War in Afghanistan

The US-led military campaign in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime and dismantle the al-Qaeda terrorist network operating in that country

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States were perpetrated by the international terrorist network al-Qaeda. The ruling regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban, gave safe haven to al-Qaeda, enabling it to conduct its operations. Shortly after the attacks, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies launched a campaign designed to destroy al-Qaeda and topple the regime that protected it. This initial campaign continued until 2014, costing the lives of thousands of American soldiers and civilian contractors as they engaged not only the Taliban and al-Qaeda but also other regional insurgents and warlords while attempting to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and stabilize the nation. Despite efforts to withdraw, the United States remained engaged in Afghanistan for years, with many experts predicting a proliferation of extremist groups if Western support of the Afghan government were to be removed. A full withdrawal finally took place in 2021, and the Taliban quickly returned to power, leading most observers to consider the war ultimately a failure.

When the terrorist network known as al-Qaeda launched its attacks against US targets on September 11, 2001, it did so from a secure location in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his leadership team were believed to be operating in a remote region of that country, where they plotted the attack, trained the perpetrators, and organized the transfer of funds to enable their operatives to carry out the plot. Al-Qaeda was able to do so because it was operating without interference, thanks to the support of the Taliban, a radical Islamic regime that had seized power in Afghanistan in 1996.

In order to get to al-Qaeda, therefore, the United States needed to engage the Taliban as well. The Taliban would need to be removed from power for the United States to launch a full-scale attack on the regions in which al-Qaeda was operating. Furthermore, Afghanistan itself would then need to be stabilized, with the Taliban's government replaced by a balanced infrastructure that would not support al-Qaeda. These objectives proved extremely daunting, requiring a significant investment of US military technology, money, and lives.

Toppling the Taliban

The Taliban was born from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, emerging from the US-supported resistance organizations that fought against the Soviets. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan during the late 1980s, various parties within the Afghan population began fighting with one another in the resulting power vacuum. The Taliban took advantage of the infighting and seized power in 1996, installing an ultraconservative Islamic form of government in the Afghan capital of Kabul.

Not long after the Taliban took power, a senior member of the group's leadership, Mullah Mohammed Omar, formed a relationship with Saudi Arabian–born terrorist Osama bin Laden after the latter moved his base of operations from Sudan to Kandahar, Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks, the United States demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden; Omar and his regime declined the ultimatum, instead offering to try bin Laden in an Afghan court. The United States then launched a major bombing campaign, followed by a full-scale invasion by American and British forces that routed the Taliban in Kabul and Kandahar, driving them away but not fully defeating them. The Taliban regrouped in the Afghan wilderness, gaining support as an insurgent group and coordinating with al-Qaeda to launch suicide bombings, car-bomb attacks, and other operations against the international coalition, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Compounding the issue was the fact that the Taliban had close, albeit undefined and unofficial, relations with the government of Pakistan, a partner of the United States in the war on terrorism. Although the Pakistani government was known to engage and capture al-Qaeda members on and within its borders, it did not launch a full offensive against the Taliban insurgency, making the US effort in remote Afghanistan more difficult. In fact, many experts believed that Omar himself moved to Pakistan, along with other members of the Taliban's leadership, and was safeguarded there after the Taliban ouster. Although al-Qaeda was the main goal of the US-and-NATO-led campaign, the flexibility and continued strength of the Taliban outside of the cities made both attacking al-Qaeda and establishing order in post-Taliban Afghanistan highly difficult.

Engaging al-Qaeda

As US leadership had anticipated, the main target of the war in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, proved an elusive foe. To be sure, al-Qaeda was frequently a collaborator in suicide bombings and other terrorist-style attacks against US and international forces. However, Osama bin Laden and his central leadership team were largely unseen during the 2000s. Most experts believed them to be in the mountain stronghold of Tora Bora, a cave complex in a rugged region in the White Mountains in eastern Afghanistan, near the city of Jalalabad. Tora Bora was a perfect hiding place, a network of caves and tunnels carved deep into the mountains. The mujahideen, Afghan fighters who had united against the Soviets during the 1980s, had used this network to evade Soviet bombings during the war. Osama bin Laden was believed to have arrived in this region in 1996 after being forced out of Sudan, and he and al-Qaeda used the stronghold to plot their attacks, conduct training exercises, and perform other operations without satellite detection.

As American and allied forces battled al-Qaeda forces in the area and relentlessly bombed the mountain stronghold, a campaign dubbed the Battle of Tora Bora, they continued to find themselves at least a step behind bin Laden and his top lieutenants. Despite a substantial reward for information leading to bin Laden's capture, information about his whereabouts always seemed to arrive a day too late, as forces would arrive at a suspected hiding spot only to find that he had already moved on.

The effort was further confounded by the fact that the Afghan people living in the eastern region, a collective of clans and tribes known as the Pashtun, refused to give up their foreign-born "guests" to the Americans. It is a Pashtun tradition to provide sanctuary to a guest who asks for it and to protect that guest with passion. Reward or no, the allied forces hunting bin Laden found little help from the local tribes. Efforts at cooperation were further compromised by collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by coalition airstrikes.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda was doing its best to convince the Afghan people that they were of the same heritage. Al-Qaeda operatives distributed propaganda to the Afghans, appealing to their shared Muslim faith and drawing comparisons between the Americans and the country's last occupying force, the Soviet Union. In this area, the United States was not just battling al-Qaeda; it was competing with al-Qaeda for the support of the people who could help it capture bin Laden and his cadre. However, when, in May 2011, US special forces were finally able to locate and kill bin Laden, he was not found in Afghanistan but in the city of Abbottabad, Pakistan. Killing bin Laden was a significant psychological victory for Americans, but it did not change the situation in Afghanistan or eliminate the threat from al-Qaeda.

Restoring Order in Afghanistan

The general goal of the war in Afghanistan was to thoroughly defeat al-Qaeda and subsequently prevent that network from reestablishing itself in the region. While ousting the Taliban and capturing the al-Qaeda leadership in the eastern part of the country were important components of this pursuit, it was critical for the success of the operation that the United States and its allies in the region work to stabilize the country, rebuild government infrastructure, and create an environment in which al-Qaeda and the Taliban could not return and thrive.

This element of the war in Afghanistan proved extremely daunting in light of a wide range of factors. One of these issues was ethnic tension. Between the departure of the Soviets in 1989 and the rise to power of the Taliban in 1996, many other groups emerged as would-be leaders in this diverse and fractured country. The most prominent of these groups were ethnic in nature, such as the Pashtuns (members of which made up the majority of the Taliban), Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Others were regional and tribal, although often distinguished by ethnicity, dominating smaller regions outside of Kabul and Kandahar. The Taliban's victory disenfranchised these groups, creating even greater divides between them.

During the war, a difficult task for Americans and the international community was to reach out to these groups and attempt to bring them to the table in a spirit of cooperation. In December 2001, under the terms of the United Nations–sponsored Bonn Agreement, an interim government was established in Kabul in which the Pashtun majority was no longer the dominant group, although the provisional government's leader, Hamid Karzai, was a Pashtun. In 2002, the interim government was replaced by a transitional government, still led by Karzai, in which Pashtuns made up a greater proportion of the administration, though still not a majority. (In 2004, Karzai was formally elected in a nationwide vote to a five-year term as president of Afghanistan, and reelected in 2009.) The new government's ethnic diversity, a positive attribute in the minds of the international commission that developed it, in many ways worked to the detriment of the government; because the various factions represented had previously operated independently of and in direct competition with one another, the government ministries under their control were frequently incapable of operating effectively.

Outside of Kabul and the cities, the stabilization of post-Taliban Afghanistan was even more difficult for American forces. The ethnic divisions that existed in Kabul were magnified in rural regions. Compounding the issue was the inherent distrust many of these groups felt for the Americans who had invaded their country. Some of these ethnic groups and tribes were suspicious of any outsiders, a fact al-Qaeda took advantage of as they competed with the Americans for the allegiance of the tribes, clans, and even warlords in rural Afghanistan.

Still another destabilizing element in the country was the drug trade. Afghanistan had long been a major producer of opium, but the drug trade during the pre-invasion years was limited somewhat by the Taliban regime, which regarded drugs as counter to the values of Islam. After being driven out of Kabul in 2001, however, the very same Taliban looked on the drug trade as a means by which it could continue its effort against the Americans. Al-Qaeda was also rumored to be involved in opium production, using the money to finance its own operations both in-country and abroad. During the 2000s, opium and heroin production skyrocketed, as without a viable alternative source of industry, Afghans continued to embrace the drug trade, undercutting the American effort to restore order to post-Taliban Afghanistan.

In 2011, with Osama bin Laden dead and an elected government in power in Kabul (though with very limited authority outside the capital), the United States and its NATO allies announced they would begin gradual troop withdrawals from the country. In December 2014, the United States announced a formal end to its combat mission in Afghanistan, although some twelve thousand US and other NATO troops remained in the country in a noncombat advisory capacity. Also in 2014, Ashraf Ghani was elected president of the country, amid a continuing Taliban insurgency and entrenched corruption in the Afghan government.

Impact

The initial thirteen-year war in Afghanistan replaced the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—nominally, it replaced a theocracy with a democracy, although the new democracy remained on shaky footing as of the end of NATO combat operations. The US goal was to destroy al-Qaeda's home base, capture or kill Osama bin Laden and the other leaders of al-Qaeda, and leave a country that was not hospitable to international terrorist activity. While the first goals were largely met, the future of the country as a haven for terrorism remained uncertain at the official end of the conflict in 2014.

In addition to the military effort, the United States needed to rebuild Afghanistan after driving out the Taliban. In Kabul, the inclusiveness of the new government proved problematic because of persistent divides between ethnic groups. Outside of the cities, the diversity of disparate clans, groups, and tribes made it difficult to unify Afghanistan, especially because the force seeking to do so was a foreign one. Finally, the major growth of the drug trade in post-Taliban Afghanistan helped support the Taliban and al-Qaeda and undermine the efforts of the United States and its allies to rebuild the country as a stable, democratic nation. However, the fall of the Taliban left a country that was, at least formally, more open to basic human rights such as education for women, and international aid organizations were able to enter the country and administer basic health care services that were missing under Taliban rule. Public opinion polls showed that a great majority of Afghans preferred the new government to the Taliban.

The first phases of the war in Afghanistan killed more than 3,300 troops from the US-led coalition, including more than 2,200 Americans. By some estimates, more than 16,000 Afghan security forces died. Taliban deaths are more difficult to tabulate, and estimates range from about 25,000 to 40,000. Civilian deaths in the conflict up to 2014 were believed to number between 15,000 and 20,000.

Persisting Conflict

Although the 2014 withdrawal of the majority of US and coalition troops marked an ending of one phase in the war in Afghanistan, Western forces remained involved in the region, mainly in advisory roles. Even before the withdrawal began, some experts warned that the Afghan government and its security forces were not stable enough to maintain power without direct foreign support, and that reducing the number of US and coalition troops would lead to a resurgence of the Taliban as well as terrorist groups. Post-2014, such a resurgence indeed took place. The Taliban's numbers increased and other extremists took up operations in Afghanistan, including a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL, Islamic State, or Daesh), which fought Afghan government and US forces as well as the Taliban. The administration of President Barack Obama was forced to rethink its withdrawal plans, slowing the removal of some troops and redeploying others, though in relatively small numbers. Operation Resolute Support, the NATO-led mission to provide continuing support to Afghan security forces that began in 2015, saw thousands of coalition troops remain in Afghanistan indefinitely.

As the fighting in Afghanistan stretched on, US policy on the conflict was shaken up by the election of President Donald Trump in 2016. During his campaign, Trump criticized US military involvement overseas and pledged to completely pull out of Afghanistan. However, by August 2017, he announced that he would in fact increase the level of US troops in that country, with the redeployment intended to destroy the Taliban and other terrorist organizations once and for all. Reportedly, Trump's view was swayed by advisers who suggested a rapid, full withdrawal would create similar problems to those encountered in Iraq, where the power vacuum left by US forces was blamed in part for the rise of ISIS. Yet despite his assurances of victory in Afghanistan, Trump gave few details of his administration's actual plans, such as the number of new troops or how the effort would differ in achieving success.

In September 2017, US defense secretary James Mattis authorized the deployment of an additional 3,500 American troops to Afghanistan. As there were reportedly still 11,000 soldiers remaining in the country, this new order brought the total to over 14,000. With the Taliban growing increasingly powerful once more, military officials stationed in Afghanistan argued that the Trump administration's new strategy for breaking the relative stalemate required even more soldiers; appeals were made to NATO countries to also supply more troops for the effort, but the fragile situation slowed the process and several important military positions remained vacant.

US forces continued to deploy throughout Afghanistan during 2018, although late in the year President Trump abruptly announced his intent to withdraw approximately seven thousand troops. Violence increased in the country as the Taliban continued to regain power, and US officials criticized Pakistan for allegedly protecting Taliban fighters. Meanwhile, the Afghan government and US advisers reported momentum in negotiations with the Taliban, and many experts suggested that some form of power-sharing deal with the militant group appeared to be the most realistic means of reducing the conflict. In early 2019, high-level talks were said to involve the full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban agreeing to oppose any international terrorist groups attempting to operate in the country.

In September 2019 negotiations between the United States and the Taliban reached a principle agreement on a peace plan for Afghanistan. However, soon after President Trump announced he was ending the talks, apparently due to a Taliban attack that resulted in the death of a US soldier. Taliban officials suggested they remained open to further discussions but also claimed they would continue their insurgency. Meanwhile, experts agreed that Afghan security forces remained heavily dependent on US support and many analysts continued to reassess what had become the United States' longest war. In early December 2019 the Washington Post noted that documents it obtained through the Freedom of Information Act showed a consistent pattern of US officials attempting to show progress in the conflict by misrepresenting facts and glossing over mistakes.

US Withdrawal

US-Taliban negotiations soon resumed, and in February 2020 a deal was signed under which the Taliban agreed to not harbor terrorists and the US would significantly draw down its forces in the country. The agreement also called for further negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government toward a stronger peace deal, which began later that year. In November 2020 the Trump administration announced the US deployment in Afghanistan would be reduced to 2,500 over the next two months.

US policy on Afghanistan continued to evolve after President Joe Biden took office in 2021. That April he announced that while the withdrawal deadline of May 1 under the previous agreement with the Taliban would not be met, all US troops would leave the country by September 11, 2021, no matter how intra-Afghan peace talks proceeded (the deadlines was later revised to September 1). He claimed the US could no longer justify a deadly "forever war." NATO officials also stated their troops would withdraw as well. Critics of these moves warned that the Afghan situation remained volatile and that extremist groups were gaining in strength, particularly after the Taliban had launched significantly increased attacks against government forces. As a large percentage of US troops had been withdrawn by July, Biden maintained that the responsibility for Afghanistan's future lay with the Afghan people and that the lives of US soldiers could not continue to be risked indefinitely.

By early August 2021, Taliban militants had succeeded in rapidly taking over several provincial capitals, and the Biden administration began redeploying thousands of troops to support evacuations of American personnel as well as Afghan civilians, particularly those who had aided the United States' efforts in the country. On August 15, it was reported that the Taliban had gained control over Kabul and that President Ghani, effectively ousted, had left Afghanistan. Many Afghans crowded the Kabul airport and sought escape alongside the diplomats, contractors, and other foreign nationals being evacuated as the transfer of power occurred. A deadly suicide attack attributed to the Islamic State also targeted the airport, heightening international attention even further. The Biden administration drew considerable public criticism for its handling of the situation, especially as it proved impossible to assist all Western-allied Afghan civilians in getting out of the country and away from potential Taliban retaliation, yet remained steadfast that the withdrawal was necessary. The last US troops left Afghanistan by September 1 as planned, though a relatively small number of US citizens remained stranded in the country in the aftermath of the evacuation.

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