Montejo v. Louisiana

Date: May 29, 2009

Citation: 556 U.S. 778 (2009)

Issue: A defendant’s Sixth Amendment protections following the appointment of an attorney

Significance: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that in some instances police may continue to question criminal suspects even after the suspect has requested an attorney without violating the suspect’s protections under the Sixth Amendment.

Background

On September 6, 2002, Jesse Montejo was arrested in Louisiana in connection with the murder of Lewis Ferrari, whose body was discovered in his home the day before. Montejo was arrested because he was an associate of Jerry Moore, who, as an unhappy former employee of Ferrari, was a prime suspect in the crime. Montejo waived his Miranda rights, and over the course of a lengthy interrogation, finally admitted that he had killed Ferrari during a botched burglary.

On September 10 he was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing. During the hearing Montejo said nothing, and a judge ordered that an attorney be appointed to represent him. Later on the same day, Montejo was again read his Miranda rights and taken on an excursion with detectives, in search of the murder weapon. While he was with the detectives Montejo wrote a letter of apology to Ferrari’s wife. He met his court-appointed attorney when they returned to the jail where he was being held. His attorney was dismayed to learn that Montejo had been interrogated without the attorney present.

The letter was inculpatory, and it was presented as evidence at Montejo’s trial. Montejo’s attorney objected but was overruled. Montejo was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.

On appeal, Montejo’s attorneys invoked a 1986 case before the United States Supreme Court, Michigan v. Jackson. The ruling in this famous Sixth Amendment case held that once an accused individual has asked for an attorney, the right cannot be waived unless the accused specifically does so. In other words, no evidence that comes from police interrogation is admissible if the interrogation occurs after the suspect has requested representation by an attorney. Montejo’s appeal stated that the letter of apology was not admissible on that basis. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that because Montejo was silent at the preliminary hearing where the judge ordered representation for him, Montejo had made no specific request for an attorney.

Because Montejo had waived his Miranda rights, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence of death. The United States Supreme Court asked one question of the litigants in the appeal: After the appointment of an attorney, does a defendant need to take additional steps to accept the appointment in order to secure the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court by a 5–4 majority overruled Michigan v. Jackson and ruled that in some cases evidence obtained through interrogation after a defendant has invoked his or her right to counsel may still be admissible. The majority opinion was written by Justice Antonin Scalia. He was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.

Justice Scalia concluded that the Jackson ruling did not apply where counsel was appointed whether or not a suspect made a request for representation, which was the case for Montejo. He argued further that other cases, notably the Miranda decision and two other related cases known as Edwards and Minnick, provided sufficient protection for a suspect.

• Under the Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but "badgering" by later requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of "a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence" before his arraignment, Cobb, 532 U. S., at 175 (KENNEDY, J., concurring), it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when Sixth Amendment rights have attached.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined in his dissent by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer in part. Justice Stevens argued that the Court should not have entirely overruled the ruling in Jackson v. Michigan. The dissent revolved around stare decisis, the principle of using precedent to make legal decisions. Justice Stevens argued that the Court was not giving appropriate value to the principle in its decision in Montejo. Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion that echoed and enhanced Justice Stevens’ arguments.

Justice Alito also filed a concurring opinion in which he was joined by Justice Kennedy. This opinion supporting the majority opinion mainly rebuts the dissenting argument. Justice Alito felt the Louisiana Supreme Court decision had appropriately ignored Jackson in its ruling and that the US Supreme Court’s decision had used precedent appropriately.

Impact

The ruling had different consequences for police officers and for suspects in crimes. The Supreme Court concluded that a suspect must actively assert his or her rights under the Sixth Amendment. If a suspect does not specifically make known the desire to exercise those rights, then he or she has waived the right to having an attorney present during questioning.

For suspects, one consequence is that the police need only provide the Miranda warning before questioning, unless the suspect clearly and specifically requests an attorney. For police, pursuant to the ruling they enjoyed much greater freedom in terms of questioning. As Police Magazine noted in an article published just two months after the decision, the Supreme Court ruling gave police officers greater latitude in investigations:

• Under the Montejo ruling, it will now be possible for law enforcement officers to attempt to obtain a waiver and an admissible statement from a defendant without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment, even after he has been indicted or has made his first court appearance on the case and has an attorney or has asked for one. The court imposed no time limit on this new opportunity for questioning, which could presumably occur even during pretrial proceedings or the trial itself.

Bibliography

Bergman, Paul and Sara J. Berman. The Criminal Law Handbook: Know Your Rights, Survive the System. Pleasanton: NOLO, 2015. Print.

Daly, Conrad C., and Lauren Jones. "Montejo v. Louisiana (07-1529)." Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School, n.d. Web. 24 January 2016.

Hall, Daniel E. Criminal Law and Procedure. 7th ed. Clifton Park: Delmar Cengage, 2014. Print.

"Montejo v. Louisiana." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, n.d. Web. 24 January 2016.

Rutledge, Devalis. "Sixth Amendment Waivers." Police Magazine. Police Magazine, 7 Aug. 2009. Web. 26 January 2016.

Warren, Jacob. E. "Montejo v. Louisiana: Affirmation Request and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel." Duke University Law School Repository. Duke University, n.d. Web. 24 January 2016.