Somalia conflict

The Event The U.S. military plays a role in a volatile African nation

Date 1992-1994

In one of the first post-Cold War operations involving U.S. military forces, a humanitarian mission changed into an unsuccessful effort to stem violence among rival factions.

After years of war with Ethiopia followed by civil war in his own nation, Somalia’s longtime military ruler fled the country in January, 1991. Without a central government, the nation was controlled by guerrilla groups who continued to fight with one another. Over the next two years, Somalia experienced both a devastating famine and the effects of African’s worst drought in a century. As many as 300,000 Somalis died during this period. These conditions led to the first of three U.N. operations. From April to December, 1992, the United Nations sought to broker a cease-fire among competing factions as well as to provide humanitarian relief. Fighting intensified, however, and six U.N. military personnel were killed. In December, 1992, the United Nations accepted a United States proposal to establish a multinational force under its own leadership. This U.N.-sanctioned operation, composed of twenty-four nations, was begun while George H. W. Bush was president and persisted after the inauguration of Bill Clinton as chief executive. In March, 1993, the U.N. Security Council approved a third operation in Somalia, which included participation from thirty-seven nations and 28,000 troops. The objectives of this operation were to facilitate humanitarian assistance, disarm rebels, establish stability, and assist in the creation of a new government.

After the murder of twenty-four Pakistani troops by Somali militia members in June, 1993, U.S. forces actively sought the capture of rebel warlords, particularly Mohammed Farrah Aidid. Aidid and his allies opposed the United Nations’ intervention and sought to derail both humanitarian and nation-building assistance. The Americans issued a $25,000 warrant for Aidid’s arrest. Several attacks against rebel forces were carried out between June and October, 1993. A July, 2003, combat operation killed seventy-three clan elders loyal to Aidid.

Battle of Mogadishu

In August, 1993, the United States deployed Task Force Ranger in Somalia, a combination of Delta and Ranger troops who could conduct operations without U.N. control. This change in strategy was approved by President Clinton and supported by members of his administration. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger forces attempted to capture Aidid associates. The plan was to deploy troops from helicopters in the capital city of Mogadishu, find and capture the targets, and transport them to the U.S. base.

A series of missteps, however, led to the downing of two Black Hawk helicopters and the trapping of American troops who sought to rescue the pilots. After a day-long battle against a combination of Aidid forces and local civilians, eighteen U.S. troops were killed, seventy-three were injured, and one Black Hawk pilot was taken hostage but later released. A relief convoy of U.N. troops from Pakistan and Malaysia helped to rescue American troops, though one of its personnel was killed and nine were injured. It is estimated that a thousand militiamen and Somali civilians were killed in the battle. Following the battle, local citizens dragged American casualties through the streets of Mogadishu. On October 6, 1993, a mortar struck the U.S. base, killing one American soldier and injuring twelve more.

Impact

When American television broadcast the pictures of dead U.S. soldiers being abused by Somalis, support for the mission quickly diminished. As a result of a national security review session held on October 6, 1993, President Clinton announced several responses to the recent events. First, the acting chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was ordered to stop all actions by American forces against Aidid except in cases of self-defense. Second, Ambassador Robert Oakley was reappointed as special envoy to Somalia. Third, all U.S. forces were to be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. The fallout from the disastrous Mogadishu battle led to the resignation of Defense Secretary Les Aspin and sidetracked the career of Major General William Garrison, who as Task Force Ranger commander took the blame for the debacle. Congressional and military investigations of the fateful Mogadishu battle uncovered several mistakes made by American forces. These blunders included attacking during daylight rather than at night, not carrying needed equipment, animosity between Delta and Ranger units leading to poor coordination, flawed intelligence, and underestimation of enemy capabilities.

In March, 1994, President Clinton signed a directive that required that American participation in peacekeeping operations be contingent on the threat to international security and on whether such assistance directly serves American interests. Reluctance to the use of military ground forces in foreign crises helps explain the U.S. response to subsequent events during the Clinton presidency, including the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Bosnian Serb army operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and Yugoslav army attacks against the province of Kosovo in 1999.

Subsequent Events

The third U.N. operation in Somalia ended in March, 1995. It took another nine years for Somalia to form a transitional government. In June, 2006, an Islamist militia took over Mogadishu, though the capital was recaptured by transitional government forces in December, 2006. In February, 2007, the U.N. Security Council authorized an African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia. However, efforts at reconciliation between rival groups have proven futile to date.

Bibliography

Allison, William Thomas, Jeffrey Grey, and Janet G. Valentine. American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2007. This text contains a section on Somalia as part of a discussion of peacekeeping and nation-building.

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. This detailed narrative of the Mogadishu battle inspired the 2001 film of the same name.

Doughty, Robert A., et al. American Military History and the Evolution of Warfare in the Western World. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1996. A section on the Somalia mission is included in a chapter on post-Cold War interventions.

Stevenson, Jonathan. Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Stevenson, a journalist, covered events in Somalia for several newspapers and magazines. Two years before the publication of this book, he published an article in Foreign Policy that traced events in the besieged country until just before the Mogadishu battle.

Stewart, Richard W. The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003. One of several military-based studies of the Somalia operation.