Great Britain Withdraws from the Concert of Europe
Great Britain's withdrawal from the Concert of Europe marked a significant shift in European diplomacy during the early 19th century. The Concert was established to maintain peace and political stability among the great powers following the Napoleonic Wars, with Great Britain initially seeking to uphold a balance of power and prioritize nonintervention in continental affairs. However, tensions arose between Britain and Russia, particularly highlighted during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and subsequent events involving liberal revolts in Spain and Naples.
Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, resisted Russian interventionist attempts and advocated for diplomatic solutions over military involvement. His successor, George Canning, maintained a noninterventionist stance but shifted British foreign policy towards prioritizing national interests over collective agreements. When the Congress of Verona convened in 1822, Britain publicly opposed the interventionist agenda, leading to its formal withdrawal from the Concert. This decision significantly weakened the Concert's cohesion, especially among Western European nations, causing a turn towards more reactionary policies among the remaining powers and diminishing the collaborative diplomatic efforts that had characterized the post-Napoleonic order. Ultimately, Britain's exit represented a pivotal moment in international relations, steering the country towards a more isolationist approach while reshaping the dynamics of European power.
Great Britain Withdraws from the Concert of Europe
Date October 20-30, 1822
Great Britain’s withdrawal from the Concert of Europe—the diplomatic, political, and military cooperation between European powers—weakened the use of collective diplomacy by the great powers to settle disputes and maintain peace without appealing to collective military intervention.
Also known as Congress of Verona
Locale Verona, Italy
Key Figures
Henry Brougham (1778-1868), Whig leader of the opposition in Great Britain’s House of CommonsViscount Castlereagh (Robert Stewart; 1769-1822), British foreign secretary and leader of the House of Commons until August 12, 1822George Canning (1770-1827), Castlereagh’s successor as British foreign secretary and leader of the House of Commons, 1822-1827François-René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), French representative at the Congress of VeronaSecond Earl of Liverpool (Robert Banks Jenkinson; 1770-1828), Tory prime minister of Great Britain, 1812-1827Metternich (1773-1859), Austrian foreign affairs ministerDuc de Montmorency-Laval (1766-1826 ), French foreign minister who represented France at the Congress of VeronaDuke of Wellington (Arthur Wellesley; 1769-1852), Brtish representative at the Congress of Verona
Summary of Event
The difference of viewpoint between Great Britain and Russia that eventually split the Concert of Europe was even evident at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. There, Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, successfully resisted attempts by Czar Alexander I to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. Castlereagh had taken the position that the Quadruple Alliance had been formed to prevent Napoleon I from returning to the throne of France, to guarantee international boundaries, and to preserve European peace. He did concede that Austria had a special right to intervene in Italy and Germany because they were Austrian spheres of influence.
Beyond his concession, however, Castlereagh probably believed that nonintervention best served British interests; he conjectured that intervention would only stir up nationalism, and that the British parliament would not back any interventionist plans. When Alexander proposed the Holy Alliance, a list of idealistic promises based on goodwill and Christian principle, Castlereagh refused to sign for Great Britain. Instead, he dismissed that alliance as “a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense.”
Castlereagh departed from the traditional British “balance of power” concept and took a more widely international view. He saw maintenance of a political equilibrium in Europe as essential to preserving the peace and maintaining British interests. He hoped that a series of congresses would lead to peaceful settlements of disputes and that Great Britain could serve in a conciliatory role, but basically, Castlereagh preferred to follow a policy of nonintervention in continental affairs unless peace demanded it. The only justification for such collective intervention was a revived military threat from France. Anything less could be handled through diplomatic channels at regular congresses.
Many British people did not agree with Castlereagh’s policy of cooperation with the continental powers. It was difficult to convince the British public of the necessity for an active foreign policy, characterized by high taxes and continued military expenditures, during peacetime. The reactionary attitudes of Austria and Russia were not popular in Great Britain, especially when Liberalism began to revive after 1820. The Whigs argued for the balance of power concepts, as did some of the Tories. The Liberals thought that Britain should oppose the suppression of continental Liberals by repressive monarchs.
In 1820 the inherent contradictions between British and Russian policies became clearer because of liberal revolts in Spain and Naples. The Spanish Revolution of 1820 came first, but a crisis was avoided when Metternich agreed with the arguments of Castlereagh and the duke of Wellington against the joint intervention that Alexander I sought. The subsequent revolt in Naples, however, created a more serious problem. Alexander I was so alarmed that he completely gave up his liberal tendencies. Metternich was also concerned with the threat to Austrian hegemony in Italy, and decided that he needed Alexander’s support. Prussia as usual followed Austria’s lead. A distinctly reactionary and interventionist turn had been given to the Concert of Europe.
A conference called to discuss the Italian problem met at Troppau on October 29, 1820. Austria, Russia, and Prussia attended, while Great Britain and France only sent observers without power to act. This action by the British represented a partial break in the Concert of Europe. On November 19, Alexander I persuaded the delegates to write the Troppau Protocol, which justified interference in the internal affairs of other nations to prevent revolutions.
In response to the Troppau Protocol, Castlereagh circulated a strong protest to concert members, which, while admitting Austria’s right to intervene in Italy because of its hegemony, objected to military intervention in internal affairs by the Concert of Europe as a group.
Some attempts were made by Metternich to conciliate Castlereagh when they met in Hanover in the autumn of 1821. Metternich supported Castlereagh’s policy of opposing Russian intervention on behalf of the Greeks in revolt against Turkey, and Castlereagh agreed to send a representative to the congresses at Vienna and Verona the next year. Difficulties centered on the continuing Spanish unrest and the Latin American revolt against Spain. Castlereagh committed suicide on August 12, 1822, however, and was succeeded as foreign secretary by George Canning.
Like Castlereagh, Canning favored nonintervention, but unlike Castlereagh, he had not been involved in creating the peace. He did not see the value of the Concert of Europe and believed that British interests often lay with revolution rather than legitimacy. Canning maintained that British national interests, not any international considerations, should guide British foreign policy. The duke of Wellington was sent as the British representative to the Congress of Verona. With him, he carried a memorandum, drawn up by Castlereagh before his death, which stated that Great Britain would prefer “rigid abstinence” from internal interference in Spain. He also carried a protest against the Russian closing of the Bering Sea. Noninterference was also to be the British policy in Greece and Latin America .
The Congress of Verona opened on October 20, 1822, and it became absorbed in the Spanish problem, which had grown acute. The extreme liberals were in power in Spain and King Ferdinand VII was virtually their prisoner. The continental powers (Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France), prodded by Czar Alexander, agreed to intervene in Spain to restore the king to power. Represented by its foreign minister, duc de Montmorency-Laval, and François-René de Chateaubriand, France argued successfully to be allowed to restore royal power in Spain. The other continental powers—Russia, Austria, and Prussia—agreed to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain as a form of moral persuasion and support of France.
When the British prime minister, the second earl of Liverpool, and the Tory cabinet heard of this agreement, they ordered Wellington to announce to the congress on October 30 that Great Britain refused to be a party to the intervention and refused to withdraw its ambassador from Madrid. This statement was tantamount to withdrawing from the Concert of Europe because it put Britain in clear and public opposition to the policies of the Concert of Europe. This move, supported by Whig opposition leader Henry Brougham and his followers, was popular in England because Great Britain feared French Bourbon ambitions and the reconquest of the Spanish colonies in America.
Significance
Britain’s withdrawal from the Concert of Europe was important as a significant diplomatic shift away from international cooperation and closer to the more nationalistic British foreign policy of maintaining the balance of power in “splendid isolation.” At the time, it was as much a shift in style, since Canning continued cooperation with Austria and supported the concert in condemning the Greek revolt. Canning did not, however, endorse intervention in Spain.
The withdrawal of Great Britain weakened the Concert of Europe considerably, especially in western Europe. Deprived of the influence of its most liberal member, the eastern members of the concert followed a more reactionary and interventionist policy. Congresses did meet occasionally after the Congress of Verona to settle such important questions as the Greek and Belgian revolts, but the congress idea had received a mortal blow. British withdrawal from the Concert of Europe ultimately represented a diplomatic revolution.
Bibliography
Clarke, John. British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1782-1865: The National Interest. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Surveys the role of domestic politics in shaping foreign policy and diplomacy in a period of growing professionalism.
Elrod, Richard. “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System.” World Politics 28 (January, 1976): 159-174. Sees the Concert of Europe as crucial to maintaining European security and stability, and downplays the significance of British withdrawal.
Hinde, Wendy. Castlereagh. London: Collins, 1981. A clear biography with a good discussion of the withdrawal from the Concert of Europe.
Palmer, Alan W. Metternich. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. An excellent English-language biography of the Austrian statesman.
Schroeder, Paul W. “The Nineteenth-Century International System: Changes in the Structure.” World Politics 39 (October, 1986): 1-26.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?” Review of International Studies 15 (April, 1989): 135-154. Two articles that connect European stability to the success of the Concert of Europe, with diplomacy by conference and political equilibrium replacing balance of power.
Temperley, Harold W. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Holy Alliance, and the New World. London: Frank Cass, 1966. Although dated (it was originally published in 1924), Temperley’s work remains the fullest account of Canning’s policies.
Webster, Charles K. The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822. 2d ed. London: Bell, 1963. Standard analysis of Castlereagh’s policies and achievements. Less sound on Metternich’s contributions.