Arctic international claims

Sovereignty disputes concerning the Arctic region

Centered on the North Pole, the Arctic region encompasses the Arctic Sea and the sea’s straits, marginal extensions, and islands. During the 1970’s, Canada and the United States claimed sovereignty to adjacent parts of the Arctic Sea, as did Denmark (which includes Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden.

Before the 1970’s, a harsh climate, polar sea ice, and physical isolation tended to keep the Arctic region out of any serious international disputes. However, such a dispute unfolded in the region in 1969-1970, when an American oil company decided to send one of its supertankers into the Northwest Passage, a series of navigable straits among Canada’s northern islands that joins the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

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Canada and the United States reacted differently to the decision. Canada claimed that it had sovereign control over any activity, either domestic or foreign, that occurs in the passage and that it did not want oil tankers using the hazardous route. The United States, on the other hand, claimed that the route passed through international waters. Hence, the Americans argued that Canadians could not unilaterally deny the passage of any vessel that meets international standards for environmental protection, crew training, and other safeguard procedures. Legal support existed for both the U.S. and the Canadian positions, but the dispute over control of the passage continued throughout the decade and beyond.

The Arctic Sea’s colorful history of exploration, which began in the sixteenth century, includes many failed attempts to travel the 4,500-nautical-mile, ice-jammed Northwest Passage. The Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen first succeeded where others had failed when he piloted a forty-seven-ton boat through the passage from 1903 to 1905. Several Canadian and U.S. government icebreakers had navigated the passage in single seasons after World War II.

There were no international differences involving the Northwest Passage until the SS Manhattan’s voyages in 1969 and 1970. The Manhattan was an oil supertanker owned by the U.S. firm of Humble Oil and Refining. In the fall of 1969, traveling from New York to Point Barrow, Alaska, the Manhattan became the first commercial ship to navigate the Northwest Passage. A reinforced steel bow and 43,000-horsepower engine turned the ship into a powerful icebreaker, although it needed assistance from conventional Canadian and U.S. icebreakers to make the two-month round-trip. The purpose of the journey was to test the feasibility of using the Northwest Passage as a new and relatively inexpensive route between recently discovered oil deposits in northern Alaska and the oil-hungry markets of Europe and the eastern United States. In the following summer of 1970, the vessel conducted a test cruise in the ice-strewn waters of the eastern end of the Northwest Passage around Baffin Island.

Until Humble Oil planned to use the Manhattan to navigate the passage, Canada and the United States were generally satisfied with extending their sovereignty from their Arctic shorelines three nautical miles (five kilometers) into the sea. Waters beyond the three-mile limit fell under the regime of high seasnavigation, where ships belonging to one country were not usually subject to laws of the other. However, the Northwest Passage was too wide to be covered by the three-mile rule.

Canadian officials foresaw this problem by claiming that the Northwest Passage was an internal waterway and that foreign ships could not navigate in the passage without Canadian permission, which the officials refused to give to the Manhattan. The basis of the “internal waters” claim was that Inuits (as Canada’s Eskimos call themselves) used the surface of sea ice as part of their hunting territory. This claim included the entire passage, as pack ice and ice floes fill the passage all year. U.S. officials ignored the Canadian claim and gave the Manhattan “un-consented” permission to undertake the voyages. As an assertion of sovereignty, Canada sent two conventional ice-breaking ships and observers onboard the Manhattan on both trips.

Impact

The SS Manhattan venture cost Humble Oil more than $40 million, and it showed that tanker transport of Alaskan oil through the Northwest Passage was feasible. However, the voyages did not result in permanent usage of the Northwest Passage by commercial tankers. Construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline from Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s northern coast to the port of Valdez on the state’s Pacific Ocean coast preempted the idea of using oil tankers in the Arctic Sea.

Even before the Manhattan entered Canadian waters, growing U.S. economic and cultural influence in their country chafed Canadians. Consequently, the vessel’s forays into what Canadians believed to be their internal waters ignited a flurry of diplomatic sniping between Canada and the United States during the 1970’s. Public controversy over the voyage caused Canada to pass the Arctic Waters Pollution Act in 1970. The act extended the country’s territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles. The legislation also withdrew the country’s recognition of jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for legal matters regarding the Arctic region.

Subsequent Events

The United States claimed that the Northwest Passage is an International Strait under the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 1985, the United States sent the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage without Canada granting official permission. However, two Canadian Coast Guard captains accompanied the ship as invited observers. After this voyage, Canada declared straight baselines around its northern islands. This declaration made all enclosed waters “internal” and provided for enforcement. Canada also reinstated its recognition of the International Court of Justice.

The two countries were reluctant to press their claims, opting to avoid quarrels instead. The 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the United States provided that both countries facilitate and develop cooperative measures for icebreaker navigation and research in their respective Arctic waters. The agreement also required that U.S. icebreakers seek permission to operate within waters claimed by Canada to be internal.

Despite the spirit of U.S. and Canadian cooperation, pressure on Canada to internationalize the Northwest Passage increased during the 1990’s. Opening the passage to shipping would make available a route between the Far East, the U.S. East Coast, and Western Europe shorter than the one through the Panama Canal. By the early twenty-first century, an accumulating body of scientific evidence of rising global temperatures and melting Arctic Sea ice increased pressure on Canada to internationalize the passage. Japan and the European Union, as well as the United States, showed the greatest interest in resolving the issue.

Bibliography

Johnston, Douglas M. “The Northwest Passage Revisited.” Ocean Development and International Law 33 (2002): 145-164. An overview of legal issues involving Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.

Smith, William D. Northwest Passage: The Historic Voyage of the S.S. “Manhattan.” New York: American Heritage Press, 1970. Detailed eyewitness account.

Smith, William D. “Study Suspended on Use of North Slope Tankers.” The New York Times, October 22, 1970, p. 71. Contemporary appraisal of plans for oil tanker navigation in the Northwest Passage.