Analysis: Letters on Peace with Great Britain

Date: 1783

Author: Adams, John; Franklin, Benjamin; Jay, John

Genre: letters; political correspondence

Summary Overview

In these letters to Chancellor Robert Livingston a fellow member of the former Continental Congress, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay explain several components of the ongoing peace negotiations between Great Britain and America. Topics of discussion include postwar land boundaries, treatment of British loyalists—or Tories—still residing within American territory, commerce agreements, and deference to the king of France. More importantly, the authors articulate an image of the new nation that not only underscores its autonomy but also its readiness to position itself as an equal among the European powers, Britain, France, and Spain. Despite a reciprocity agreement signed with Louis XVI of France in 1788 that forbade a separate peace with Britain, Americans maneuvered around the terms of that treaty to work directly with British ministers. In doing so, Americans asserted their political prerogatives and shielded their new country from subservience to France.

Benjamin Franklin

Benjamin Franklin was born on January 17, 1706, in Boston, Massachusetts, to Josiah and Abiah Franklin. Despite his parents’ urging to pursue a career in the clergy, Franklin pursued a different path. For a brief time, he worked at his brother’s print shop. During the 1720s, Franklin mastered the printing trade and published secretly in his brother’s paper under the pseudonym, “Mrs. Silence Dogood.” Franklin left his brother’s shop on bad terms and moved to Philadelphia. By the end of the decade, he had established his own paper, the Pennsylvania Gazette. On September 1, 1730, Franklin entered into a common-law marriage with Deborah Read, a woman with whom he had two children.

Franklin published under various pseudonyms and enjoyed great popularity, especially with Poor Richard’s Almanac, a project that lasted from 1733 to 1758. In addition to being an accomplished writer, Franklin developed an interest for scientific and philanthropic projects. Known in France as the “man who tamed lightning,” Franklin also helped fund public works, including the University of Pennsylvania and a public library in Philadelphia.

During the War for Independence, Franklin most notably served as ambassador to France and helped negotiate the 1778 treaty between America and King Louis XVI. As the war reached its conclusion, Franklin retained a central role in diplomatic affairs and, with the help of Adams and Jay, ensured Americans received recognition from Britain as an autonomous nation. Benjamin Franklin died on April 17, 1790. His death was mourned by both Americans and the French, with whom he had spent several years.

John Jay

John Jay, son of Peter and Mary Jay, was born in New York City on December 12, 1745, to a prosperous merchant family. He descended from French Huguenots who fled France after Louis XIV rescinded the Edict of Nantes, a law which stipulated limited tolerance for French Protestants. As the son of a prominent member of New York, Jay received an extensive education, his parents having hired private tutors. When Jay was fifteen, he went to King’s College (now Columbia University), entering the legal profession after graduating. In April 1774, Jay married Sarah Livingston, a member of the New Jersey elite. They had six children.

Jay was a conservative who served on both the First and Second Continental Congresses. During the revolution, he went to Spain to try and secure funding and Spanish recognition of America’s independence. Though Spain eventually entered the war against Britain, Jay never obtained their recognition. In mid-1782, Jay traveled to Paris where he aided John Adams and Benjamin Franklin in negotiating the Treaty of Paris. After the revolution, Jay served his country in a variety of ways. He first became Secretary of Foreign Affairs, advocated a strong central government in the Federalist Papers, became the Chief Justice on the United States Supreme Court, negotiated a treaty with Britain in 1795, and later served as governor of New York. He died on May 17, 1829, in Bedford, New York.

Document Analysis

The commissioners’ letters to Robert Livingston illustrate the difficulties that American diplomats faced when negotiating a treaty with Great Britain as a result of their alliance with France. Letters during the eighteenth century were not always meant for private consumption. Although the letter, written from Passy, a residence in Paris, France, was directed to Livingston, the authors intended for its message to be delivered to Congress as well.

The treaty with France stipulated that both parties should provide full exposure of the peace discussions with Great Britain. Despite their feelings of amity toward Louis XVI and the financial and material support granted by the French, the commissioners recognized the danger in becoming too reliant on their ally. Moreover, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay expressed overt suspicion concerning Spanish territorial goals in North America. As a result, the commissioners carried out secret negotiations with Great Britain in 1782 to settle the geographical boundaries of America, make arrangements for loyalists still residing in America, and stipulate terms for repayment of debts owed to British lenders. These “quid pro quo” settlements, as the commissioners euphemistically called them in their missive to Livingston, would allow Americans to navigate toward friendlier and economically advantageous relations with Great Britain in the following years. More importantly, the secret negotiations reflected a sense of urgency by the diplomats to assert American sovereignty in determining the terms of independence and recognition.

As the document demonstrates, Robert Livingston, the US Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1781 to 1783, addressed two letters to the commissioners, one on March 25 and one on April 21. In the letters, Livingston expressed his displeasure at having learned of the secret negotiations undertaken by the three men. He alluded to America’s 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France. Article VIII indicated that “Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace, with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtained.” Instructions sent by Congress reaffirmed this article and charged the commissioners to make all negotiations with the British diplomats known to the French king. Livingston recognized America’s indebtedness to France’s generosity. Moreover, he and members in Congress faced daily pressure from the French ambassador. Explaining that “honesty was the best policy,” Livingston asked for a recapitulation of the commissioners’ actions.

The commissioners’ response to Livingston is somewhat problematic. It reflects the germination of obstacles to the Franco-American alliance. Yet, it was with uneasiness that the diplomats negotiated separately from their allies. From 1776 to 1785, Benjamin Franklin served as ambassador to France and integrated himself thoroughly into several elite circles. Initially, Franklin opposed secret negotiations, but later yielded to Adams and Jay on the matter. Writing back to Livingston, they remarked that if their actions had insulted France, it would “give us great pain.”

The defensive strategies used by Adams, Franklin, and Jay in their missive reveal some nuances of eighteenth-century diplomacy. Despite being charged with undermining the defensive alliance with France, the diplomats countered by depicting the secret negotiations as advantageous to the French. Although not conforming to Livingston’s rules of diplomatic “propriety,” they assured him that the Compte de Vergennes, the French minister, had “more reason to be pleased than displeased with [their] silence.” Put simply, they asserted that their separate discussions and subsequent reticence helped France avoid delay in forming her own treaty with Britain. More importantly, the American diplomats underscored another vital theme—the notion that national interests and needs trumped alliances. Although the diplomats wanted to keep the “separate Article” about the Floridas “secret for the present,” they maintained that “France had not the smallest interest” in the matter. The negotiations, they argued, were inconsequential and benign to France’s interests. The commissioners’ strong attitudes toward the Spanish underscore another layer of tension that occurred during the peace negotiations. Spain had entered the war under the Family Compact with France. The Treaty of Aranjuez (1801) outlined Spain’s role in the conflict against Britain, which made no reference to America’s independence. Rather, their aims involved controlling the Mississippi River, ceding Gibraltar, and gaining Minorca and the Floridas. More covertly, they wished to limit the geographic expanse of America. For the duration of the war, Spain—itself a monarchy and not wanting to fan enthusiasm for republicanism—refused to recognize the independence of Americans. The commissioners writing to Livingston witnessed these animosities, according to their letter, and argued that Spain “extended her pretensions and claims of dominion, not only over the tract in question but over the vast region lying between the Floridas and Lake Superior.” They explained that “[t]he negotiations between Spain, France, and Britain were then in full vigor, and embarrassed by a variety of clashing demands.” Put simply, the diplomats explained to Congress that in order for America’s demands to be met, it was necessary to prevent Spain from learning of their work. That France was tied to Spain in a separate treaty muddled Franco-American relations even further. Had France known of the American acquiescence to Britain over the Floridas, they asserted, they would have felt it necessary to share the information with Spain and even further complicate negotiations.

Adams, Franklin, and Jay also recognized and accepted that the individual interests of nations could undermine treaties. Prior to Yorktown, each “belligerent” party in 1781 looked to settle the dispute diplomatically. The cost to each nation in men and money had dampened morale and their respective economies. France, a party in two treaties, was especially vulnerable to a protracted war. They had agreed to remain in the conflict until America received recognition from Britain as a separate nation and until Spain obtained Gibraltar. The diplomats observed that while the French Minister appeared as “our friend,” his primary objective remained to “promot[e] the power, riches, and glory of France.” Adams and the others sought to do the same, naturally. Against the interests of Spain, they advised Britain against relinquishing areas surrounding the Mississippi River to the Spanish, as it would impact their trade. Despite America’s urging, Britain eventually did abandon the mouth of the Mississippi and the Floridas to Spain.

Land comprised a large portion of the secret negotiations with Britain. American commissioners did not seek access to the entire North American continent. Much of what is America today was purchased in 1803 as part of the Louisiana Purchase. The Mexican-American War from 1846 to 1848 extended America’s boundaries further. Comparatively, in 1783, delegates sought to “extend as far down towards the mouth of the Mississippi” because of the “natural fertility and position” of the land. They denied Britain’s claims to “extend the bounds . . . of West Florida, up to the Yazoo River.” Moreover, they successfully renegotiated the ownership of the eastern shores of the Mississippi River despite the British delegate’s verbose explanation about “the ancient bounds of Canada, Louisiana, &c.” To Livingston, they explained that “the surest way to reconcile and obtain both objects would be a composition beneficial to both parties.” The map of America at the end of the war reflects the successful maneuvering of the American delegates in refusing British geographic claims. By 1783, Georgia extended to the eastern shore of the Mississippi River and south toward the Gulf of Mexico. However, Spain and Georgia claimed some of the same territory.

The letter to Livingston also alludes to some of the strategies for dealing with colonists who had remained loyal to Britain during the war. Large pockets of loyalists resided in areas of New York, including the borough of Queens in New York City, which was under British control for much of the war. Southern loyalists, for instance, adhered to strong political maxims that situated the monarch at the forefront of the social and religious hierarchy. During the revolution, states articulated treason laws. Essentially, treason was defined as assisting the enemy, in this case, Great Britain. Treason was punishable by property confiscation, exile, or death. In the 1770s and 1780s, revolutionaries used the term “tories” to allude to loyalists. The moniker was replete with negative connotations. Great Britain had depended heavily on loyalist factions in New York and colonies in the south to fight the revolutionaries. At the closure of the war, loyalists were left without property and branded as traitors. The commissioners worked with Britain to develop a plan for allowing loyalists to leave America. Mr. Hartley, a British commissioner, assured the diplomats that “positive orders for the evacuation of New York have been dispatched, and that no avoidable delay will retard that event.” The British delegate also desired portions of southern land to remain under British control to facilitate a “convenient retreat to the tories.” The sixth article articulated that America should cease confiscating property of loyal British subjects. Yet, Britain enunciated a deference to and preference for British subjects and refugees, hoping to preserve the property of absentee landowners.

Another central component to the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris involved debt owed to British lenders. Naturally, Britain was eager to recoup these funds. In the eighteenth century, Britain followed a mercantilist policy which emphasized trade regulations both internally and externally. American debts represented a long-established economic relationship whereby Britain controlled the distribution of American goods. Though Americans disliked Article Four of the treaty, as represented by the delegates’ offer to Livingston to “propose an Article . . . postponing the payment of British debts for the time,” it was nevertheless imperative in order to make room for future trade agreements between the two countries. In 1776, Adam Smith published a tract, abbreviated as The Wealth of Nations, which instigated a break from traditional mercantilism by calling for free trade. British merchant Richard Oswald (who was an emissary for the signing of the Treaty of Paris), mentioned in the letter by Adams, Franklin, and Jay, recognized the economic opportunities in trading with Americans. In his journal, he recounted these sentiments, rationalizing that because of the vast amount of open land, Americans would focus on production, leaving opportunities for British manufacturing. Seeing that future commercial exchanges were inevitable, the delegates proposed a “future special treaty, to be made either in America or Europe.”

Collectively, the concerns set out by Adams, Franklin, and Jay culminated in a desire to assert American autonomy from both their allies and former king. Although the revolutionaries depended on French assistance, their letter reflects uneasiness at acquiescing control over the peace proceedings to France. Put simply, they did not want to trade obeisance from a constitutional monarchy to an absolute monarchy. By initiating and constructing a provisional treaty with Great Britain, the delegates positioned themselves on equal footing with Vergennes and Oswald. They demonstrated to Great Britain that the newly formed nation would not be a puppet to France, subservient to their needs. Instead, they articulated that “Since we have assumed a place in the political system of the world, let us move like a primary and not a secondary planet.” In addition to this show of American nationalism, the delegates countered Livingston’s admonitions of dishonesty, exclaiming that, unlike France who clamored for “riches,” they had not “sacrifice[ed] our faith, our gratitude, or our honor, to any considerations of convenience.” Rather, they worked according to “the dignity and independent spirit, which should always characterize a free and generous people.” The delegates drew an invisible line between what benefited America and their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance. They contended that it was not their “duty” to be forthright or offer “flimsy excuses” to France regarding their discussions with Britain. Though indebted to France for her assistance, the delegates skillfully acknowledged the diplomatic need to assert autonomy from all parties involved in negotiations.

Bibliography

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