Abahai

Manchu leader (r. 1626-1643) and emperor of China (r. 1636-1643)

• Born: November 28, 1592
• Birthplace: Hetu Ala, Manchuria (now in China)
• Died: September 21, 1643
• Place of death: Shengjing, Manchuria (now Shenyang, China)

Abahai consolidated and then expanded the Manchu empire begun by his father, Nurhaci. He established the foundations for the Manchu conquest of China and the replacement of the Ming Dynasty by the Qing Dynasty.

Early Life

Abahai (ah-bah-hi) was the eighth son of Manchu leader Nurhaci. Little is known about his early youth, but apparently as a teen Abahai impressed his father with his fierce courage and intelligence. By the beginning of the 1600’s, Nurhaci had created a unified Jurchen political state, which he originally intended to be ruled by his son Cuyen after his death. In 1613, however, when Abahai and several of Nurhaci’s other sons swore that Cuyen had tried to recruit them in a conspiracy against their father, Nurhaci had Cuyen killed.

In 1616, Nurhaci reorganized his government, calling it the Later Jin, in reference to his ancestors’ rule over North China during the Jin Dynasty (1116-1234). Apparently stung by the earlier ambitions of his eldest son, Nurhaci had determined to leave control of his nation to a ruling council rather than any single individual. Accordingly, in 1616, he named the four senior beile (or princes), who were to assist him in the administration of his growing kingdom. The four beile were Nurhaci’s three sons Daisan, Manggultai, and Abahai, and a nephew, Amin. In 1621, the four beile began to take monthly turns in the administration of national affairs.

Nurhaci warned his sons against choosing a strong, vigorous leader, predicting that such a man’s only goal would be to satisfy his own ambition. Upon Nurhaci’s death, in September of 1626, the four beile nominated Abahai to become the second khan of the Later Jin. Clearly out of deference to their father’s wishes, but also in keeping with their own ambitions, the beile expected Abahai to share power with them, and in the beginning, during all state functions, the four beile sat at the same level. Each prince commanded a single army banner (a military administrative unit that Nurhaci had created).

Abahai, however, having secured the title khan for himself, had no intention of sharing his power with his siblings in the long term. Sensing the group’s fear of their other brother, Dorgon, Abahai convinced them to force the suicide of Dorgon’s mother, the empress Hsiaolieh. In doing so, however, Abahai was able to gain control over another banner, thereby tipping the balance of power in his favor. He used this military advantage, as well as his political skills, to consolidate his rule and expand the empire that his father had begun.

Life’s Work

In 1629, Abahai abolished the monthly rotation of beile. One year later, he imprisoned Amin for a variety of offenses, and Daisan and Manggultai “voluntarily” swore allegiance to the khan. Upon Manggultai’s death, Abahai declared his brother to have been a traitor and took control of his banner as well. In consolidating his power in Manchuria and expanding his sphere of influence into China, Abahai relied on two separate sources of support: Chinese military and civilian officials serving the khan and younger Jurchen military officers who opposed the strictly hereditary power of the princes.

Abahai’s relationship with the Chinese provides an interesting reflection of both his political cunning and his historical acumen. He listened carefully to the advice of Chinese officials on political and administrative policies and acted on their suggestions to centralize his government. Moreover, he cautiously paid heed to their exhortations to fight the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and plan the conquest of China. On May 14, 1636, Abahai proclaimed himself emperor, changing the name of his dynasty to Qing, and his reign title to Chongde. (In the Chinese dynastic chronicles, his temple name would be Qing Taizong.) Nevertheless, Abahai was exceptionally fearful of his people’s being Sinicized, and he embarked on a series of measures to keep the Chinese and Manchus (a term he adopted for the Juchen in 1636) separate forever.

Abahai’s special handling of the Chinese was militarily astute and politically brilliant. Although Nurhaci had also employed Chinese people, his son developed a comprehensive program for recruiting Chinese military, technical, and political experts. In warring against the Ming Dynasty, Abahai took special pains to lure the Chinese military commanders to his side. He offered them substantial rewards for abandoning the Ming Dynasty and defecting to the Manchus. Moreover, Abahai was careful to insist that his own troops refrain from looting or any other conduct that would alienate the Chinese population. Chinese officers who had previously submitted to the Manchus often appeared in Chinese towns or garrisons to relate their own good fortunes and recruit people to the Manchu side. In this manner, countless Chinese not only submitted to Manchu rule but also came to serve Abahai loyally.

Chinese soldiers not only served as crucial allies in Abahai’s struggles against his brothers, but also frequently were instrumental in Manchu victories over fortified Ming towns, thanks to their mastery of artillery. Their skill in combat alone made them important members of the Manchu army. Equally important, however, was the fact that Abahai was preparing for the possible conquest of China. To this end, he needed knowledgeable officials, already familiar with the local politics and bureaucracy of the vast nation, to serve him and his successors should they become emperors. Undoubtedly, Abahai was aware of the ancient Chinese adage that “one may conquer China on horseback, but one needs learned officials to rule it.” Under Chinese guidance, he established a chancellery, or literary office, which he gradually developed into a secretariat. He also borrowed from China the concept of six boards and a censorate. All these measures were intended to facilitate the eventual transfer of power from Ming China to the Manchus.

Abahai understood that many of his younger officers sought a more accessible route of advancement. He promoted young men on the basis of their courage, service, and loyalty and created a network of capable and trustworthy officers. In 1637, Abahai created the Council of Deliberative Officials, composed of lieutenant and deputy-lieutenant generals. Princes and generals were excluded on the grounds that they were too often absent and lived too far from the capital.

Abahai also sought to attract non-Chinese people into his burgeoning empire. Accordingly, he created in 1638 the Li Fan Yuan (board of colonial affairs), which would oversee the management of relations between Manchus and those Mongolians who submitted to the Qing. Eventually, the board’s purview came to include Tibetans and Uighurs as well. Although not personally given to religious beliefs, Abahai sponspored Lamaism, the form of Buddhism prevalent among the Mongolians and Tibetans, and established an excellent relationship with the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. Understanding the value of symbolism, he secured the great seal of the Mongol khan and began to style himself as the successor of Genghis Khan. The seal accorded Abahai enormous prestige in inner Asia and enhanced his potential claim to China.

A masterful politician and an insightful statesman, Abahai was also capable of great personal courage and strategic brilliance on the battlefield. Immediately after his ascendancy to the Later Jin throne, he had embarked on a program to defeat or at least neutralize his father’s Chinese nemesis, General Yuan Chung Huan. Failing to achieve the former goal, Abahai moved, in November, 1629, through the territory of the Karacin and Tumed Mongolians, around Yuan’s forces, and into China proper through the Xifeng (Hsi-feng) and Kupei Passes. Yuan was forced to hurry his troops to Beijing to defend against the invaders, who were at the capital’s gates. Yuan’s success in driving off the enemy did not mitigate his failure to have prevented the invasion in the first place, and the Ming court ordered him arrested and dismembered. Among the reasons for the Chinese general’s demise were the rumors, planted by Abahai’s spies, that Yuan was planning to defect to the Manchus.

With his Chinese adversary removed, Abahai began, in the fall of 1631, an attack upon the heavily fortified garrison complex at Daling He (Ta-ling Ho). During the complicated siege, Abahai himself led a contingent of about two hundred men and successfully routed a rescue army of seven thousand. In the end, Abahai’s diplomacy and military skill secured the Chinese commander’s surrender. Subsequently, many of Abahai’s military maneuvers in China proper were actually designed and executed by Chinese officers in the service of the Manchus.

From 1631 to 1636, in addition to successful forays into China, Abahai’s forces succeeded in subjugating the Chahar Mongolians and gained valuable horse-breeding grounds. During the closing days of 1638, the Qing emperor personally led an army into Korea and within one month secured the submission of the Korean king. In subsequent years, most of northeast Asia fell under Manchu control.

On March 18, 1642, the Manchus captured Song Shan and, shortly thereafter, Jinzhou, two strategic Chinese towns. With these victories, the fall of Beijing and the Ming Dynasty seemed inevitable. The first emperor of the Qing Dynasty, however, did not live long enough to see this transpire. On September 21, 1643, Abahai died of natural causes at Shengjing. His brother Dorgon would complete the conquest of the Ming, and his oldest son, Fulin, would become the Shunzhi emperor, the first emperor of the unified Qing Dynasty.

Significance

Abahai was a rare man in the annals of history. Skillful at the politics of survival, he was equally at home on the battlefield. In the ultimate analysis, however, his genius lay in attracting capable men, earning and maintaining their loyalty, and effecting the best of their suggestions into policy. In these matters, he was even more successful than his father, Nurhaci. Not since Genghis Khan had there been such a talented leader in the steppes of northeast Asia. Though perhaps lacking the overall military genius of Genghis, Abahai was particularly strong in areas where even the “khan of khans” had been lacking. Abahai was an educated man who valued the lessons of history and had a sense of the future that bordered on prescience.

Having used Chinese advisers and military men to his advantage, Abahai nevertheless determined to keep the Manchus racially and culturally distinct from the Chinese. He repeatedly exhorted his Manchu followers to read the history of the Jin and learn from their earlier mistakes. His decision to forbid further use of the terms Juchen or Chien-chou may have been an effort to disavow the assimilation and political demise of his ancestors. Abahai predicted that the ultimate penalty for Sinicization would be the disappearance of the Manchus as a people. Having essentially guaranteed the Manchu conquest of China, he perhaps foresaw that his people might someday vanish. In a sense, the life of Abahai, as it relates to the history of the Manchus, constitutes an epilogue to a classical tragedy. Destined to create an empire that included China, the Manchus were also destined to fulfill Abahai’s ominous prophesy and disappear as a people.

Bibliography

Crossley, Pamela Kyle. The Manchus. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002. A history of the Manchu people, including information about Nurhaci and succeeding members of the Qing Dynasty.

Hummel, Arthur W., ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, 1644-1912. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-1944. Volume 1 contains an excellent biography of Abahai.

Kessler, Lawrence D. K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 1661-1684. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Although concentrating on the achievements of Abahai’s grandson, the Kangxi emperor, the author provides an analysis of the administrative beginnings of the Qing under Abahai’s direction.

Michael, Franz. The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942. Reprint. New York: Octagon Books, 1965. A somewhat controversial but still incisive discussion of the frontier state and the processes undertaken by Nurhaci and Abahai to prepare for the conquest of China.

Oxnam, Robert B. Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. In searching for the origins of the concept of regency and the nature of Oboi’s policies, the author devotes considerable attention to Abahai.

Peterson, Willard J. The Ching Empire to 1809. Vol. 9 in The Cambridge History of China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Covers political, social, military, and economic developments in China from 1644 to 1809.

Roth, Gertraude. “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618-1636.” In From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China, edited by Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. This chapter explores the role of Chinese advisers in Abahai’s consolidation of power and his establishment of the Qing.

Struve, Lynn A., ed. and trans. Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tigers’ Jaws. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993. Personal accounts of Chinese life from the waning years of the Ming Dynasty through the Manchu takeover and eventual Qing rule.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China. 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. This work is destined to be a classic in the study of Chinese history. Wakeman presents a comprehensive study of the Manchu conquest and rule over China. Volume 1 devotes much attention to Abahai’s political and military activities.