youths while still enabling the juvenile courts to achieve their goals.
Additional Rights
A question left open by the Gault decision was whether juveniles were entitled to other due process protections as well. This question was answered, in part, in In re Winship (1970), in which the Court held that due process demands that allegations in juvenile court be proved to the same standard beyond a reasonable doubt as those in adult court. Although some commentators applauded this decision as necessary to protect innocent youths, others objected that to provide juveniles with the same rights as adults would prevent the juvenile justice system from achieving its goal of protecting children’s best interests.
The Court may have been responding to those criticisms a year later when it held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) that those accused in juvenile courts are not entitled to a jury trial. In this case, the Court once again expressed a deep disappointment in the failures of the juvenile justice system. However, it believed that to require a jury would not remedy these failures and would effectively erase the differences between the juvenile and adult systems, turning the juvenile system into a full adversary process. The Court was not yet willing to give up on the promise of the juvenile justice system.
After Gault and the subsequent decisions, the juvenile justice system has evolved to resemble the criminal system in some, but not all, aspects. For example, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause applies to juvenile proceedings and that juveniles are entitled to essentially the same Miranda rights as adults (but no greater). Juveniles, like adults awaiting trial, may be detained before their delinquency hearings to prevent them from committing additional crimes. On the other hand, the Court has also held in a series of cases that children, at least while they are in school, have more limited First and Fourth Amendment rights than do adults.
By the end of the twentieth century, when the juvenile justice system reached its hundredth anniversary, many policymakers as well as members of the general public echoed the Court’s frustration with the juvenile justice system. Many states enacted laws increasing the number of crimes for which juveniles may be tried as adults and lowering the minimum ages for adult court jurisdiction. As a result, most serious offenders were no longer treated by the juvenile justice system.
In fact, juveniles convicted of serious crimes could be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole or even death. In a series of cases decided in the early twenty-first century, the Supreme Court deemed that the Eighth Amendment protection against "cruel and unusual punishment" applies to juvenile offenders who commit their crimes before the age of eighteen and are tried by adult criminal courts. Juvenile offenders can no longer be sentenced to death, as a result of the 2005 ruling in Roper v. Simmons. Further, they cannot receive a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for nonhomicidal crimes committed as a minor (Graham v. Florida, 2010) nor mandatory LWOP for homicide or being an accessory to homicide (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). The Miller decision inspired efforts to make the rule retroactive—that is, apply to inmates who, as juveniles, were sentenced to life in prison without parole prior to Miller the opportunity. Ten state supreme courts applied the ruling retroactively in their states, while four decided against it, leading to the case Montgomery v. Louisiana to be decided by the United States Supreme Court. Taken together, these cases reflect a growing understanding of adolescent development thanks to developmental psychology and neuroscience research, and a corollary movement away from retributive justice for juvenile offenses toward rehabilitation.
Bibliography
Darden, Tiffani N. "Juvenile Justice's Second Chance: Untangling the Retroactive Application of Miller v . Alabama under the Teague Doctrine." American Journal of Criminal Law 42.1 (2014): 1–37. PDF file.
Del Carmen, Rolando V., Mary Parker, and Frances P. Reddington. Briefs of Leading Cases in Juvenile Justice. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1998. Print.
Hertz, Randy. "Judging Juveniles." Nation 294.14 (2012): 5. PDF file.
Krisberg, Barry, and James F. Austin. Reinventing Juvenile Justice. Newbury Park: Sage, 1993. Print.
Rubin, H. Ted. Juvenile Justice: Policy, Practice, and Law. 2nd ed. New York: Random House, 1985. Print.
"Roper v. Sullivan: The Supreme Court Prohibits the Execution of Minors." Supreme Court Debates 13.1 (2010): 6–8. PDF file.